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Summary of Thesis. 
The Poetics of Impurity: 
Louis MacNeice, Writing and the Thirties. 
This thesis argues that the notion of 'impurity' may be taken as a model for paradigms 
in MacNeice's texts which are subjected to undercutting and transgression, by virtue of 
their presumed identity, their context, and by the workings of the text. This impurity 
challenges notions of MacNeice as an exponent of 'common-sense' empiricism. 
Chapter One examines notions of purity and impurity as promoted by MacNeice 
in the thirties. MacNeice's exposition in Modern Poetry is shown to be contradictory. 
Comparison with the figure of Orwell indicates that Modern Poetry, and its promotion of 
common-sense 'experience' or 'life', is an unreliable guide to MacNeice's thirties work. 
Chapter Two examines notions of 'History' in the thirties, and of MacNeice's 
treatment of time in a number of poems. MacNeice's poems demonstrate a conception 
of time-as-difference, which is shown to be historically constructed within 'static' or 
'imaginary' frames of reference. These frames of reference are seen to be imperiled by 
historical circumstances 
Chapter Three analyses MacNeice's presentation of representation in, and of, 
society in the thirties. Attention is paid to poems dealing with problems of 
representation and of observation within a given social context, particularly that of 
consumer culture. 
Chapter Four examines MacNeice's examination of the subject or 'I' of the 
thirties. I argue that MacNeice evidences a scepticism towards the claims of the 
thinking, acting, subject, inhabited as it is by the dominance of text or 'writing' within 
history, and the indeterminacies this engenders. 
Chapter Five offers a reading of Autumn Journal which emphasises MacNeice's 
attention to the processes of the construction of 'unreliable' fictions. Rather than 
asserting the values of liberal humanism in the poem, it is seen to question the 
implications of such an act itself. The poem is shown to question the notion of the 
possibility of the 'honesty' of the subject which is often attributed to MacNeice. 
Chapter Six argues for the necessity of further re-examination of 'Louis 
MacNeice, writing and the thirties' and the wider implications of 'impurity'. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Impurity and the Thirties. 
'My generation was brought up to regard luxury from an aesthetic 
standpoint. Since the War, people don't seem to feel that any more. 
Too often they are merely gross. They take their pleasures coarsely, 
*don't you find? At times, 'one feels guilty, oneself, with so much 
unemployment and distress everywhere'. 
Christopher Isherwoodl 
'Oh I do hope they'll make a revolutionl' Isabel exclaimed. 'I should 
delight in seeing a revolution. ' 'Let me see, ' said her uncle, with 
humorous intention; 'I forget whether you're on the side of the old or on 
the side of the new. I've heard you take such opposite views. ' 
'I'm on the side of both. I guess I'm a little on the side of everything. In 
a revolution ... I think I should be a high, proud 
loyalist. One sympathizes 
more with them, and they've a chance to behave so exquisitely. I mean 
so picturesquely. ' 
Henry JameS2 
4 
My friends had been writing for years about guns and frontiers and 
factories, about the 'facts' of psychology, politics, science, economics, 
but the fact of war made their writing seem as remote as the pleasure 
dome in Xanadu. For war spares neither the poetry of Xanadu nor the 
poetry of pylons... both these kinds of poetry stand or fall together. 
Louis MacNeice3 
2 
In 1938 Louis MacNeice made, a plea for impure poetry, that is, for poetry conditioned 
by the poet's life and the world around him'. 4. This study seeks to analyse the 
implications of such a declaration, its consequences for the reading of MacNeice's texts, 
and for the assessment of his response to the thirties. In particular, it will examine how 
different notions of 'impurity' can be found in, and applied to, MacNeice's work. As a 
consequence, it will examine how different meanings can be assigned to the notion of 
'writing', and how this may modify our sense of, the literature of the thirties. ,I 
---,. Perhaps the most obvious meaning which is suggested by 'a poetry conditioned 
by the poet's life and the world around him' is an attitude which distrusts various kinds 
of artifice, style or form in preference to a poetry which is in vivid contact with the real 
via communication or reference. This is a poetry fully informed by the importance of 
experience'; it is relevant, above all, to 'fife'.,, Here, 'purity'- is associated with form, its 
opposite with 'content' and by extension 'the world'. As we shall see, these categories 
of purity and impurity are not as stable as one might think or, perhaps, wish. Moreover, 
this association of the categories of 'purity' and 'form', 'impurity' and 'content' only 
complicates such categories further. In examining these various complications this 
study does not aim to recuperate some notion of 'purity' in the reading of MacNeice's 
texts. In fact it seeks the reverse, in arguing for the continuing importance of the 
category of 'impurity' in an understanding of MacNeice's work of the thirties. However, 
in making this extension I will argue for the importance of aspects of the text which 
might be associated with 'purity' of various kinds, which have been underrated in 
existing studies of MacNeice's work. This project will necessarily involve consideration 
of certain areas which MacNeice is often thought to have ignored or rejected. One 
consequence of this examination, I will argue, is the problematization of a sense of 
impurity as a kind of unmediated formlessness which can be easily equated with raw 
'experience'. Equally, the notion of MacNeice as a writer who unequivocally embraces 
the role of 'ordinary-man-in-the-street', and endorses the perspective of commonsense- 
empiricism will be questioned. Such an identity, I will argue, significantly damages our 
understanding of MacNeice's involvement in the thirties. However, since it is this 
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persona which is most often associated with 'impurity' in MacNeice's work, this is the 
identity with which we will begin our examination. 
Perspectives: Writing the Thirties. 
Perhaps the best way of understanding the various meanings of 'impurity' is through 
what may be meant by 'purity' and its implications for attendant notions of 'artifice', 
'style', or most productively 'form', and their opposites. Immediately, however, we run 
into difficulties, as the following remarks by Christopher Norris indicate: 
Except in the most obvious aspect - the shape of the words on the page 
- it is hard to attach any clear meaning to the idea of poetic 'form'. This 
concept may indeed be a species of enabling fiction, having more to do 
with the interpretative rage for order than with anything objectively 
'there' in the text. Or it may be the product ... of a close 'dialectic 
interplay' between poem and reading, such that the poem takes on a 
precarious unity of form in answer to the subtle teasing-out of unifying 
themes and figures. Criticism would then be caught up in a process of 
aesthetic mystification whereby its own desire for unity and closure was 
ceaselessly confirmed in the act of reading. 5 
To this one should add that the elusive 'idea of poetic form' is itself subject to 
change over literary periods. 'Form' is defined and interpreted differently, awarded 
different degrees of importance, placed within different conceptual oppositions, as it 
figures within different frameworks of reading and writing. It is, perhaps, this 
instability, rather than its status as 'enabling fiction' which must lead always and 
necessarily towards notions of 'unity', 'coherence' and 'closure', as Norris suggests, 
which accounts for the elusive quality of the concept. In beginning our discussion, 
therefore, it is necessary to consider some of the ways in which such a concept was 
seen to operate within the literary context of the thirties. 
It seems almost inevitable that among the many features of the literary text, and 
its production, undergoing mo dification by new British writers in the thirties were ideas 
about literary form. Such changes appear all the more pronounced by the attention 
given to this issue by the period's immediate forbears. Comparing work in the thirties 
with the daring innovations of modernism would indicate that thirties writers began to 
grant 'form' a different status in their writing, moreover that they began to think of it 
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differently, perhaps less adequately., If an important aspect of modernism was a re- 
examination of the possibilities adhering in the formal properties of the text, thirties 
writers became concerned with what seemed to lie 'outside' it. Many concluded, of 
course, that any properly valid text must have a significance beyond the playground of 
the signifier, or what Peter Widdowson has called 'the impact of modernist formal 
experimentation'. 6 Instead, it must allow for the 'strict and adult' conditions of the 
individual sanctioned by involvement in 'the great without' of society, politics, and 
history. 7 This is this sense which informs, for instance, David Lodge's description of a 
thirties 'mode' of writing as 'characteristically, antimodernist, realistic, readerly and 
metonymic'. 8 For Terry Eagleton, too, the concern with what seemed to be the, 
'outside' of literature in the period of 'Auden and Orwell' put 'realism ... firmly back in the 
saddle'. He continues: 'what Marxist criticism England could produce occurred in this 
period following the missed moment of modernism, when the heights of criticism had 
already been largely captured by the political right or liberal centre'. 9 With the thirties, it 
seems, in came history, realism and discursive writing, and out went form. 
But history, literary and otherwise, imposes many kinds of limitations, not all of 
which need be immediately apparent. It can now be suggested that modernism should 
not be read, as it often was, as the last ditch affirmation of bourgeois individualism, but 
the radical disruption and exposure of the assumptions underlying bourgeois ideology. 10 
In their apparent rejection of modernism, therefore, many thirties writers now run the r 
risk of being visited by a literary-historical irony. Should we read the thirties as a period 
in which essentially bourgeois literary conventions were re-settled and re-asserted, we' 
might well be tempted to view vulgar Marxism, realism, cumbersome political allegory, 
quasi-surrealism, as signs of the British bourgeoisie labouring anew to come to terms 
with its own contradictions, and patching itself up in ideological closure. Consequently, 
those writers who hoped to diagnose capitalism's, or western civilization's, crisis may 
now in one sense seem to have been writing against themselves. Any authentic -, 
challenge they hoped to make against this system was timidly contained within the 
ideological conventions that underwrote it. Clearly this analysis assumes - that all 
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thirties writers were blind to the innovations of modernism and its implications.: In 
addition, it assumes that the only effective way of accommodating any socio-political 
reality is that prescribed by modernist writing, high modernist writing at that. Both 
these notions, of course; - can be challenged. The critique, however, is useful if it calls 
into question the validity of the declared aims of the thirties in dismissing modernism in 
favour of 'history' and social consciousness, - and the resultant espousal of an 
unsophisticated approach to this newly self-appointed role. -t :rI, 1ý 
ýj In making this critique, we should be cautious of accepting easy . 'exceptions' to 
the rule. Take Auden, for instance, a central figure of the decade, 'yet often assumed to 
transcend the limitations and excesses of this cultural environment. -. Whatever the 
merits of Auden's texts, they cannot wholly escape the charge of complicity with the 
naiveties of the period,, as the following remarks by Bernard Bergonzi indicam, -, 
At a time of world economic depression there was something re-assuring 
in Auden's calm demonstration, mediated as much by style as by 
content, that reality was intelligible, and could be studied like a map or a 
catalogue, or seen in temporal terms as an inexorable historical process. 
Hence the instant appeal of the classificatory vision, the reliance on 
definite articles and precise if unexpected adjectives, which placed and 
limited their subjects. 11 -cý,, -IIýIý,. ' .I 
Again, whatever the merits of Auden's texts, one could argue that they contributed, 
forcefully to the period's anomalies, in its reading and imitation of these texts. ý This is to 
sketch a cultural phenomenon, suggesting that in writing out of and 'to' his period 
Auden was gravely periodized. And rather than seeing his work as just encouraging a 
view which artificially 'limited! or allowed some comforting but illusory control over the 
historical moment, one could argue that readers and imitators of these texts committed 
themselves to what Walter Benjamin considered the characteristic feature of, in fact, a 
fascist cultural politics: instead of politicizing the aesthetic, they aesthetized the 
political. 12 ý -, e ý, .1-ý -_ - 
Perhaps, however, we can offer a real exception to these difficulties in the figure 
of Louis MacNeice. Here is a writer who overtly eschewed the programmes of high 
modernism, yet always steered clear of wholesale submission to the necessities of the 
period. As Samuel Hynes puts it: 
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Of the poets of his generation, MacNeice was the most isolated, and the 
least political., He was never involved in movements, and. he remained 
outside the political-literary cohorts of the period... Living irl the time 
that he did, he accepted left politics as necessary, but commitment went 
against his nature. 13 
Because of this stealthy avoidance, MacNeice was able to become 'a celebrant of 
ordinary things', a proponent of 'the pleasure of simply living', in which 'his self- 
proclaimed role of common man was a kind of substitute for political commitment, a 
way of being a-political with a good heart' (p. 295). This strategy, one might argue, 
paid off; MacNeice evaded the traps of politically-motivated writing, ý and its naive - 
dismissal of literary form. In its place he presents something much more valuable -a 
celebration of the ordinary, the authentic, the honest. This achievement also stands 
against the obfuscations and obscurities of modernist formalism, providing a middle- 
ground in touch with the richness and complexity of 'life' and 'experience'. -This is all 
the more rich because it is an experience informed by a wider public world of history 
and citizenship, always firmly anchored in the perspective of the empirical subject. 
Moreover, it is always, however painful to the subject and others, honest. 
It is; perhaps; this quality of honesty which lies behind Hynes's coupling of 
MacNeice with Orwell towards the end of his study (p. 367). , In this light Eagleton's 
Auden-Orwell couple might be replaced by MacNeice-Orwell, in a way which pays more 
attention and accords reverence to this redemptive sincerity. This is a sincerity which 
does not depend on the political motivations of a communicative 'realism' but is a 
straightforward empiricism, a lonely truth-telling, grown more valuable with the course 
of the years. Certainly this is a view endorsed by 9, nother commentator on MacNeice: 
He [MacNeicel was not only amused, but, like Orwell, frightened by the- 
surrender of the intellectual to totalitarian habits of mind, to strategic 
imperatives. ' 
MacNeice, like Orwell, honestly faces the difficulty of eliminating 
bourgeois reflexes. 
MacNeice's retrospect on Spain [like Orwell's] fastens on the gap 
between the perceptions of idealistic or prejudiced outsiders and the 
actual complexity of the conflict. 
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Just as Orwell ... sees Spain as a violent reproach to the 'deep sleep' of England, so MacNeice's refrain proclaims the need to wake up, and to 
admit the voice of conscience! * 
To the other affinities he finds between MacNeice and Orwell, Hynes 
might have added outrage at the propagandist violation of language. 
MacNeice frankly acknowledges his class status, Orwell's sine qua non. 
Autumn Journal strikes an Orwellian blow 'for democratic socialism', or 
-at least for the political wing of liberal humanism..! S __ 
These remarks, from Edna Longley's recent work on MacNeice, cast MacNeice as 
prominent poetic equivalent to Orwell. That is, as one who in resisting an imputed 
'surrender of the intellect' to totalitarianism 'honestly faces' the 'actual complexity' of 
'frankly acknowledging' his 'outrage at the propagandist violation' of 'Orwellian 
democratic Socialism. This is a view of MacNeice which I want to challenge. It is not 
the comparison per se that I want to dispute, so much as the sense of MacNeice's 
poems which allow it. This is a sense of MacNeice as a writer embracing and 
promoting, above all, a deeply held empiricism. It is manifested, in the simplest terms, 
through a supposed commitment to 'experience', and its honest description. This 
commitment is assumed to demand a subordination of 'form' or 'textuality' within a 
view of language and the text as a more or less transparent vehicle of a more or less 
unmediated experience. Paradoxically, in arguing for a different view of MacNeice I can 
best begin with a brief analysis of the figure of Orwell, and the limitations to which such 
a figure is subject. 
Honest Louis? MacNeice, Modern Poetry, and 'Aestheticism'. 
In a discussion of George Orwell's experience in the thirties Raymond Williams has 
offered some particularly instructive insights into the problems of writing during the 
period. Williams presents Orwell as a figure expelled from his class by conscience, yet 
still adhering to many of the values inscribed within that class. The task of constructing 
a new social identity 'outside' the dominant ideology is complicated by the absence of 
clearly defined principles for doing so. It is, moreover, complicated by the need to - 
reconcile this new position with the wish to be 'a writer', indeed to use writing as part 
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of this self-definition, together with the necessary consideration of what kind of texts 
such a writer should produce. This last concern is the most interesting for our 
discussion. ,ý .--ý ,'11ý. , ý, "ýj1; .-I-ý 'ý 1, ýIý 
-- :- In Orwell's musings on this new role the issue of 'Aestheticism', Williams 
argues, featured prominently, as the following extract from the retrospective piece 
'Writers and Leviathan' demonstrates: 
The invasion of literature by politics was bound to happen. It must have 
happened ... because we have developed a sort of compunction which our 
grandparents did not have, an awareness of the enormous injustice and 
misery of the world, and a guilt-stricken feeling that one ought to be 
doing something about it,, which makes a purely aesthetic attitude to life 
impossible. 16 
The notion presented in this piece of the 'invasion' by politics into a 'natural' pre- 
political self is sometimes seen as a definitive one among thirties writers, both during 
and after the period. 17 However, the odd thing about this passage, as Williams points 
out, is the assumption that this situation is original: 
Reading Orwell's account quickly, one might never remember the English 
novelists from Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell to George Eliot and Hardy: 
those contemporaries of 'our grandparents' who were indeed aware of 
'the enormous injustice and misery of the world' and who in different 
ways made literature from just this experience. There is nothing 
especially new about social awareness in writers, and indeed in the 
nineteenth century it had been widespread and growing, especially 
among the novelists. (pp. 35-36) 
Williams implies, indeed, that the gap between the 'aesthetic'-and the 'socially aware' 
was not solely the product of the thirties burgeoning social conscience, but had its roots 
in the 'important quarrel between James and Wells - between a composed, pure, 
essentially passive art, and new kinds of projected, committed, essentially purposive 
writing'. Within this 'pure' art, Williams notes disapprovingly: ýo 
Not only was social experience seen as content and literature as form; 
also, and more dangerously, social experience was seen as only general 
and abstract, with the result that the definition of literary content was 
itself narrowed to an emphasis on abstracted 'personal relationships'. (p. 
36) 11-1 11, 
Within this model, literature is removed from the abstract 'content'. of social experience, 
but is not itself entirely 'formal'., Instead it supplies its own kind of content, distinct 
from that of social experience. -This content finds its best expression in the valo, rilzakieFA 
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of asocial 'personal relationships'. This situation, Williams argues, had important 
parallels in Orwell's sense of the writing which preceded the thirties. Orwell identified 
this 'Jamesian' concept of literature as an abnegation of responsibility, even a kind of 
complicity by default. -As Williams puts it: ---IW 
The 'aesthetic attitude towards life' was a displaced consciousness 
relating to one of many possible artistic decisions but above all related to 
a version of society: not an artistic consciousness but a disguised social 
consciousness, in which the real connections and involvements with 
others could be plausibly overlooked and then in effect ratified: a 
definition of 'being a writer' which excluded social experience and social 
concern. (P. 37) 
Williams's identification and discussion of the division between the 'aesthetic' and the 
'purposeful', or the duke versus the Wile, is an acute criticism of the obvious tendency 
for thirties writers to think and write as though this difficult relation between the text 
and social reality existed for their age exclusively. It is as though 'politics' was their 
own discovery, or invention. In fact, Williams's analysis of the problem could be traced 
as least as far back as the preface to the Lyrical Ballads, leading up through Arnold's 
'The Study of Poetry', even allowing, that is, for the particular configuration of the 
problem that Williams finds in the 'James/Wells debate'. 
--- But the perspective should also be narrowed, for if this debate can be seen as 
one such configuration of a larger literary and historical contest, so too can the 
particular problems and analyses of the thirties. Here Orwell's self-enclosed myopia is 
itself significant. One might be tempted to identify the specificity of such problems 
primarily in terms of the particular social pressures that thirties writers encountered: ' the 
General Strike, the Slump, the rise of Hitler, the Spanish Civil war. Although such , 
issues were certainly sometimes agonizingly pressing, such an identification would make 
us subject to a myopia more damaging than thirties writers were ever guilty of. It ---, 
assumes, on the one hand, that the issues generated by such historical conditions (Class 
conflict, Fascism as the last stage of Capitalism, for instance) were such that events like 
the Great War and its two million British dead were relegated to minor historical hiccups, 
which no one really had to worry over too much -a prelude, as it werej to the big 
problems. Modernism, of course, took sharp notice of this occurrence, and thirties 
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writers remained determinedly conscious of it. 18 It also assumes that the precursors to 
thirties writers were of slight interest. This would obscure the propensity of writers like 
Orwell, who lacked a clear sense of literary direction, to define themselves against what 
had gone before. Faced with the need to 'make it new' from a new point of view, , 
'Aestheticism' became an icon or cultural marker, even an argumentative strategy, in the 
hope of defining this sense of direction. Unsure about what precisely was to be done, 
one could at least be comparatively sure about what should not be done, as a means to 
sketching out new projects and values. The paradox of this situation, however, is that 
in their identification, and in the nature of their understanding of certain aspects of 
modernism, some thirties writers had already marked out a position. It was a position 
inhabited by various assumptions and commitments which led inevitably to a -, 
misunderstanding of the project and possibilities of modernism, which in turn limited 
their sense of its importance. 
As indicated, this identification paid close attention to the status given to form, 
also to the precedence granted to language and its relation to experience. Form, it was 
assumed, had been grossly over-valued. The obscure, indulgent, incomprehensible 
preoccupations of what had gone before needed to be replaced by new priorities. To 
return to Williams: 'Language, characteristically, is taken to be an agent rather than a 
source of experience. Or ... content is taken to precede language, and the writer can 
then choose whether to reveal content directly or to work with words for their own 
sake' (p. 30). Thus stated, there cannot be much of a choice. These assumptions find 
their fullest expression in Orwell's egregious 'Politics and the English Language'. 19 In 
'Why I Write' he describes the dangerous aberration in childhood and adolescence from 
Ia mere description of what I was doing and the things I saw' to the risky 'joy of mere 
words, i. e. the sounds and associations of words'. 20 Later he accused certain writers 
of never progressing beyond this indulgence: 'In "cultured" circles art-for-arts-saking 
extended practically to a worship'of the meaningless., Literature was supposed to 
consist solely in the manipulation of words'. 21 An this analysis; any formal innovation, 
or break with the -paradigms of classic realism, is simply a kind of foolish play. 22 We 
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can assume that Orwell saw himself breaking out of these circumstances. In doing so, 
he sought a kind of mimeticism where writing was meaningful because its words were 
pulled out of, and re-submitted to, a social and political context. Words are charged 
with meaning (an unOrwellian sentiment, granted) by the way in which they faithfully 
represent, act in and contribute to this context. 4- 
What Orwell failed to appreciate, however, was the complexity of the relation 
between his writing and this world. i Examining his 'observation' of northern working 
class communities, Williams notes: 
Here the political point is the literary point. What is created in the book 
is an isolated independent observer and the objects of his observation. 
Intermediate characters and experiences which do not form part of this 
world - this structure of feeling - are simply omitted. What is left in is 
'documentary' enough, but the process of selection and organization is a 
literary act: the character of the observer is as real, and yet createdas 
the real and yet created world he so powerfully describes. 
All of Orwell's writing until 1937 is, then, a series of works and 
experiments around a common problem. Instead of dividing them into 
'fiction' and 'documentaries' we should see them as sketches towards 
the creation of his most successful character, 'Orwell'. (p. 52) :, -- 
This 'Orwell' is the 'successful impersonation of the plain man who bumps into 
experience in an unmediated way and is simply telling the truth about it'. 23 Authentic,, 
Common-sensical. - rigourously empirical: the ordinary-man-in-the-street, or in Bolton, or 
Spain, or Burma, or Oceania offering us the truths of an uninspected experience through 
a transparent text; 'Honest George' as he has been dubbed - the real thing. 24 ý The point 
for our discussion is not how Orwell, within his discourse, consciously omits or 
suppresses information in a deliberate attempt to mislead or misinform in his degree-zero 
style. On this score one should say that although Orwell was among the most 
successful, or unsuccessful if you like, - of such writers, he was by no means alone in 
this role during the thirties, and by no means consciously duplicitous, having important 
truths to tell, even though we might now say that such truths could be no more than 
partial. Neither was Orwell exclusively a 'documentary' or 'realist' writer. Instead, we 
should consider the discourse which the character 'Orwell' practised as containing 
inevitable limitations, obfuscations, disguises, of which both writer and reader can be 
unaware. What Williams's comments imply, of course, is that in seeking 
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unproblematically to escape what seemed like the sterile and unproductive space of, 
'mere words' writers like Orwell only led themselves more deeply into the conditions of 
language and of discourses within history. , It's not just that Orwell was so wrong about 
form, but that this led him to be significantly wrong about history, and the problems of 
writing about history., If 'Aestheticism' was a 'displaced consciousness ... above all --4 
related to a version of society' one might venture to say that this kind of social writing, 
with its unintended entrapment in the conditions of language and of the text, was a 
displaced aestheticism. .--, 1,1 11: -ý- _-, I I, * I 
In this account, Orwell seems less an uncompromising maverick of the thirties 
than a writer sharing with others some of the period's worst oversimplifications and 
mystifications. True, he resisted many of the naive political formulas of the period. 
However, in 6ixommitment to this rugged empiricism, precisely that feature which is 
cited as a countermeasure to these formulas, he demonstrates a lack of awareness of 
the conditions of the text which is just as damaging. ý The text, that is to say, infiltrates 
those areas where Orwell assumes it to be all but absent. ", At the same time a fuller , 
knowledge of the activity of the text is withheld, 'because this knowledge lies in an area 
always outside the scope of his investigation, even though it remains crucial to this 
investigation., ,ýI. IýIIýIIII 
-ýý-, Clearly in such a discussion one should be cautious of lumping together writers 
of one period in an attempt to mark out general conditions of literary production. 
However, as Valentine Cunningham has pointed out, a sense of a rigid 'either/or' 
separation between form and content did make a come-back during the thirties: 
- They held more or less conventional and commonsensical views of 
language, and so of texts, as being simply mirrors on to reality. The 
world was antecedent to, and more important than, the word, and words 
had better not stand too much in the light. The plainer, the more 
revelatory the linguistic medium and the more like the most naturalistic 
of nineteenth-century fiction the novel, the better. Eugene Jolas's 
'revolution of the word' was just 'mumbo-jumbo', an irrationalist's 
racket. 25 
Surprisingly, the 'they' that Cunningham describes is not Spender, Auden, Orwell, 
MacNelce. It is orthodox Marxist criticism, rejecting a set of practices which, he notes, 
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can be traced back to Mallarmd and Rimbaud. In many ways Cunningham's work is 
concerned with challenging readings of the thirties which rely on this kind of over- - 
simplification, and which identify it as the characteristic feature of the period. Instead of 
a rigid separation of signifier and signified, text and context, he argues for attention to 
(con)texts within the writing of the period, - where 'all texts and contexts [are] thought of 
as tending to lose their separate identities, collapsing purposefully into each other' (p. 
1). -This contention is supported by the notion that 'a period of history and its literature 
are, like a language. - most realistically to be seen as a sign-system, or set of sign- 
systems, of signifying practices, composing a structural and structured whole' (p. 1). 
This is, without question; an exciting way of reading the thirties, indeed of any literary 
period. However, what it can obscure is the propensity of thirties writers t6accept 
these communal sign-systems during the period without any recognition that they were 
sign-systems. This myopia extends as much to the political mythologies of the thirties 
as it does to the empiricism of Orwell. It is not necessarily that they employed the same 
kind of sign system, but that both remained unaware of their world-view as sign-system. 
This lack of awareness can be gleaned from the fact that the purposeful collapsing of 
form and content for which Cunningham argues, where neither is subordinated to the 
other, is precisely that which Orwell resists. In Orwell's conception of the text and its 
execution 'form' is subordinated to, not mixed in with, content. This subordination as 
van agent of experience' aims at the elimination of form, rather than its exploitation. -A 
particular sign-system emerges it seems (empiricism), - which is in part committed to ,, 
notions that forbid any sense of something like a 'sign-system' existing. , Indeed, views 
are promoted which militate against the recognition of any such system. 
I, ý, It is at this point that I would argue for the crucial difference of MacNeice from 
Orwell, and the strain in thirties thinking and writing that he might be taken to represent. 
My contention is that although MacNelce did enter into these debates with a kind of 
'Orwellian' character, this character forms only part of his poetic project during the 
thirties; The remainder of this project is concerned, first,, with the rigorous inspection 
of such a character by attention to issues which are commonly assumed to lie outside 
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its scope; and secondly, with attention to these issues (representation, -, textuality, ,- 
temporality, subjectivity) in their own right. MacNeice's attention, however, cannot be 
examined without first understanding its provenance, particularly since such aý 
provenance must be established before it, and its assumptions, can be understood to be 
under attack., It would be wrong to suggest, therefore, that the identification of, r 
MacNeice as a poet of 'common-sense', is entirely groundless. First, because this 
identification has been made since the earliest commentaries. 26 Second, because it was 
a role that MacNeice himself consciously promoted in the thirties. -ý But it would be 
equally wrong to argue that MacNeice Is only a poet of common-sense. ý To do so is to 
miss half the story, to miss the most important half, which, for example, has been 
hinted at by George Fraser's acute sense of MacNeice's 'evasive honesty'. 27 Yet 
because the latter half depends on the former, and because necessary and important 
clues to this 'other' MacNeice can only be found in this first MacNelce, we must take 
account of this character, and his promotion by MacNeice. ; 'ý 'r 
'When Modern Poetry was first published in 1938' Walter Allen has written, 'it 
had all the appearances of a manifesto, even of propaganda'. 28 The thirties, as we are 
well aware, was a time for the reading and writing of manifestos, literary and 
otherwise. 29 But unlike the previously cocksure, brashly cryptic statements of purpose 
by, say, the Imagists or Surrealists, MacNeice's text offers itself as a level-headed, 
democratically demystifying assertion of the values, and value, of the ordinary citizen: a 
citizen to be represented in a poetry written for this ideal reader. True, there are some 
obvious divisions within the essay: betweeni for instance, a desire to break with the 
apparently exclusive, elitist and self-absorbed canons of the literary text, whilst 
maintaining the authority invested in such canons. Primarily though, the argument seeks 
a 'going over' of the privileged, capable intelligence from the confinements of class to 
the voice of contemporary society, and the voicing of its concerns. A man speaking to 
men, in fact; but also a man speaking against his own class identity. - In this speech the 
critical faculty bred for the support of such an identity is turned against the privileges 
and limitations of this class; Hence the classic wisdom of the Greeks is turned upon the 
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aberrations of nineteenth and early twentieth century 'aestheticism': 'The greek poet of 
the fifth century B. C. wrote his poems as a member of a city-state who took as much - 
part as most people in the activities of the community and who shared with that - 
community a certain morality, a certain number of social and aesthetic preferences, a 
nucleus of religious belief'. 30 Such an awareness can be seen in certain critical values, 
MacNeice goes on to argue: 'none would have denied that it is part of a poet's - 
legitimate business to say what he thinks are the best or the next best goods for man, 
or, in Matthew Arnold's words, to criticize life' (p. 2). Behind such an assertion is, of 
course, both a tacit rejection of aestheticism, and an attempt to legitimate a discursive, 
mimetic, and didactic verse where there might be doubt as to whether such writing 
could be allowed the status of poetry, or whether it was not in fact just 'propaganda'. 
However, also written into such a paradigm is a social programme: t, the poet was part of 
an 'organic' community because there was an organic community for him to be part of - 
citizenship is presented as a shared activity as opposed to the pursuits of atomistic 
fragmentary individuals, the social waste land of an isolated selfhood. - Hence 
MacNeice's double tale of social and textual alienation, deriving from the poet's 
estrangement from this lost organic social body: 1ý -I 
For this reason poets and artists developed the doctrine of Art for Art's 
sake. The community did not appear to need them, so, tit for tat, they 
did not need the community. This being granted, it was no longer, - 
necessary or even desirable to make one's poetry intelligible to the 
community ... 
Ignoring the fact that all words are products of human life, 
but recognizing that all life is essentially life within communities, they set 
out to exclude as much as possible of this life from their poetry, hoping 
that the words remaining would not betray their origin. Parnassianism 
and Symbolism in France, the poetry of the nineties in England, and, 
later, Imagism in America, were all attempts to divorce art from life - 
unsuccessful attempts because their poems still represented life, but 
successful in so far as this life was whittled away to a shadow of a 
portion of itself - the make-believe life of aesthetes,, the life of dreams, a 
life divorced from morals or the reason or community values, a parasite, 
a luxury. (p. 3) 
The attempts of thirties writers 'once more to become functional' is, then, a movement 
away from this sense of poetry as discrete, transcendent, realm of beauty or abstraction 
-a state obtained whether the poem is viewed as transcendent 'reality' or pure stylistic 
fornament'. It is a gesture towards reclaiming, or re-inventing, that lost social 
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consciousness by embodying it, or reflecting it, within a sympathetic poetic text. - -The 
gap established between 'man' and 'society' (a gap inhabited by both man and poet) will 
thus be healed, providing the justification for this mimesis and its attendant truths. 
Equally, such poetry is a gesture, or socially justified action, on the part of the writer as 
citizen, 'in presenting a social artefact which aims, by persuasion, or education of the 
faculties, to bring such a society into being via a redeployment of this happy social 
consciousness. - 
MacNeice's assertion that 'every word is a community product' and that 'words 
are essentially vehicles of communication and so ipso facto have intellectual, emotional, 
or moral connotations' (P. 5), forms an important part of this socializing gesture. But 
we should not be misleJ. into thinking that this attention to the sociality of language 
gives anyone who 'plays with words' the immediate social justification of providing 
some kind of formal service to the community. 1 On the contrary, such purely formal 
activity is seen by MacNeice to rob language of its properly referential role. ',, Attempts to 
distance language from this arena are therefore not simply perverse or wrong-headed, 
but seem socially aberrant. In this context, all language can do for MacNeice is refer, or 
refer and connote by virtue of its communion with the warm humanity of the social, ý , - 
which authenticates the text by its presence: 'for the poet's first business Is mentioning 
things' (p. 5)., Hence, in response, 'The poets of New Signatures have swung back ... to 
the Greek preference for information or statement' (p. 21). - Any modification of the text 
must take place within this framework of mimesis, since 'style without content' is, for 
MacNeice; 'bad style' (p. 6). Thereby lies the foundation of MacNeice's notable 
description of the citizen-poet: 
My own prejudice ... is in favour of poets whose worlds are not too 
esoteric. I would have a poet able-bodied, fond of talking, a reader of 
the newspapers, capable of pity and laughter, informed in economics, 
appreciative of women, involved in personal relationships, actively 
interested in politics, susceptible to physical impressions. (p. 198)' 
This being the embodiment of the writer of 'impure poetry, that is ... poetry conditioned 
by the poet's life and the world around him'. , 1, .I- 
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ý MacNeice's sense of 'impurity', thus stated, implies more than Orwell's 'telling, 
the truth', in that it provides a sense of the conditions, and the purpose, of such truth. 
Moreover, it implies not so much a situation where a choice is available between the 
pure and the impure, but a perpetual condition of impurity, which finds its dynamic in' 
the embracing of the consciousness and representation of, 'life'. This consists of the 
messy, the circumstantial, contingent, and contradictory; it is lived as much as it can be 
by the poem's creator, represented in its fullness and diversity, or at least as full, 
diverse, 'and substantial, within the poem., Describing impurity as a condition, therefore, 
is to imply that the purity of the aesthetes was in fact no kind of purity at all. Already , 
MacNeice has presented a situation where the pure state was betrayed by the referential 
properties of language, and where that to which reference was made was, within the 
context of 'life', ' thin and neurotic. Pure poetry is, therefore, either not poetry, since it 
becomes simply sound; or not pure, since it will always present an element of reference, 
and never adequately transcend the vitiating discourses it seeks to reject. But in an, 
equally important way, a pure poetry divorced from any entanglements with ethical or 
other discourses can never be achieved since, once valued, they can be ignored or 
transgressed but never shown to be non-existent. If life were this non-dynamic, always- 
given entity there could be no point in hoping to represent it., MacNeice implies that the 
aesthetes tried to achieve a position of pure transcendence through art, but that the 
condition they hoped to be freed of could never actually be relinquished: nothing which 
is is ever that pure, static, given. 
'However novel MacNeice's theory and practice may have seemed thirty five 
years ago'i Walter Allen wrote in 1974, 'they related to the oldest traditions of 
poetry'. 31 It may seem that there is little particularly novel in such theories, and that 
they relate not so much to the oldest traditions of poetry as to Arnoldian conceptions of 
these traditions, and their use as a kind of spiritual-social engineering. 32 Orwell's 
somewhat misplaced sense of the 'novelty' of his own position has already been noted. 
However, in addition to arguing for something which was far from new, MacNeice is 
arguing against cultural trends which might now be less obvious. This notion of 
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'impurity', then, 'would have had a number of cultural resonances which are perhaps less 
well established. Moreover, 'such resonances indicate a cultural vocabulary considerably 
wider and more sophisticated than that of Orwell. ýI have already mentioned, ý as 
MacNeice does, the names of Mallarmd and Rimbaud. In addition, the 'pure' poetry of 
Edith Sitwell, the Oxford aestheticism of Harold Acton, Eliot's 'Auditory Imagination", 
and Henri Bremý, o ocfý La Podsie Pure (1926) spring to mind. Yet the period , ý, ,i", 
immediately before the thirties was also marked by a growing interest in; for instance, 
the work of the Italian Neo-idealists, and their followers in Britain. Douglas Ainslie's full 
translation of Benedetto Croce's Aesthetic was not available until 1922, a key statement 
of which was that 'the aesthetic fact.. Js form and nothing but form', in making available 
the non-pragmatic aesthetic-as-intuition. 33 Croce's theory found careful application in 
The Romantic Theory of Poetry., An Examination in the Light of Croce's Aesthetic 
(1926) by A., E. Powell, ' wife of MacNeice's friend and mentor E. R. Dodds. 1922 also 
marked the first English translation of Theory of Mind as Pure Act by Giovanni Gentile, 
who one year later joined the Italian fascist party to begin a prominent career as the 
'philosopher of fascism' and proponent of 'fascist culture' in Italian education. Two 
books on Gentile's work were published in England in 1937.34 R. G. * Collingwood, the 
main proponent of this branch of idealism in Britain, and indeed outside Italy, published 
the results of his various studies in Principles of Art (1938), one year before partially 
dissociating himself from these thinkers in his widely read Autobiography, which ended 
with the following declaration: 
I am writing a description of the way in which ... events impinged 
upon myself and broke up my pose of a detached professional thinker. I 
know now that the minute philosophers of my youth, for all their 
profession of a purely scientific detachment from practical affairs, were 
the propagandists of a coming Fascism. I know that Fascism means the 
end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism. I know that all my 
life I have been engaged unawares in a political struggle , fighting against 
these things in the dark. Henceforth I shall fight in the daylight. 35 
In The Strings are False MacNeice acknowledges the influence of, and his rejection of, 
Croce, together with his one time adherence to the 'dynamic flashy idealism' of Gentile, 
whom he cites in 'Poetry To-day', a prototype essay for Modern Poetry, as late as 
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1935.36 He makes reference to Collingwood's Autobiography in this book and in The 
Poetry of W. B. Yeats 11940), where the logic of 'Question and Answer', the key term 
in Collingwood's attack on Oxford Realism, is applied in a discussion of Yeats's 
aestheticism. 37 There were and are important differences between all these thinkers, in 
their work in philosophy and aesthetics. What they did share, however, was a rejection 
of the mimetic and the instrumental as criteria for the artwork in favour of a 'pure' state 
of expression, in which form played a major part. It is not, therefore, a notion of 'form' 
as pure ornament, but as a principle of transcendence, that MacNeice seems to stand 
against. 
By far the most influential doctrine of aestheticism, however, for MacNeice and 
others, was presented in Clive Bell's Art, with the theory of the artwork as Significant 
ForM. 38 For Bell, 'the representative element in painting may or may not be harmful, 
always it is irrelevant. For, to appreciate a work of art, one need bring nothing from life, 
no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotion' (p. 27). This realm 
of Significant Form is a 'world of aesthetic emotion', with 'an intense and peculiar 
significance of its own that is unrelated to the significance of life' (p. 28). This is the 
cornerstone of Bell's theory, which is at once abstract, transcendental, and committed 
to defining the artwork in terms of the 'emotional' capacities of the perceiving subject. 
Within this theory, the aesthetic is that which occasions a unique emotion by way of 
relations and combinations of light and colours ... aesthetically moving 
forms I call 
"Significant Form" (p. 17-18). Certain material forms are 'significant' in that they are 
distinct from the forms of ordinary non-transcendent reality; in the fact that a self- 
contained and unique kind of signification is seen to operate within this distinct realm; 
and, more colloquially, in their importance. Iconic, mimetic or what Bell calls 
'descriptive' forms (for example Frith's Paddington Station) cannot be considered 'Art' 
since 'they leave untouched our aesthetic emotions because it is not their forms but the 
ideas or information suggested or conveyed by their forms that affect us' (p. 22). 
Hence, Pure Form: the art-work renders a reality uncontaminated by everyday forms 
(Pure Form), in an artwork constituted not by mimetic representation, but by line and 
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colour (Pure Form). Bell urges the perceiver, then, to see form as an end in itself, both 
in material reality and in the specific instance of this reality that is the artwork: 
To see objects as pure forms is to see them as ends in themselves ... they 
are not a means to anything except [aesthetic) emotion ... who has not, 
once at least in his life, had a sudden vision of landscape as pure form? - 
For once, instead of seeing it as fields and cottages, he has felt it as 
lines and colours. 
[W1hat is the significance of anything as an end in itself ... but that 
which the philosophers used to call 'the thing in itself' and now call 7 
fultimate reality'? (p. 45) 
Frank Lentricchia has pointed to similarities between Bell's renunciation of the referential 
function of art, together with the pragmatic world and feelings of the subject within this 
world, with the 'bracketing' of the historical subject in the work of Flaubert, Mallarmd, 
Husserl, and Saussure. 39 Such an analogy is revealing in an unexpected manner. 
Viewed in this way, Bell's adherence to pure form as transcendent principle can be seen 
less as an adherence to form as end-in-itself than to the free-floating formlessness of an 
intentioned interiority of 'consciousness'. This manifests itself as 'aesthetic emotion', 
emotions freed from the coarse emotions of exteriority in everyday life. What 
Significant Form amounts to, in Bell's account, is less an appreciation of materiality as 
end-in-itself, than an adherence to it as a means for the transmission of these 'aesthetic' 
emotions from one subject to another: 
When we consider anything as an end in itself we become aware of that 
in it which is of greater moment than any qualities it may have acquired 
by keeping company with human beings. Instead of recognising its 
accidental and conditioned importance, we become aware of its essential 
reality, of the God in everything, of the universal in the particular, of the 
all-pervading rhythm. Call it what you will, ý the thing that I am talking ý ý-, 
about is that which lies behind the appearance of all things - that which 
gives to all things their individual significance ... 
And if a more or less 
unconscious apprehension of this latent reality of material things be, 
indeed, the cause of that strange emotion, a passion to express which is 
the inspiration of many artists, it seems reasonable to suppose that those 
who; unaided by material objects, experience the same emotion have 
come by another road to the same country. (pp. 69-70) 
And here we can gain a sense of the circularity of Bell's argument if one tries to define 
the qualities of the aesthetic emotion and the aesthetic object; for he is unable to define 
such an emotion, as opposed to other emotions, without reference to its inspiration in 
the 'aesthetic object', yet he is unable to define this object, in relation to other objects 
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or usage of pictorial form, without deploying its capacity to create or express aesthetic 
emotion. 
Hence, implicit in MacNeice's manifesto is, as well as a commitment to 'life' in 
impurity, a rejection of a number of theoretical positions which would base the artwork 
on formal mediation, where this formal mediation figures as a means to non-referential 
transcendence. This is not, therefore, Orwell's limited and uncomprehending rejection 
of 'formalism' as excessive interest in decorative style, or purposeless verbal play. But 
MacNeice, with this knowledge, still commits himself to a more or less referential view 
of the literary text, still comes out in favour of 'life', 'content' and 'experience'. Does 
not that mark a far greater commitment to these notions and categories, a commitment 
far exceeding that of Orwell?, I On the face of it, yes. But there are a number of 
problems in MacNeice's presentation of these categories in Modem Poetry, which pose 
even greater problems if we were to apply them to his poems. 
Modern Poetry is, in fact, marked with contradictions and inconsistencies. In 
the first paragraph, for instance, where a division is marked (on the grounds of subject 
matter) between the poet conscious of himself as a poet and conscious of himself as a 
man: 'The poet ... in a sense is man at his most self-conscious, 
but this means conscious 
of himself as a man, not conscious of himself as a poet'. The distinction seems clear 
enough until one begins to ask how this former kind of self-consciousness is manifested 
in the text. What is the 'self' of which the text is conscious? What does it entail to be 
conscious of oneself 'as a man'? If it is the 'whole' man, would the poem then not 
have to include the activity of writing, and if so, how would writing portray that act, 
inscribe its own inscription? Equally, would not this portrayal include the concerns of 
writing, i. e. the writer or poet, as poet? The upshot is this. MacNeice has established 
an opposition between poet and man, and has pointed to the artificiality of those 
representing themselves as 'poets', in order to slip over into the implication that the full 
representation of the 'man' is an unproblematic activity. In doing so, he ignores and 
effaces the necessary artifice of the text, its status as writing, and the fact that any 
subject present within the text can be there only by virtue of being written. 
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In fact MacNeice himself, seemingly unwittingly, problematizes these distinctions 
of Pure : Impure :: Poet : Man shortly afterwards: 
The poet is often not completely sure what he is trying to say until he 
has said it. He works up his meaning by a dialectic of purification. 
There is the thing A and his own reaction to it B, but as he is a poet 
(and, as a poet, only properly or fully existent when making a poem) his 
poet's reaction to A is not realized till the thing A has been transported 
(a mysterious process) right into his poem, when it is no longer A but a, 
and with this a is fused his own poetic reaction to it - B. Or, more 
strictly, instead of the still segregated A and 8 there is now only the 
resulting poetic unity aB. (p. 21) 1 
Within this model MacNeice reinstates the divisions between 'men' and 'the poet' which 
he expressly hoped to dismiss. He does this, paradoxically, by collapsing the distinction 
between 'man' and 'poet' within the text itself. Any sense we can achieve of 'the 
man', that is to say, can come only through his representation in the poem. Instead of 
man conscious of himself as man we now have the poem presenting a particularly poetic 
reaction, or at least a reaction occasioned by, or presented within, the particular scene 
of the poem or its writing. Instead of the poem being created from, and representing, 
the man, now man, or the poet, is created for the reader from the poem. One might 
well ask how this 'dialectic of purification' can operate within an avowedly impure 
poetry. This is not simply the 'unity of form and content' in which it is implied that 
form can act simply as the vehicle for 'experience'. One clue is in MacNeice's reference 
to the 'mysterious' transposition from the human response to the poetic, where 'thing' 
and 'reaction' are unified within the concrete unity of the poem. -, For what MacNeice is 
really getting at here is the notion of the unity of the poem, as distinct from other 
discourses, coming about through the unification of form and content in the ý 
representation, or embodiment, of the subject, and of the poem as presenting the 
speaking subject, presenting voice. The poet's role is, then, 'not merely to record a fact 
but to record a fact plus and therefore modified by his own emotional reaction to it; this 
involves mannerism in its presentation - hence the tricks of poetry' (p. 197). In 
MacNeice's analysis form (or poetic tricks) operate to make available this emotional, 
speaking subject which, as an individual absorbed in 'life', forces the poem away from 
abstraction or transcendence towards mimetic justification. At the same time this 
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To describe the situation thus is to argue for a different, - but more 
thoroughgoing, sense of 'impurity'. We might see this instance of an impurity of form 
and content as an enabling example of other (related) situations which exploit questions 
of transgression, contamination, the breaking of borders. It is because of the 
importance of this sense of impurity, present only covertly in Modern Poetry, that the 
term is crucial to an understanding of MacNeice's engagement with the thirties. At the 
same time, it is because of this sense of impurity that one is tempted to make the , 
overstatement that, read quickly, Modern Poetry is no better a guide to the poetry of, 
MacNeice than it is to the poetry of Mallarmd or Rimbaud. This overstatement would be 
unhelpful because it would ignore the real necessity of the consideration of, say, history 
during the thirties, as well as the critical limitations that this consideration can impose, 
which are illustrated in the above comments from Valentine Cunningham. A necessary 
result of taking account of these limitations, however, is an awareness on our part of 
how MacNeice himself, in his poems, demonstrated a comparable self-awareness, which 
accepted the crucial importance of history, and which, although ignored or under- 
emphasised, is where his most important responses to the questions of the thirties lie. 
The Subject of Impurity: 'To a Communist'. 'Now that the shapes of mist'. 'Snow'. 
One way into these responses is to consider a poem where MacNeice seems to argue 
for the favourable effects of the empirical, experiencing subject against, for example, the 
contaminating effects of propaganda, or 'ideology': 
To a Communist 
Your thoughts make shape like snow; in one night only 
The gawky earth grows breasts, 
Snow's unity engrosses 
Particular pettiness of stones and grasses., 
But before you proclaim the millennium, my dear, 
Consult the barometer - 
This poise is perfect but maintained 
For one day only. 40 
This 1933 poem is often cited as 'self-explanatory' evidence of MacNeice's 
views on the invading qualities of thirties Marxism. 41 The implied reading might be 
something like: Marxism operates by the artificial imposition of an unnaturally unified 
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and unifying system upon history. As snow covers a diverse landscape, Marxism I 
I covers' history, 'engrossing' difference within a seamless discourse. Perceived entities 
are allowed to register only within the terms of this transforming and self-repeating 
discourse. All signifiers, then, lead to and are reduced to a single signified, the class 
struggle perhaps. Since this kind of activity is rendered as a process ('your thoughts 
make shape') we have the distinct implication that it is not only the landscape 
'engrossed' in this system, but the observer. -Perception, consciousness, are reduced 
and subordinated to the application of a system which then expands to 'cover' history 
and 'absorb' the observing, thinking, individual. However, the Marxist's attempts to 
bring history to an end in the perceived 'millennium' ignores the fact that it is itself 
historical. If interpretation is made 'of' the world, this interpretation is also in the world 
- it too is subject to time, and the change it seeks to make over for itself.. I '. 
The problems in this reading need not stem from one's knowledge of thirties 
Marxism, or indeed from one's agreement with or objections to MacNeice's treatment. 
Rather the poem is problematic in the strategic positions it at once seems to uphold and 
refute. For instance: the injunction to 'Consult the Barometer'. A thirties Marxist might 
well have questioned where this privileged access to history or historiography derives 
from, and on what assumptions it relies. However; we should be aware of how such an 
injunction problematizes the sense of Marxism as an 'engrossing', subordinating, mind- 
controlling imposition. - Injunction implies the possibility of dialogue: here the speaker 
asks the addressee to step outside the self-enclosed, self-repeating discourse and 
inspect its conditions and limitations. But one of the conditions of such a discourse 
would be the inability to step outside in this way. The injunction, then, operates as a 
device towards showing limitation; yet these limitations are simultaneously asserted and 
denied as the addressee is asked to relinquish the discourse, whilst the previous lines 
assert the impossibility of so doing. If we allow dialogue, therefore, we must allow some 
'distance' between thinker and system - the interpretation makes shape; now that the 
shape is made the thinker can be addressed. His or her interpretation exists 
independently 'there'. 
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Much of the strength of this poem relies on its use of the metaphor of 'snow' in 
talking about thought; thought is thus turned into an 'object'- The speaker can then 
both share in the kind of perception that such thought produces, and distance himself 
from it. 'Snow' indicates the activity of thought, the kind of interpretation that the ý 
Marxist system introduces, and the effects it has on its user. As an, object, it can also 
indicate a position for the speaker, standing 'outside' of the thought processes of the 
addressee. However, this privileged position is not quite as free from that of the Marxist 
as one might suppose. The fault of the Marxist is that s/he both unifies and implies 
stasis through this unification. But there is no reason why a system that unifies in this 
way should be subject to change in this way. Quite the reverse in fact: - one of the ,- 
reasons why dogma announces itself as dogma is that it endures the truth-telling effects 
of time, absorbs the otherwise valued 'pettiness' of evidence within its own falsehood. 
The success of the metaphor must rest, then, ' not on access to the innocent and - 
transparent 'perception' of an ordered, pre-given world versus the unnatural ,- 
contamination of an interpretative 'system', but on the consciousness of time, and the 
effects of time on thought from without. The thought of both addressee and speaker 
becomes more and more 'objecty' in that it is subjected to forces, or rather conditions, 
which lie outside itself and its own internal laws. If the poem is properly to lay claims to 
the conditions of time, its own discourse must be included within these conditions; it 
too must be subject to the 'other' of time. As noted earlier, the Marxist's error is not 
just unifying-in-time, but assuming that time will stop, that the discourse and poise, or 
historical hiatus, is not 'for one day only', but forever. In time, might not the speaker's 
'perception' of 'particular pettiness / Of stones and grasses' be seen as a particular 
interpretation, subject to the destabilizing effects?, My point is that a wholly innocent 
and timeless 'perception' of the world which Marxism may be seen to depart from, or 
obscure, or contaminate, is nowhere asserted in the poem. The Marxist's error is not 
interpretation, or, 'shape making'ý in thought, but a particular kind of shape making. The 
error, certainly, is in making a rhetoric which would seek to efface difference, yet also to 
deny its own status as rhetoric, and the timely conditions of that rhetoricity. To say 
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that a fallacious kind of mediation is imposed upon the mind is not the same as saying 
that mind exists in some pure unmediated state. It is this recognition of time, therefore, 
of which the addressee becomes aware, and which allows the addressee to step outside 
his/her 'engrossing' discourse. But this is not an entry into a pristine, stable position. 
Rather it is a recognition of the instabilities of time, which must include the speaker's 
perceptions and categories as much as it does the addressee's. 
What, then, is the status of that perception which Marxism supplements and 
obscures, but which is nevertheless subject to the same destabilizing conditions as 
Marxism? Does MacNeice elsewhere grant it more validity, more of an 'innocence' than 
that which can be inferred merely from its difference from the rigidities and closures of 
thirties Marxism? 
Two poems can serve as examples of MacNeice's attention to the details of 
perception together with their consequences for notions of the subject. -'Now that the 
shapes of mist' (CP, p. 76) concerns itself with the question of 'shape' in the world, and 
its apprehension, as the first two stanzas easily testify: 
Now that the shapes of mist like hooded beggar-children 
Slink quickly along the middle of the road 
And the lamps draw trails of milk in ponds of lustrous lead 
I am decidedly pleased not to be dead. 
Or when wet roads at night reflect the clutching 
Importunate fingers of trees and windy shadows 
Lunge and flounce on the windscreen as I drive 
I am glad of the accident of being alive. 
We find here the description of a marginal, defamiliarizing, and defamiliarized 
environment, thick with partial observation, personification, and metaphor. Mist slinks, 
like an animate object, light in water appears as milk in lead, trees possess fingers, 
shadows lunge and flounce, seemingly of their own accord. In many ways it's a vividly 
realized scene. The poem is, however, usually neglected or criticized by commentators. 
Terence Brown, in particular, cites it as an example of 'disorganised use of imagery. 
The images lack coherence. The poem disintegrates as a total, formal artifact'. 42 
Moreover, he reads it as symptomatic of 'what Michael Longley has called MacNeice's 
*impatience, that refusal to let his ideas settle to a depth, which in lesser poems results 
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in surfaces made brilliant in order to cover up imaginative inconsistencies"' (pp. 132- 
33). The question immediately provoked is whether such criticism misses the mark in 
its demand for 'depth' and 'imaginative consistency', in a poem which seems from the 
start, to be about instabilities, and about perception in, and through, various kinds of 
surfaces. 
Our first instability is movement. Travel, the journey, is a recurrent 
preoccupation of thirties writers, as commentators are quick to point oUt. 43 We can 
read in journeys to the frontier, the border, to Iceland or to China, re-statement of quest 
myths in, to name but two, psychoanalytic or socio-political terms. - We read of journeys 
back to the lost origin of the womb, or out of the confines of the English Bourgeoisie, to 
the good country of individual rebirth in the new social relations of Socialism. 44 The 
poem's opening, then, is a nicely bathetic re-statement of these codes, not so untypical 
of the period. Yet MacNeice's traveller is seemingly without direction or obvious goal - 
going nowhere. Rather than reading this as a realist recuperation of these allegorical 
codes, we might analyse the poem as a departure from them into a journey of its own, 
as a journey, or allegory, of perception. Such an investigation gives purpose to those 
areas of the poem which Brown, for instance, finds 'difficult to construe'. 45 The 
narration of a particular experience - night driving - allows a testing, or exploration, of 
experience (a quest in itself, perhaps), and of perception and its objects. 
- Thus stated, the metaphor of motor-travel might tempt us to introduce into our 
discussion questions such as 'do the mists slink, or are they made to slink, is the world 
moving or is the speaker? '. The actual substance of the poem, though, is far less 
arbitrarily speculative than this. The perception of shapes in mist foreground, from the 
beginning, the search for order within an indistinct environment. Their status as - 
'hooded beggar-children' exploits this situation, through its suggestion of a recognizable 
social entity, albeit somewhat mythical, which, though identifiable, seems to withhold 
its true identity. The figures are both substantial and intangible: they appear, but do so 
fleetingly, in mist; they are like beggars, and like children in their appearance and 
motion, but, as 'hooded' creatures, any identity lying outside this classification, the 
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@person' behind the 'mask', so to speak, is simultaneously insinuated and withheld. In 
this situation, the speaker is thrown back upon his own resources. Rather than simply 
rendering this event, the poem exploits its allegorical potential in foregrounding, within 
this 'ungrounded' framework, the place of metaphor in perception: light as milk, 
together with the above mentioned details, signify a thoroughgoing anthropomorphism 
in the 'resources' of the speaker. The poem, then, 'does not merely represent a 
particular event of perception, but calls the nature of that perception into question. 
Such an analysis helps to make sense of the two lines: 'I am decidedly pleased not to 
be dead', 'I am glad of the accident of being alive. On the one hand these lines seem 
colloquially banal -a common response to any unusual, but pleasing, experience or 
event. Or, indeed, we can read them as exorbitant, incongruous. -Why should driving 
through a misty night prompt, unannounced, pleasure at not being dead? Who said 
anything about death? These statements are themselves ambiguous and different from 
one another. It is unclear whether this situation, this 'Now', is distinct from common 
experience as a result of the speaker feeling pleasure at being alive, or whether the 
speaker feels more fully 'alive' than usual at this point. Pleasure may arise as a 
consequence of an insight into what life is always like, but never discerned; or the 
condition of 'life' may be privileged since it can, at times, present such moments of 
pleasure. Equally, the statement 'not being dead', poised as it is on the fulcrum of a 
posited but undefinable existential condition (death) and an unspecified negation of this 
condition (not being dead, but not being anything specifically other than dead), is not 
the same as 'being alive',, a statement implying some supporting definition of what this 
state involves. I would suggest that these lines require the recognition that problems 
are being posed as to the nature of pleasure, and perception within the subject. What 
these lines require is our consideration of a marginal, or unusual, event as revealing the 
conditions of the typical, or the usual, and that this revelation offers pleasure both in 
itself, and for the insight it provides into 'normal' perception. 
What kind of insight might the event provide? It is significant that practically all 
of the narrated detail is shown to be mediated in one way or another. The lamps of the 
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vehicle are seen in pools of water. Similarly trees are reflected in the road, shadows 
appear on the windscreen. Explicitly foregrounded, therefore, is the perception of 
objects through various kinds of media; indeed, much of the speaker's 'pleasure' might 
be seen to derive from the multiplicity that this provides. 'Lamps' which 'draw trails' 
suggest an appropriation of the Yeatsian antinomy of the lamp and the mirror as 
emblems of the artwork and/or perceiving subjeCt. 46 In this instance, of course, the 
two are conflated - the lamp appears in the mirror of reflecting water, and is transformed 
into 'milk'. A 'trail' implies a track previously marked out by another traveller, or one 
being marked by the present one. 'Draw' can be used to suggest 'pulling, dragging' or 
'composing, sketching, laying out'. Which way is the traveller moving, backwards or 
forwards? Do the lights mark out a trail, or follow one? If the latter, how does the 
traveller 'follow' the trail that he himself is laying down? This figure invites us to 
consider that the imaginative path suggested by the image of the lamp in this poem is 
wholly dependent on its mediation through the 'mirrors' of established discourse and, 
crucially, that these mirrors do not simply reflect a preexistent reality, but that they 
reflect the conceptions of the perceiving 'lamp-like' subject. The shift from 'light' to 
'milk' is, of course, a shift from an independent illuminating transparent source, to a 
self-contained opaque agent of perception. This manoeuvre is repeated in the second 
stanza, when the transparent medium of the vehicle's windscreen becomes the opaque 
ground for the apprehension of projected images - windy shadows. Images, we might 
say, twice removed from their source - by their status as shadows, and by their 
appearance on the mediating agent of glass; moving glass at that. In short, then, the 
traveller is, most significantly, a perceiver, one making shape within purblind 
circumstances, dependent on various mediating vehicles (motor cars, mirrors, windows), 
which draw out, or construct, the trails of their own making, follow the paths of their 
own logic; furthermore, it is implied, life is like that. 
To describe such a situation as 'accidental' in any other than a colloquial way is 
to deny the perceiving subject any transcendental, authenticating origin or source. The 
traveller is 'not dead' in that, moving in a potentially hazardous environment, it hasn't 
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met with an accident, an accident which continually suggests itself. Hence, the speaker 
is 'not dead', rather than 'alive', because the possibility of death is made present by 
these conditions. But by the time the speaker gets to 'being alive' we perceive that he 
has already met with his accident, already become acquainted with his decentring 
dependence on mediating agents, together with the possibility that this 'life' of the self 
is inhabited by the conditions of radical contingency, or accident. Both circumstances 
conspire to undermine notions of the subject as sovereign and autonomous., 
The remainder of the poem continues to exploit the potential for exploration of 
perception and the self contained in the above analysis: 
There are so many nights with stars or close- 
ly interleaved with battleship-grey or plum, 
So many visitors whose Buddha-like palms are pressed 
Against the windowpanes where people take their rest. 
Whose favour now is yours to screen your sleep - 
You need not hear the strings that are tuning for the dawn - 
Mingling, my dear, your breath with the quiet breath 
Of sleep whom the old writers called the brother of Death. 
In these stanzas the previously narrated events are contrasted with notions of the 
'norms' of night-time perception. The enjambment of the first two lines allows a sense 
of received, easily described detail. Nights have stars, or are overcast, dominated by an 
undifferentiated mass of colour, grey and plum. The 'interleaving' of this dense mass 
sets up a marked contrast to the previous 'interleaving' of the shadows of trees. The 
focalization, or breadth of vision, in the poem is thus expanded from the closely 
observed detail of the journey. But the detail we are now confronted with in this 
perspective is, in a sense, opaque. This is because the detail is perceived transparently, 
was it is'. In this sense the mediating vehicles of perception remain out of sight, --- 
invisible, where in the previous stanzas they were laid bear, the opaque character of 
their mediation open for the speaker to see. This perspective forbids the knowledge 
which allows penetration into a realm of the real which is concealed. We may read the 
'so many nights' as referring to previous nights experienced by the speaker and, of 
course, to nights experienced by other people. But we have, furthermore, an additional 
kind of perception within this situation - the windscreen of the car replaced by the 
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'windowpanes' of home, or domesticity. 'Rest', in this context, figures both as 'stasis', 
as opposed to the movement of the traveller, and to 'sleep' or recreation. In this 
situation the windowpanes act as blocks or barriers to the presence of undomestic, 
prohibited 'visitors'. They are there to be seen, if one cared to look, yet their character 
is distorted by their representation in glass - palms are pressed up against glass, 
deformed in the process. Clearly we can read 'windowpanes' as metaphor for the vision 
of the individual in sleep - these are 'new' perspectives, different representations, yet 
since they are still 'windowed' they are intimately connected to the old. In this kind of 
sleep we see new or extraneous things but, it is implied, we are still contained in, and 
see through, the lenses of the conventional; 
We might assume, therefore, that the speaker has achieved some position 
'outside' this kind of perspective - in gaining insight into the nature of perception in the 
journey, he has gained similar insight into what these conventional perceptions of 
reality, including the reality of sleep, lack. In sleep the 'visitors' bestow the favour of 
Iscreening' (protect, enclose, filter) the outside world. But a 'favour' is also bestowed 
by the windows of domesticity, which can 'screen' in the cinematic sense of 'display'. 
We have a sense, then, of yet another aspect of the observing self - that of the 
unconscious, which resides in the 'rest' (remainder, left-over) of the self in sleep. In 
observing this, the speaker thus gains a further privileged insight into the perceiver. 
Sleep is the 'brother of Death' (a Greek euphemism, upper case indicating received 
conception) in that it reveals the 'death' of the individual in unreflective mediocrity, 
together with the dissolving of the autonomous, rational subject, which is assumed to 
be independent of the agents of perception. There is, however, a less comforting sense 
in the last line which undercuts this newly privileged position - namely that there is a 
kind of 'Death' which can implicate this speaker as much as the modes of perception he 
attacks. For the 'breath' of this speaker is 'mingled' with that of sleep as personified 
object. It exists within the self, among those areas of the self which are concealed, yet 
it is also somehow independent of, other to, the self. It seems to possess a 'breath' or 
voice of its own. 'Death' characterizes this condition precisely because of this invasion 
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of the self by this other. Where previously the mediating agents of perception were 
externally 'there', to be observed and reflected upon by a speaker who is pleased to be 
alive, this kind of mediation, these kinds of representations, are both internal to the self, 
and beyond the self's control: It's not, then, merely that a new area of the self (say, the 
unconscious) is disclosed, which implies the death of a previous conscious self which 
we assumed to be complete, but the means by which such an area is disclosed,, and, 
how its representations operate - internal to the subject, and with a 'breath' of its own. 
Quietly, the voice of the speaker is here being usurped and dissolved by the breath of , 
sleep and its representations., This breath is within the speaker, or his addressee, but it 
is alien to him. This quality of otherness, of something which lies not only concealed 
within the self but beyond the self's authority and control might be described as a kind 
of writing. It is a seemingly authorless - hence deathly - text at the heart of the self, 
representing the self to itself. 
In describing this kind of representation as a kind of writing in this poem we can 
draw on a discussion by Jacques Derrida of a similar confusion of inside and outside in 
the work of Edmund Husserl. In considering the Vabsolute') distinction between 'body' 
and 'soul' in Husserl Derrida notes: 
Writing is a body that expresses something only if an actual intention 
animates it and makes it pass from the state of inert sonority (Korper) to 
that of an animated body (Leib). This body proper to words expresses 
something only if it is animated (sinnbelebt) by an act of meaning 
Wedeuten) which transforms it into a spiritual flesh (geistige 
Leibfichkeft). 47 
However, Derrida argues that for intention to animate speech, which is internal to the 
subject, this speech must in some sense be 'within' the subject, the 'outside' of the 
'signifier' existing inside of the subject, undermining this intention from within. Speech 
is possible only 'because the possibility of writing dwelt within speech, which was itself 
at work in the inwardness of thought' (p. 82). This is a sense of writing which is at 
once intimately connected to the subject, but is other to it, contaminating its purity from 
within. For our purposes, this otherness, internal to the subject or not, is important for 
this sense of undermining: writing implies the absence of the subject, a mode of 
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signification in which the author's control over meaning is erased, but which, as in 'Now 
that the shapes of mist', exists within the subject as a condition of this subjectivity. It 
is this which most fully characterizes the quality of 'death' in the poem, which, it is 
implied, exists not merely within the representations of sleep, but covertly, invisibly, 
with the conscious perceiving subject. 
In a different, though related, manner 'Snow' (CP, P. 30) is intimately concerned 
with perception and its mediation. A claim for 'mediation' in the poem is more 
contentious than one might immediately suppose, since the poem may well be taken as 
evidence of MacNeice's commitment to the rendering of unmediated experience through 
the text -a concrete, present, palpable experience centred 
firmly in the life and experience of the empirical subject:. -- 
The room was suddenly rich and the great bay-window was 
Spawning snow and pink roses against it 
Soundlessly collateral and incompatible: 
World is suddener than we fancy it. 
World is crazier and more of it than we think, 
Incorrigibly plural. I peel and portion 
A tangerine and spit the pips and feel 
The drunkenness of things being various. 
Though rooted in the life of the senses, and of experience, this rendering of a privileged 
incident, carefully read, militates against; rather than for, the unity of the subject it is 
sometimes taken to assert and defend. The moment is privileged because of its 
difference from those of the empirical subject, rather than its elevation, intensification or 
continuities with this subject. - 
The experience is taken to be significant both for its immediacy ('the room was 
suddenly rich') and its diversity (incorrigibly pluraA. In addition, such a perception offers 
itself as almost wholly distinct from conventional perception and conception: the world 
is suddener than we 'fancy' it; it's crazier and more of it than we 'think'. Perception is, 
therefore, intimately linked to conception in the poem. However, the difficulty 
encountered in this experience is the tension between the richness of the scene as a 
result of the immediacy of objects, and the pleasure encountered at their diversity. For 
the more the speaker becomes aware of the palpability of objects, the snow, the roses, 
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the tangerine, the more a sense is generated that this palpability is predicated on their 
difference from other objects. As much as the palpability of object and things, the poem 
examines the relations between things, and the consequences for this sense of 
palpability. In addition to being 'incompatible' as self-contained objects, they are 
scollateral', or parallel, existing together. Hence, each object is inhabited in what it is by 
the trace of what it is not. And the more this lobjectness' is intensified, the more this 
trace, or absence, is apparent. Hence the world is given to be incorrigibly plural; the 
structure of difference exists as a defect, and one which operates against the 
perceiver's conventional ordering of the world (crazier), undermining the appearance of 
the object like a concealed, unmanageable, secret. The objects can never be fully 
themselves, yet the absence which prohibits this identity is embedded in such identity 
o4'they have. The totality of this structure; therefore, is always 'beyond', always 
deferred and resistant to assimilation. Hence, 'The drunkenness of things being 
various': the drunkenness, or disruption of the order of things as things within a 
structure of difference, by virtue of the fact that they are 'various'; the fact that such 
things are 'in process', they are 'being' various, in the sense that any perception of one 
object involves a movement or shift to another in response to the trace of the other; in 
addition, of course to the inebriation of the subject apprehending things in this way, 
who is also 'being various', divided, dislodged by the consequences of his new 
conception. It's a conception which involves both the condition of variousness as 
difference between, or in, objects together with the split between such a condition 
viewed as pleasurably multiple, or intolerably intangible: 
And the fire flames with a bubbling sound for world 
Is more spiteful and gay than one supposes - 
On the tongue on the eyes on the ears in the palms of one's hands - 
There is more than glass between the snow and the huge roses. 
Clearly the spitefulness' of the world implies a kind of intractable childish malevolence, 
fully compatible with the sense of the withholding of the object which continually means 
to suggest itself as present in itself. Equally, that sense of the 'gayness' of the world 
invites a carnivalesque abandonment to the deferral of presence which seems 
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concomitant with the fragmentation of the speaker into sensual perception - the 
disruption of the perceiving ego into a chaos or flux of sensation. There is 'more than 
glass' between these two phenomena because there is more to them than their 
existence in empirical reality; in addition, there is more to be considered in their nature 
than the fact that they can be viewed as self-contained objects which just happen to be 
side by side'. And of course the reference to 'glass' invites comparison with the 
previously discussed metaphor of the window as the vision of the conventional or 
quotidian, the seemingly transparent medium which in fact conceals its mediating status, 
together with the possibilities for the exploration of the 'self-evident', which it seems so 
faithfully to represent. ' 
In these poems, therefore, we find less of an emphasis on pure experience of an 
unmediated external world than an inspection of this experience which insists on both 
the impurity of the subject and the perception of this experience. The impurity of 'Now 
that the shapes of mist' is that of the subject, where the contaminating agents of 
perception of the outside world are seen also to exist within. In 'Snow' these mediating 
agents are augmented by the instability of the identity of objects when seen in relation 
to one another. ý In the poem's assertion that this variousness, ý this instability between 
categories, is a function of time, we can better understand the attack made on the 
closure of time that was attacked in 'To a Communist'. The understanding of time here 
performs an ideological function. But this feature of 'closing' time, stabilizing it within a 
particular frame of reference, is also a feature of the speaker's discourse, even if this 
discourse is aware of the difference inherent in 'stones and grasses'. If we are properly 
to understand how the 'variousness' of percep tion seen in a poem like 'Snow' operates 
in MacNeice's poetry, and how this can be seen to undermine types of closure, which 
may be ideological or not, we should investigate this operation of time more closely. 
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Chapter Two 
In Our Time: 
Temporality and Representation 
In the Thirties. 
Temporality is evidently an organized structure. The three so-called 
'elements' of time, past, present and future, should not be considered as 
a collection of 'givens' for us to sum up - for example, as an infinite 
series of 'nows' in which some are not yet and others are no longer - but 
rather as the structured moments of an original synthesis. 
Jean-Paul Sartre. 1 
The danger of the method of the interior monologue ... is that it may fall 
completely into chaos. For the unconscious is the chaos of unexpressed 
and uncontrolled desires and emotions, and the danger is that of simply 
reflecting the unexpressed. 
Stephen Spender. 2 
41 
In The Strings are False MacNeice offers the following account of his painfully divided 
experience of the early thirties: 
That spring Mariette and I visited Cambridge and were entertained by 
Anthony [Blunt], playing charades with an assortment of Cambridge dons 
and undergraduates and Bloomsbury intellectuals. A charade was good 
if it was risque or blasphemous, and I felt I was back at Marlborough. 
-The same private gossip and tittering, the same disregard for everyone 
not ourselves. Perhaps it was better to live among the characters. But 
is it a fact that no-body ever gets anywhere? 
[Sometimes in the nights I woke and wondered where we were 
going, but most of the time I was doped and happy, most of the time 
except when I thought about time that most of the time is waste but 
whose is not? When I started again to write poems they were all about 
time. We had an old record of 'The Blue Room', one of the most out- 
and-out jazz sentimentalisations of domestic felicity - far away upstairs - 
but the blue began to suffocate] (MacNeice's parentheses). 3 
Valentine Cunningham has detailed at some length preoccupations with various figures 
of 'enclosure' among thirties writers. 4 MacNeice's account of this period is heavy with 
such figures. He notes that, when at Birmingham University 'I felt that the halo of 
Wilarnowitz was not for me. I did not want to be a scholar; I wanted to 'write'. The 
trouble is that you cannot write in a hothouse ... 
To write poems expressing doubt or 
melancholy, an anarchist conception of freedom or nostalgia for the open spaces (and 
these were things that I wanted to express), seemed disloyal to Mariette' (p. 137). Part 
of the distinction of MacNeice's account is the rigour with which he outlines the 
problems of writing oneself out of 'the hothouse' of bourgeois domesticity. 'I found no 
reassurance in the intelligentsia', as he puts it, 'I remembered how under the Roman 
Empire intellectuals spent their time practising rhetoric although they would never use it 
for any practical purpose; they swam gracefully around in rhetoric like fish in an 
aquarium tank' (p. 145). Professed Communists, although finally intellectually 
indefensible for MacNeice, had their attractions: 'I joined them however in their hatred 
of the status quo, I wanted to smash the aquarium' (p. 146). 
It is difficult to say, however, whether this desire to move out of the hothouse, to 
smash the aquarium, could, or did, allow him a position properly outside of these 
enclosures, or whether it was symptomatic of his inescapable immersion within them, 
or, indeed, within the wider enclosure of bourgeois reality. Equally, it is hard to say 
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whether MacNeice's dissenting musings on time - about time which is wasted; about 
our time, which is mostly waste - should be read as an effective challenge to the 'status 
qUol. ý ýThe musings could equally well be read as an ironic reflection on a further 
containment within such a status quo: One which, like the Cambridge charades, 
proffers a faux rebellion symptomatic, more than anything else, of MacNeice's inability 
to come into contact with anything outside this world. We would then have to see him 
as moving to another place in the discursive aquarium, but still visibly inside its frame. 
This would be all the more pernicious, we might add, in the self-congratulatory I 
assumption that such a position had been reached. One might guess at some thirties 
writers, freshly 'outside' these enclosures, arguing that it was about time people like 
MacNeice started thinking about things other than 'time'. In other words, arguing that 
intellectual rigour lay not in the abstractions of speculation on temporality and the ,ý 
individual, but in the consideration of history and the citizen, or the Citizen and History. 
History and the Undefeated., 4,; - 1". I. 11. 
ý, *I 
In the previous chapter we noted that when thirties writers began to consciously - 
(re)establish themselves and their writing within a social context, they began to become 
pre-occupied with what at times seems like a new discovery: History., As Auden's 
'Spain 1937' has it: 'And the poor in their fireless lodgings dropping the sheets / Of the 
evening paper: "Our day is our loss, 0 show us / History the operator, the / Organizer, 
Time the refreshing river"! s Auden's poem seems simultaneously to introduce the 
awareness, or possibility, of history as a structural agent, a tangible process, and to 
deny that such an agent could have any genuine force outside its concrete embodiment 
within concrete historical subjects: 
And the life, if it answers at all, replies from the heart 
And the eyes and the lungs, from the shops and the squares of the city: 
'0 no, I am not the Mover, 
Not to-day, not to you. To you I'm the 
'Yes-man, the bar-companion, the easily duped: 
I am whatever you do. 
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If history is whatever we do, it is also what other people do, or have done. Pointedly, 
for Auden's poem, it is whatever is being done in the Spanish War, a specific set of 
events invested with significance because of their historical importance, and because 
they grant concrete substance to what otherwise might appear to be an abstraction: 
'Our thoughts have bodies; 'the menacing shapes of our fever H Are precise and alive'. 
The Spanish War offers to demonstrate, then, that we live in history, and such a 
habitation is of prime importance, not least because history lives nowhere so much as in 
us.. Interestingly, the poem does not really offer any new metaphor for this situation. 
Primarily, it operates within what one might call a synecdochic structure. 6 It seeks to 
link individual experience to a historical process as a part operating within a larger 
whole, located in a more or less realist presentation of this situation. Such a view can 
be seen quite clearly in Edward Upward's short story 'Sunday', published in the New 
Country (1933) anthology. 7 'Don't flatter yourself', his narrator argues,, 'that history 
will die or hibernate with you; history will be as vigorous as ever but will have gone to 
live elsewhere'. - In answer to the question 'then where is living and how can you get to 
it? ', together with the fear that an 'abstract generalisation' is being mistaken for a 
concrete thing', he replies: 
History is here in the park, in the town. It is in the offices, the 
duplicators, the traffic, the nursemaids wheeling prams, the airmen, the 
aviary, the new viaduct over the valley. It was once in the castle on the 
cliff, in the sooty churches, in your mind; but it is abandoning them, 
leaving with them only the failing energy of desperation, going to live 
elsewhere. It is already living elsewhere. It is living in the oppression 
and hustle of your work, in the sordid isolation of your lodgings, in the 
vulgarity and shallowness of the town's attempts at art and 
entertainment, in the apprehensive dreariness of your Sunday leisure. 
History is living here, and you aren't able to die and you can't go mad. 
(pp. 187-88) 
Here we find one of those thirties lists which are described as metonymic by a number 
of commentators. 8 In this instance, a metonymic-realist rhetorical structure works to 
establish a sense of historical position as synecdochic - we are a part of history within 
the quotidian, the everyday, world. Presentation of this relation requires the realistic 
presentation of this world, and of this world-as-history., - 'ý ""I, 
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Bernard Bergonzi has pointed out how subsequent writers used metaphoric 
figures for history which differed from this presentation of a synecdochic relation to -( 
history: 'references to 'History" were as frequent as ever, but that entity was no longer 
a godlike force directing the course of human development; it seemed, now, the very 
embodiment of the irrational and the destructive'. 9 Hence Roy Fuller: "History inflicts 
no wound / But explodes what it began / And with its enormous lust / For division splits 
the dust; Herbert Corby: 'History rears before us like a wave, Its high white head , 
poised while we catch a breath'; Randall Swingler: -'... And are the dead rewarded / With 
a bearer bond on history's doubtful balance? ' (p. 56). Here, the observer is distanced 
from, not a part of, a history which is characterised by disorder (metonymy) rather than 
a relation of clearly defined continuity (synecdoche). 11 --II;,, ý- '' 
Bergonzi's discussion neglects to mention what I would argue is an important 
application of this will to discover, describe, and locate the subject within such 'force', 
namely John Cornford's 'Full Moon at Tierz: Before the Storming of Huesca': ýý 
Time present is a cataract whose force 
Breaks down the banks even at its source 
And history forming in our hand's 
Not plasticine but roaring sands 
Yet we must swing it to its final course. 
The intersecting lines that cross both ways, 
Time future, has no image in space, 
Crooked as the road we must tread, 
Straight as our bullets fly ahead. 
We are the future. The last fight let us face. 10 
I single out these two stanzas not for their perspicacious analysis of the Spanish - 
Conflict, nor in wholesale endorsement of their thirties Marxist rhetoric, but because of 
their connections with the previous attempts to find tropes for history and the historical 
process, and for their illustration of a tendency implicit in all the strategies mentioned 
above. This is a desire to see history as an object, to use figural devices to describe this 
object and one's relation to it; to see history as something one can almost touch. It's 
one thing to discern a pattern or teleological design in human affairs, and to seek -, - 
devices to describe such a process. It's another thing to point to concrete literal events 
located within such a design. - What these lines do, however, is conf late this 
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synecdochic impulse with the literal observer or speaker, one in action within history. 
Rhetoric here, with history as plasticine or roaring sands, asserts an equivalence based 
on contact, through activity, rather than just illustrating an abstract process with a 
concrete trope and then moving out of this design to real events within Europe. The 
poem maintains itself within a rhetorical structure which locates the situation of the 
subject, the activist, within that structure. 
In doing so, it forces an important question we might overlook in the previous 
tropes, namely the status of such a subject. At the same time as it asserts the subject's 
wholesale involvement in history the poem assumes a curious, though not untypical, 
detachment. History is something upon which a conscious, pre-formed individual goes 
to work. But what 'work' does history do on such a subject? What work has it already 
done on that subject, in its construction or otherwise? Rather than showing an 
individual entirely in history, don't these lines offer us instead a subject acting with 
history, where the full implications of this cherished, invigorating and iconoclastic 
concept are held at bay? Such a line of inquiry involves the following questions: who, 
or what, is the 'we' or 'I' that is involved with history? In turn, how is history involved 
in that 'we' or 'I'? If history is here, like an object which you can almost touch, what 
kind of object is it? One might argue that these were questions largely ignored by 
thirties writers, lying outside their historical vocabulary - these weren't the questions 
generated by their (sometimes agonizing) experience of history, and to expect answers - 
to them within this historical and literary context is, really, to expect too much; or to - 
miss the point. Such an approach, however, relegates thirties writing to a more or less 
commonsensical consideration of their circumstances, which sells some writers short. I 
do not deny that consideration of the context was often second-hand, naive, and 
commonsensical. But, I would argue, not all of it was so, and MacNeice's texts of the 
thirties are one example where this is the case. The complexity of his analysis is 
intimately related to the questions posed above. Paradoxically, the easiest point of entry 
into this complex negotiation with 'History' and its many questions can be seen through 
consideration of time, and the subject. 
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Killing Time: 'August'. ,, -1 ."" 
In 'August' JCP, p. 23) we can find one expression of MacNeice's preoccupation with 
time,, and the situation of the subject:;, ,I I- ýI-,, I 
The shutter of time darkening ceaselessly 
Has whisked away the foam of may and elder 
And I realise how now, as every year before, 
Once again the gay months have eluded me. 
At first glance, we might read in these lines an awareness of a sense of absence as a 
result of the passage of time, concomitant with a desire for stasis. The moment, mk') 
'gay months' of summer were there, now they are gone, swept away by temporality, 
'eluding' the self that would retain them as a permanence. As the poem develops, 
however, this sense of 'elusion' or evasion is complicated: 
For the mind, by nature stagey, welds its frame 
Tomb-like around each little world of a day; 
We jump from picture to picture and cannot follow 
The living curve that is breathlessly the same. 1, - 
While the lawn-mower sings moving up and down 
Spirting its little fountain of vivid green, 
1, like Poussin, make a still-bound f6te of us 
Suspending every noise, of insect or machine. 
Garlands at a set angle that do not slip, 
Theatrically (and as if for ever) grace 
You and me and the stone god in the garden 
And Time who also is shown with a stone face. 
In these stanzas there is a growing sense of an 'elusion' of the moment occasioned less 
by temporality per se but as a consequence of a desire for stasis which is successfully 
fulfilled in conception. The moment is 'lost' not by change, but by a desire for stasis. 
This desire is related to, though not identical with, a desire for stasis as permanence, 
and will bear close examination. 
In outlining this desire MacNeice is pre-occupied with conventional, 
instrumental methods of ordering time. Using the metaphor of the film-reel, the poem 
suggests that the supposed 'impermanence' of time masks its conception as moments 
of stasis. Temporality is understood as a continuous succession of present, self- 
identical images, 'frozen' as they are within film stock. The operation of time within this 
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'frame', or collection of frames, provides only the illusion of change. The 'shutter of 
time', analogous to the succession of day and night can therefore be seen as a 
'projection', or representation. The mind is 'stagey' in that it works by dividing 
temporality, if nothing else, into self-identical 'stages'. Equally, what we might call 
'mind-time' is a collective, conventional site of fiction and performance. Such a stage 
governs the 'world' of those working within this fiction. The phrase 'each little world' 
implies the following: each individual subjectivity enabled by this representation; each 
single day/night as an autonomous, static, self-contained 'world' of its own; and, in an 
infinitely anatomizing sense, the possibility of breaking down this static unit into smaller 
and smaller worlds of stasis, and units of presence. Hence the speaker, like Poussin, in 
an ekphrastic reference to what must be Dance to the Music of Time, forms an 
avowedly static representation of time (as static), fixes or 'binds' the moment as still, or 
within a 'still' (the connotation for cinema-going thirties readers would not have gone 
unnoticed), or still moments, as a principle of order and continuity. 
All of which, we are told, is delusive: 
But all this is a dilettante's lie, 
Time's face is not stone nor still his wings; 
Our mind, being dead, wishes to have time die 
For we, being ghosts, cannot catch hold of things. 
Initially, we may hold that the freezing of temporality within mind-time, or Poussin's 
Dance, is a lie for two reasons. Most obviously, because in time the moment is always 
already lost or passed, always and irretrievably. Representation of the moment can 
provide us with only signification; the sign is not the thing, but works on the level of the 
imaginary. Secondly, and more importantly, because any representation which does not 
take account of the passage of time, within its 'still' frame so to speak, cannot be 
deemed felicitous. Both these readings, however, point mainly to a reading of 'elusion' 
as impermanence, a reading which, in the assertion of mind-time as stasis land 
presence), is contradictory: the loss of a stasis through change; what was once 
permanent is no more. If mind-time is a collection of static moments, and any change 
within this collection is illusory, what can be left? Underlying permanence? The 
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reference to a 'living curve that is breathlessly the same' would seem to suggest 
something of this nature., But how 'breathless'? Within MacNeice's analogy of mind- 
time with death, how can something outside this system be without breath, dead? -A 
reading more in keeping with the presentation of mind-time is that it deceives in its 
assertions not because the moment is thought to be permanent, or thought incorrectly 
to pass, but because the moment is, or was, never authentically there to begin with. 
Clearly we should focus attention further on this sense of mind-time, and the type of 
elusions, or evasions that it engenders. ýI-, zý, f'' ,ý 
- In Jacques Derrida's re-statement of Saussure's theory of language as a system 
of 'differences withoutpositive terms' as diffdrance, of meaning as differential and 
infinitely deferred, we find the following assertion: 
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a- 
system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means 
of the systematic play of differences. - Such a play, diffdrance, is no 
longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a 
conceptual process and system in general. 12 
We are familiar with the two senses of diffdrance as spacing (different from, discernible, 
distinct) and temporalization (deferred, put off, in reserve) and with notions that teach, 
us that 'there is no breach without difference and no difference without trace', 3. - 
Identity, of the sign or whatever, is predicated on difference; each and all is inhabited by 
an absence which is the trace of the otheri where full presence is continually inscribed, 
yet withheld. Later in his discussion Derrida proposes the following analysis of the 
trace, in relation to an 'unconscious': 
[Clontrary to the terms of an old debate full of metaphysical investments 
that it has always assumed, the 'unconscious' is no more a 'thing' than 
it is any other thing, is no more a thing than it is a virtual or masked - 
consciousness. This radical alterity as concerns every possible mode of 
presence is marked by the irreducibility of the aftereffect, -the delay. In 
order to describe traces, in order to read the traces of 'unconscious' 
traces (there are no 'conscious' traces), the language of presence and 
absence, the metaphysical discourse of phenomenology, is inadequate... 
[Tlhe alterity of the 'unconscious' makes us concerned not with 
horizons of modified - past or future - presents, but with a 'past' that 
has never been present, and which never will be, whose future to come 
will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence. 
Therefore the conception of the trace is incompatible with the concept of 
retention, of the becoming-past of what has been present. One cannot 
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think of the trace - and therefore diffdrance - on the basis of the present, 
or of the presence of the present. (p. 21) , -2 ,I 
I quote at length from this passage not, primarily. - to introduce a discussion of the 
unconscious or traces of the unconscious as it functions in diff6rance or time, but to 
consider time in terms of the trace, and diffdrance. Not to consider time in the 
unconscious, but the unconscious of time, and of the trace in time. -- 
This formulation, I would suggest, is particularly useful in an analysis of mind- 
time as 'lie' in 'August', since it allows a more focussed sense of the implications of 
'stasis' within this time consciousness, and of the implied alternatives to this ý-, -, 
conception. For, where mind time casts time in terms of the moment, and of the 
moment as present and self identical, Derrida's formulation allows us to consider the 
'structure' of time as differential. - Instead of difference and change (the illusion of 
movement) being predicated on identity (the moment), identity is predicated on 
difference., Each moment. - in process, - is inhabited by the trace of that which preceded 
it, and the one which will follow. Inhabited, that is, by an absence of the other -a 
conclusion absolutely necessary if we are to think of time as movement,, and to avoid 
the notion of the moment as static. To see, in other words, time passing through each 
moment., Indeed, to speak of 'the moment' at all is to risk prejudging the matter, for we 
might feel it more appropriate to discuss time as a negotiation between past and future, 
what MacNeice elsewhere calls 'the embankments / Of past and future' ('An April 
Manifesto', CP, p. 25) where 'the moment' holds a conventional, instrumental, reality. 
Hence, the sense in 'August' of the moment as a lie, where the 'stasis' of the moment 
fails to account for its position in a system, or in process, as continually subject to 
absence and change. Again, - this is not the same as saying that the moment changes or 
departs, for inhabited by this absence it was never there autonomously, or as presence, 
to begin with. Hence, also, the sense that 'we cannot catch hold of things'; we cannot 
fully apprehend the thing as autonomous thing since its identity is always predicated on 
absence in difference - the other - in addition to the process or system which lies 
outside our grasp. Equally, we, as subjects, cannot apprehend the system as a whole, 
we cannot see the trace, so bound up are we in mind-time.: 7he 'living curve' we are - 
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told, which we cannot followi is 'breathlessly the same'. Difference is always the same 
where identity is predicated on difference; difference is not the same when it is -, - 
predicated on identity, when it is an established self-sameness that, in succession, is 
different. Yet it is 'breathless' because it is neither living nor dead in terms of the_ 
empirical 'breathing' subject; as Derrida puts it,, 'diffdrance is not' (p. 21). 
we cannot catch hold of things, what can we catch - But if, as the poem says, 
hold of? To be more precise, in what way are we made aware of this inability in view of 
the trace? A problem emerges in the poem if we try to ascertain the precise nature of 
the 'elusion' narrated in the first stanza. It is unclear whether we should see the 
speaker as being 'outside' the frame of mind-time, where the 'thing', he hopes to lay 
claim to is always already undone by absence, ýwhere the speaker is articulating the , 
recognition of this absence, Conversely, it is unclear whether the speaker speaks from a 
position 'within', the frame, implying the inability of the subject to think empirically 
outside mind-time, where the 'gay months' are constrained to be understood as present 
and, consequently, it is the fact of the trace which is absent - within mistaken, or 
illusory presenceý What eludes, paradoxically, is the elusion, the trace. ý In addition, we, 
have a problem with the tone of the piece. Does the speaker suggest something like 'I 
thought that the gay months were present, now, with my perspective on mind-time, I 
find that they were not% or does the stanza mean to suggest 'these months have , 
eluded me, when I thought they would, at some point, come (to me)'. Equally, whether 
the speaker is inside or outside the frame, a sense of 'elusion' implies a search, a hope 
for a presence which is deferred (as Derrida has taught us), but which nevertheless -- 
inscribes the speaker as in some sense subject to the same desire for presence which 
inhabits mind-time, even if he is attempting to negotiate some reflective distance from 
this position. ý -Further, it is possible to say that the subject, although accepting 
diffdrance in conceptuality, or time-as-difference, is instituting, for all the recognition of, 
absence and trace, a different kind of presence., This would attempt to reinstate a 
transcendental signified, which supplements the, 'Iack' of motion in time-as-stasis, 
instituting a kind of dynamic time in place of the moment, an animated time in contrast 
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to the 'dead' time of the mind., It might be something along the lines of Bergson's durde 
rdel, which is all the more transcendent because it is 'beyond' the horizon of mind-time. 
In view of this, we might be tempted, had we not been before, following 
Derrida, to place those terms 'the moment', 'presence',, and now 'time-as-diffdrance' 
sous rature (seus--rature) where 'since the word is inaccurate it is crossed out., Since it 
is necessary, it remains legible'. 14 This would, however, be dishonest for the following 
reasons. Not the least'of these would be the claims of this discussion for high - r-- - 
theoretical stakes unsupported by a reading of one poem only. More importantly, to -, 
attempt such a manoeuvre within the domain of commentary would be dishonest to this 
text, in implying that such strategies lie solely in the hands of the reader. In implying, in 
fact, that we are presented with a 'closed' and stable text. It is the case, conversely, 
that the strategy we have been describing is carried out by the text itself. Rather than 
the poem offering a solution to the ambiguities mentioned above, such ambiguities are 
dramatized within its very operations. 
We can gain a sense of this operation by attending more closely to the 
ekphrastic citation of Poussin; and his Dance to the Music of Time, concentrating on the 
manner of this intertextual moment, as well as the matter. Previously, we considered 
the narrated detail of this moment: of the painting as representation, what is - 
represented, together with its status as a product of mind-time, and as a metaphor for 
it. In addition, however, the poem invites us to consider the narrating of this moment. 
If the Narrated 'I' in the poem forms a representation of the temporal moment, so too 
does the Narrating '1' of the poem itself. We might usefully recall here the distinction in 
linguistic theory between the subject of 1enoncer(or subject of the enounced, the 
subject as signified within a given enunciation as signified and subject of Arnonciation 
(or enunciating subject, the subject as agent of the enunciation). 16 Within this poem, a 
'still-bound fete' is said to be made by Poussin, by the enounced speaker, and, crucially, 
by the enunciating 'I', the poem itself. All are representors, functioning within the 
discourses in which mind-time works. The ambivalence of this position is augmented by 
the line 'But all this is a dilettante's lie'. Initially, the line attacks the deceit of mind- 
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time. However, within this established position of complicity with the representative 
strategies of mind-time, the line augments the complicity of the enunciating subject with 
the subject of the enounced., Any position you or I hoped to achieve 'outside' mind-time 
as representation, objectifying it or setting oneself at a distance from it, is denounced. 
All this is a lie; yet we are within the lie; we must be in it to call it a lie; we must make 
use of it to call it a lie; hence our wholesale denunciation of this enunciation is a lie also. 
, We can go further in the implications of this statement: 'alf this is a lie - all of 
it, even the statement 'this is a lie'? Jacques Lacan has made much of the implications 
of the paradoxical nature of the statement 'I am lying', which means one must be telling 
the truth, etc. 16 In this poem, the statement effectively encapsulates the position of the 
subject in mind-time, where it is caught with the position of double-bind within 
representation - to tell the truth about representation you must represent, i. e. you must 
lie, which means in some way telling a different kind of truth, which is, in its own way, 
a kind of lying. Given this, we can say that the poem forbids any position, any ... 
presence, 'outside' mind-time, and those related discourses for which it serves as 
metaphor. All one can do is articulate its inauthenticity; but, as Paul de Man has 
written, 'to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be authentic' - particularly, we 
might add, when in the very act of knowing, one must make use of that inauthenticity 
one claims to identify as inauthentic. 17 
This is as good an articulation as any of a particular use of irony, similar in 
design to the processes of discursivity described in the following passage by Roland 
Barthes: 
It is because language is not dialectical (does not allow the third term 
other than as pure oratorical flourish rhetorical assertion, pious hope) 
that discourse (discursivity) moves, in its historical impetus, by clashes, 
A new discourse can only emerge as the paradox which goes against 
(and often goes for) the surrounding or preceding doxa, can only see the 
day as difference, distinction, working loose against what sticks to it., 
This is a sense of irony which forbids silence, yet is infused with the inaccuracy of its 
own enunciation; at the same time, and vitally, it forbids a position outside this speech 
which can be arrived at uncomplicatedly. To remodel a previous phrase, since the word 
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is necessary,, it is legible; since it is inaccurate, it is crossed out. In outlining such a 
position, it is useful to recall the ambiguity in MacNeice's position which begun this 
discussion. " From a Marxist position (oratorical? ) there was little to choose between 
Charades at self-regarding Cambridge and ungrounded reflections on time. In the light 
of the previous discussion, we can perhaps re-orientate this notion, and suggest that 
there may have been little to choose between Cambridge blasphemy and Marxist 
blasphemy; both were delusively assumed to occupy a position outside the discourse 
they hoped to challenge or counteract. If nothing else, MacNeice's position on time, 
representation, and textuality is without these delusions. It is, perhaps, about time we 
examined this 'without' more thoroughly. 
Time, Change, History: 'The brandy glass', 'The glacier', 'Meeting point', 'Train to 
Dublin'. -Iý, -I--ý, 1. ý I 
. In order to proceed with this discussion it is necessary to examine our terms - 
once again, - and take stock of what has been called 'MacNeice's obsession with flux and 
stasis'. 19 Although frequently referred to in discussions of MacNeice's work, these 
terms are often insufficiently examined by commentators. On the one hand, there has 
been a tendency to reify concepts such as 'flux' without a supporting definition of this 
principle, or adequate discrimination between types of flux or, indeed, of stasis. - Such a 
tendency leads to a less than useful abstraction in terms which might already be -ýI 
considered abstract enough. From this follows the second insufficiently explored area: 
the relation of time, flux, stasis to other issues, equally 'obsessive' for MacNeice: , 
representation, society, subjectivity. As our discussion of 'August' shows, neither of'. 
these areas of discussion are as straightforward as they might initially suggest. We 
must consider the complexity of the issues themselves - in isolation and in relation to 
one another - the sometimes difficult relation of these to other thirties issues, and,, , 
perhaps most important of all, the considerable ambivalence, the refusal to rest with or 
condone any one position; that characterizes MacNeice's examination. 
In a valuable recent discussion, Peter McDonald has gone some way in 
considering these terms, recognizing Hi i% ambivalence, and exploring its implications. In 
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particular, a notion of 'Time' is seen to continually undermine a period identification 
with, and championing of, 'History': 
In Poems MacNeice had used the idea of the present tense as a 
manifestation of uncontrollable temporal flux in ways that undermined 
familiar New Country patterns of 'historical' coherence. The poet's 
preoccupation with time may be traced back to some of his very early 
work, and in the late thirties this concern became absolutely central to 
MacNeice's work, the present tense growing more urgent and subversive 
than before. 20 
As the thirties progressed, McDonald argues, the 'subversive' nature of this concern 
became more and more disquieting: 
... his writing later in the thirties acknowledges more openly the desire for 
coherence, for the cold comforts of history as well as the hectic rush of 
time. Even then, MacNeice realized that 'History' would still be trumped 
by time, in the same way as the self's coherence could be disrupted by 
the other outside it. (p. 67) 
Although this distinction between a purposeful, coherent process and its 
destabilizing 'other' is undoubtedly useful, it requires modification in a number of ways. 
The simplest observation would be that thirties writers were not always so fully 
optimistic, so sure that history was without its destructive force. 21 More importantly, 
one is tempted to say that McDonald is here dealing with two concepts of history, 
rather than with distinct realms of history and time. One, as he implies, understands 
history as coherent, knowable and amenable to control. This is an essentially optimistic 
belief. The other sees history as incoherent, resistant to understanding, and chaotic in a 
way which grants few favours to the subject immersed in it. However, to make this 
distinction one between notions of history rather than between time and history too 
glibly is really to risk causing more problems than one solves. One such problem would 
be the daunting prospect of offering a new definition of 'time', distinct from these two 
senses of history. Another, more important, would be to miss McDonald's sense that 
MacNeice subverts the notions of other thirties writers by a different understanding of 
change in human affairs. In place of a 'historical' perspective, which hopes to identify a 
non-personal agency and then relate the personal to this agency, we have what we 
might call a 'temporal' understanding. This privileges the perspective of the personal, of 
the subject, without necessarily granting it any security or stability. So as much as the 
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'hectic rush of time' allows a sense of bright multiplicity, it risks a sense of unknowable 
chaos, to which notions of 'history' can act as 'cold comfort', but which are always 
'trumped by time'., -1,1 -I "" -II It 
- However, our reading of 'August', with its sense of the understanding of 
temporal laas a shared collective activity, might imply that, wishes to the contrary, the 
categories of 'history' and 'time' have a tendency to merge. Instead of two discrete 
types of understanding, each with its own object (public; private) and perspective - 
(stable; unstable), it is possible to discern notions of personal life being stabilized within 
a historical ('New Country') frame of reference, and of history giving way to a hectic 
rush for which only a certain kind of historical understanding can act as cold comfort. 
Hence, if the New Country writers were guilty of a sense of stability and optimism ý 
unwarranted by the facts, MacNeice might have been guilty of displacing an essentially 
subject-based mode of understanding on agencies to which it was inappropriate. - - 
Historical and temporal modes of understanding do in fact shade into different views, 
and different priorities, about this same non-personal entity. But if one consequence of 
this would be, in MacNeice's case, to make hopelessly chaotic what some might argue 
is in part understandable by other means, another would be to introduce a different kind 
of stability, a curiously disguised sense of order. This sense of stability and order ý 
proceeds from the way time itself might be conceived within a particular historical - 
context. McDonald's juxtaposition of thirties 'history' with 'time' implies the 
juxtaposition of an artificial system with a concrete, unavoidable condition of 
experience, which is assumed to be 'given'. Without question, time is a condition of 
history. 'August', however, shows that although time does seem to work as a 'given', 
it is nevertheless subject to construction. '' This construction does not only work against 
: sense of temporality as some natural condition which can be taken for granted: In 
ddition, it points to an understanding of temporality in which the subject's own sense 
of time is produced by forces which can be described as non-individual, -and is in fact, 
potentially historical. -, f, 
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From this we might draw the following conclusions. If time in its entirety, time 
as difference is something we cannot entirely get hold of, one way in which we attempt 
to get hold of it is through the imposition of a construct, which is in fact marked by 
stability. Change within this construct cannot be more than a shadow of real change, 
and is rather best understood as an agent for the assertion of presence (what was here 
is now gone) than a means of grasping the full instability of time as difference. If, 
therefore, New Country writers introduced a sense of stability that was factitious, we 
should be equally cautious of introducing new stabilities in place of them. One such 
stability might be this notion of 'time'. 'August' shows how the apparently unstable can 
mask notions of presence which efface the action of time as difference, covertly 
introducing notions reliant on stability and presence. To contrast a notion of time with 
that of history runs the risk of repeating this manoeuvre. Furthermore, it takes as 
natural condition what is in fact an artificial construct. In addition, it privileges the 
perspective of the subject, unstable or otherwise, as the ground for understanding of the 
non-personal force of history. In making a claim for the historicity of MacNeice's 
position my aim is not to recuperate a sense of history as a necessarily understandable 
force, from which stable point we should base our understanding of the subject. Rather 
it is the reverse. The notion of time as historical, and of this historicity of 'mind time' as 
stabilizing, must give way to a sense of time as difference. But this is not to propose a 
realm beyond history, or an instability which can be contrasted with the stability of 
(historical) mind-time. This instability through difference is the instability of history. 
Similarly, though the subject is destabilized here, this destabilization cannot be deemed 
a-historical, any more than time can be considered a fixed, definable, given 'condition' 
against which to define, in turn history. Here absolute instability is absolute historicity, 
and vice-versa. This is not merely a different way of saying that history 15 unstable. 
Previously, it was the perspective of the subject which posited this assertion. Here the 
subject is destabilized because of the instabilities within history, of the making over of 
(historical) mind-time to difference. 
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To gain a full sense of this historical sense of time, together with the importance 
of construction and instability, we should consider the ambivalence engendered in 
MacNeice's presentation of temporality, as well as his concern with notions of - 
temporality as stable. One of the most intriguing qualities of 'August' is that for all its 
subtle de-mystifying force regarding change and stasis within notions of time, the poem 
finally reinstates what it claims to dismiss. First, by its activity within a double-bind of 
truth/lie. , Second, by returning to a sense of lack (albeit in a different form) that the 
poem began with. For instance, - in answer to an assumed presence within, or of, the 
moment we are told that 'we cannot catch hold of things'. But do we not still want to, 
do so? We might assume that the closure of the moment in an illusory, or imaginary, 
stasis is motivated by a sense of desire, or lack, culminating in this false presence. But 
does the disclosure of the imaginary nature of this stasis do away with this sense of 
lack, or merely reinstate it in a more explicit and thoroughgoing manner? , Before, we 
were -aware that we could not 'hold' the past, now its absence inhabits the present too. 
Does this mean that one is liberated from the past, -and a sense of deprivation and 
nostalgic yearning, since we need no longer mourn the passing of something which 
never was to begin with? - Or, indeed, does the absence which now inhabits the present 
lead us to yearn for some as yet unformulated presence, much in the manner of what 
post-structuralist theory calls the transcendental signified: the point within a structure 
of pure difference which transcends this structure, the one item possessed of a self-, 
sufficient identity which gives meaning to all the others. Such a position may lead us 
far from the usual notion of MacNeice as a 'nostalgic' poet. 22 If this is a nostalgia it is 
not for qualities of the past, but, to use a postmodernist catch-phrase, a nostalgia for 
the future. Here, the conventional yearnings of the nostalgic for the past are displaced, 
in full awareness of lack and desire for presence, upon the future. Desire is not 
diminished, but is now relocated within the horizon of the future. 
We have, moreover, gone some way from the notion of MacNeice as 
unquestioningly endorsing the bright multiplicity and variety of flux. To be sure, 
'August' is full of images which render stasis as a kind of stagnation, petrifaction and 
58 
death. , However, it is much quieter about the alternatives: ý 'breathlessly the same' 
might imply a sense of brilliant exhilaration... It can equally well imply, as in 'Now that 
the shapes of mist' a state or entity devoid of the breath of human presence, the, 
authenticating 'voice' or speech of the subject replaced, or put in the context of, the 
ego-less 'writing' of the text. - Added to which, of course, 
is the notion of this state of 
difference carrying this new sense of absence, or lack, mentioned above. And can the 
absence of 'tomb-like' qualities immediately imply a liberating sense of life for the 
subject? - To describe a state of petrifaction does not automatically imply that the 
alternative is a condition of 'life' which the subject can easily achieve or inhabit. , Is s/he 
able to conceive of or inhabit any position fully outside the imaginary time which the 
poem inhabits? Or is the subject constrained to inhabit the realm of the imaginary with 
only the knowledge of the inauthenticity of this position as comfort? So, 'stasis' could 
be read in terms dominated by petrifaction or by stability, depending on whether we 
read 'flux' as multiplicity, chaos, or as inhabited by a paining absence., -, -, -ý---. 
At this point it may be useful to replace what we have known as 'mind-time' 
with another term. Lacanian theory has given us the category of the 'Imaginary' as a 
site of identification of the subject with an 'Ideal "I"' during the Wirror stage'. The 
image is 'ideal' in its coherence and stability, -Yet this image is undermined by the 
creation of the unconscious, which is identified with lack, and desire. The image is not 
the thing, but a 'stand-in, ' or signifier, for the thing. ý The unconscious works to remedy 
this deficiency through the processes of desire, producing in its turn a subject in 
process. 23 For the remainder of this discussion I will use the term 'Imaginary time' to 
denote that structure of temporality described in, 'August', using the term to imply .- 
notions of stasis, stability, identification by the subject, in addition to the 'undermining' 
of this identification by the operations of difference. -, !,,, ý,, I-I-II- 
- -- The notion of nostalgia, often invoked in relation to MacNeice, requires, , 
clarification here. Ordinarily, the nostalgic yearns for the return of something which is 
now lost, leaving a discerned absence, or a poorer version of a past reality. 'Given our 
sense of imaginary time in which the nostalgic operates, -we can conclude that it is not, 
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only his sense of a presence which departs (since, by departing, it cannot be a 
presence) which is contradictory. ý In addition, by virtue of the fact that he inhabits 
imaginary time, we must conclude that his sense of a lost presence is replaced by 
another moment in some way inhabited by presence, even though the contents of this 
moment, so to speak, are inferior to that of the past. - The perspective of time as 
difference shares a sense of absence, in that it admits the trace of the absent other in 
asserting time as passage. It is, though, a very different kind of absence, which is 
subversively part of the structure of imaginary time, undermining it rather than replacing 
C 1, 
some imputed presence now wholly lost. It cannot admit that the moment ever existed 
as presence. MacNeice hints at this perspective in the later poem 'Nostalgia' (CP, p. 
205; written 1942). The nostalgic is described as 'longing For what was never home', 
as 'homesick for the hollow Heart of the Milky way'. Both these statements assert a 
desire for something which holds an illusory fullness which in reality is inhabited by 
absence. MacNeice here departs from a sense of nostalgia as a falsification of a state of 
affairs, to a sense of the nostalgic in some way dealing with the stuff of time itself. In 
the thirties MacNeice provides one example which is fully nostalgic in this sense, and in 
the sense that nostalgia, as a product of imaginary time, does not only posit a lost 
presence, but can achieve an illusory replacement of this lost presence in the imagined 
present. 
It is 'The brandy glass' which (CP, p. 84) is fully informed by a sense of 
nostalgia, in a manner which is significant for our analysis of time as stasis or 
passage/flux, and the ambivalence which this engenders: 'Only let it form within his 
hands once more -/ The moment cradled like a brandy glass. Sitting alone in the empty 
dining hall.... As in 'August' the relation of the subject to time, and to temporal 
relations, is described in terms of touch. This will recur later in our discussion. Here we 
can emphasize the notion of the moment being present, palpably there for the subject, 
that the subject stands outside this moment, yet remains in full contact with it, and that 
the moment is 'caught' or captured, held as a permanence by the subject. The subject, 
therefore, involved in temporal relations, hopes to transcend them: the moment, if held, 
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would give pleasure because of the overwhelming sense of departure and loss. Yet the 
belief that this can be accomplished is undercut by the narrative progression of the 
poem itself:,, -ý. --11,1,1 " 1. 
From the chandeliers the snow begins to fall 
Piling around carafes and table legs 
And chokes the passage of the revolving door. 
The last diner, like a ventriloquist's doll 
Left by his master, gazes before him, begs: 
'Only let it form within my hands once more. ' 
It is important to note that time is not depicted here as a 'hectic rush', a dissolving hail 
of data and discordant impressions. Instead we have figures suggestive of fixity and 
stasis, a quiet negotiation of beginnings and endings. In 'To a Communist' we saw 
snow offering a sense of imaginary stasis, to be 
. 
undercut by temporal progressiom 
Here the image implies burying, freezing preservation. The passage or movement of the 
door is 'choked' by what follows. The speaker yearns for the reappearance of a lost 
moment of plenitude and presence; one which, perhaps, will differ from its last 
appearance in that it will now be permanent. As in 'August' we can say that if the 
moment is now lost, then it was never properly there - as presence - in the first place. 
Two consequences emerge from this desired transcendence of the self, and of the 
moment, in time. The desire is shown to be fallacious in its assumption of presence, 
and that the lost moment can ever return as anything other than a memory or sign. 
More importantly, however, the desire for permanence is served by an onerous sense 
of desolation, isolation, and petrifaction. Instead of holding time, the speaker is himself 
held by time. On the one hand, time is an inescapable condition, on the other, by 
attempting to transcend this condition the speaker renders himself bereft of its capacity 
for change. Instead of permanence one enters death. Hence the reference to the 
'ventriloquist's doll'. It is the speaker who is the doll, controlled by time, animated by it 
albeit in a deterministic fashion. The attempt to overthrow this determination, and its 
conditions of loss and absence, in redemption and presence render the speaker deserted 
by the controlling, mastering force. Rather than emancipation, the speaker encounters 
desertion. 
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--, We have, then, a sense that time is an inescapable burden for the subject. Yet 
the loss of time in an attempt to transcend or control it is even more terrible. From this 
position comes an essential ambivalence in the poem, which is formulated much more 
forcibly than in 'August'. The speaker 'begs' for the moment. From this the desire is 
not simply demythologized, becoming an illusion exposed. The illusion is shown to have 
grounds in denial and lack, and in the disquieting consequences of the alternative. You 
can't have the moment, and if this wasn't bad enough, the moment was never here. 
Hence, the nostalgic wants to make time stop in three ways. First, by desiring that an 
irretrievably lost moment return. Secondly, by having it return as presence. Thirdly, in 
the assumption that it was available as presence to begin with: that it did ever indeed 
'form within his hands' as presence or totality. In this last detail, therefore, his activity 
typifies conventional means of ordering time, rather than deviating from them. As in 
'August' perceptions of the past are used to reveal attitudes towards the present 
moment. Again, it is in the loss of the moment, that which should render its quality of 
passage most exactly, that the presence of the moment is asserted. In this poem the 
speaker is 'absorbed' in time irretrievably. But he is also absorbed in, or by, his 
identification with time as stasis or presence, to the extent that it stops, and he is 
trapped within it. 
In 'The glacier' (CP, p. 24) MacNeice also shows a deviation from conventional 
time-consciousness where he applies the cinematic metaphor for time-conception to 
reveal a sense of time dominated by stasis. The poem sets the grounds for 't ampering 
with time' in a suggestive manner: 'Just as those who gaze get higher than those who 
climb /A paradox unfolds on any who can tamper with time'. The poem carries the 
implication that the 'gaze' can disrupt notions of time because such notions are 
themselves constituted through the gaze in connection with 'representation' of temporal 
progression, a representative frame. By gazing, instead of climbing, one achieves a 
reflective, self-conscious, position in relation to this framing, in contradistinction to 
climbing or 'working' through time in a unreflective empirical activity. Looking at the 
gaze provides more insight than using the gaze as an end to further activity, since the 
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instrumental nature of this gaze in relation to this activity can thereby be discovered or 
'unfolded': 
Where bus encumbers upon bus and fills its slot 
Speed up the traffic in a quick motion film of thought 
Till bus succeeds bus so identically sliding through 
That you cannot catch the fraction of a chink between the two, 
But they all go so fast, bus after bus, day after day, 
Year after year, that you cannot mark any headway, 
But the whole stream of traffic seems to crawl 
Carrying its dead boulders down a glacier wall 
And we who have always been haunted by the fear of becoming stone- 
Cannot bear to watch that catafalque creep down. 
As in 'August' we have a sense here that linear, or imaginary, time is a type of change 
which disguises its actual reliance on notions of stasis and presence. This reliance is 
revealed when its essence of change is intensified, when it is speeded up. The patterns 
or elements of stasis reveal themselves, or 'unfold', like a secret code suddenly 
disclosed. The key to this notion of underlying 'stone' in a process apparently given to 
change and fluidity is that reference to 'bus succeed(ing) bus so identically sliding 
through'. What the 'quick motion film of thought' relies on is a notion of difference, the 
difference between one moment and the next, being predicated on identity, rather than 
the other way round. When speeded up, this identity, the poem suggests, continually 
repeats itself ceaselessly. In addition to the evident notion of one bus looking identical 
to another, therefore, we have a sense of the 'frame' (to use the cinematic metaphor) 
being identical, in that it relies on identity for its functioning within consciousness. It 
thus reveals its resistance to a sense of time conceived as fully in passage, as 
difference, where, presumably, instead of identity, an intensification of time-as-passage 
would reveal this structure of difference. In addition, the identity of the discontinuous 
moment would be revealed to be the result of its multiplicitous difference from all other 
moments, in the same way that signs are within a signifying system 'without positive 
terms'. The poem is far from explicit, however, in how this might be achieved. Here, 
in contrast to 'The Brandy glass', it is the one whose gaze shifts from the imaginary 
progression of linear time, who disrupts time by moving against it in memory, or its 
remnants, or signs, who achieves a liberation. Those who fear becoming stone: 
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... turn away to seemingly slower things And rejoice there to have found the speed of fins and wings 
In the minnow-twisting of the latinist who alone 
Nibbles and darts through the shallows of the lexicon 
Or among plate-glass cases in sombre rooms where 
Eyes appraise the glazen life of majolica ware,, 
Or where a gardener with trowel and rheumatic pains 
Pumps up the roaring sap of vegetables through their veins. 
It would appear that the only way out of this underlying structure of stasis within linear 
time is to disrupt its process by looking backwards, as it were. This, we should note is 
not the same as the backward gaze of the nostalgic. The poem explicitly refuses the 
notion of any achieved 'depth' or full reinstating of the past. The latinist moves through 
the 'shallows of the lexicon', he has the signs and not the things. Moreover, he has the 
shallows of the lexicon rather than its depths. Even the language suffers from its 
absence in time. Equally, the 'life' of the majolica is 'glazen', or removed from full 
existence. In addition, that is, to being a sign or fragment of a past civilization, rather 
than the civilization itself as a whole. We can here gain a sense of identity through 
difference, in that it is through the difference from linear time and current civilization 
that the majolica ware gathers its significance. This denial of depth seems to be ,, - 
contradicted by the organicist metaphor which ends the poem. We should, however, - 
recognize its metaphoricity within the defamiliarizing structure of the poem - instead of 
this image granting depth to the others, it describes their nature when contrasted with 
the stasis of imaginary time. In any event, it is not so much 'nature'ý which is described 
in the final image of the gardener, but the appropriation of nature through culture. "The 
figure remains indeterminately poised, then, between nature and culture., 
- There are, therefore, two conflicting features in these last lines. It is unclear 
whether the speaker is assumed to have 'got among' the past through this activity, 
actually broken the rules of linear time in the appreciation of the past, or is simply-ý*- 
disrupting it. The sense of the 'shallows' of the latinist, both caught within a system 
like a 'minnow' and denying that system depth, would seem to suggest that there is no 
'depth' to this movement, but that it can still be read as a liberating influence; 
particularly, it seems;, if we must associate depth with the horizons of stable, illusory, 
imaginary. ,--IIC 
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Given this attachment to flux as a welcome multiplicity after the illusory closure 
of imaginary time - which concentrate on notions of seeming impermanence or desired 
stability, both of which mask a reliance on assumed presence - the following lines must 
strike us as incongruous: 
Time was away and somewhere else, 
There were two glasses and two chairs 
And two people with the one pulse 
(Somebody stopped the moving stairs): 
Time was away and somewhere else. 
And they were neither up nor down; 
The stream's music did not stop 
Flowing through heather, limpid brown, 
Although they sat in a coffee shop 
And they were neither up nor down. 
The bell was silent in the air 
Holding its inverted poise - 
Between the clang and clang a flower, ý 
A brazen calyx of no noise: 
The bell was silent in the air. 
John Montague has written that this poem (Weeting point'; CP, p. 167) is among! , 
those constituting 'testimonies to the power of time to efface love. Love, indeed, can 
only exist outside time'. 24 This view is supported by E. R. Dodds, who comments that 
'always the stairs would move again; time would return, and the melancholy with it'. 25 
In an important sense we cannot dispute this. Time cannot momentarily stop in any 
literal sense. It either stops or it doesn't. 'And as much as the poem exhibits and,, " 
celebrates a figural end to time, it implies the illusory nature of this ceasing., together 
with the melancholy which will follow. , But what should concern us here, in the context 
of our discussion, is the apparent reversal of a previous position. The melancholy-ý 
burden of temporality in previous poems has been noted. But here the moment of 
stasis, contesting with this melancholy, is celebrated. What, if anything, distinguishes 
this moment from others, so that the implication of stagnation or petrifaction does not 
follow? What, in this situation, are the implications for our sense of time as difference? 
To this, I would add: how seriously should we take this moment of supposed 
transcendence possessed as it is of details such as: 
The camels crossed the miles of sand 
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That stretched around the cups and plates; 
The desert was their own, they planned 
To portion out the stars and dates: 
The camels crossed the miles of sand. 
Time was away and somewhere else. 
The waiter did not come, the clock 
Forgot them and the radio waltz 
Came out like water from a rock: 
Time was away and somewhere else. 
It is hard to resist the implication of bathos in the time-defying lines. They are so ,ý 
reminiscent of details from an exotic 1930s Hollywood classic, something in the manner 
of East Meets West 0 936), with irreverent puns on 'stars', and (in this desert scene) 
'dates', biblical recounting of 'radio waltzes' in addition to the poem's chiming nursery- 
rhyme metre. 26 This is a reading which, 'perhaps, must lie in wait when considering 
other angles. t ý, 11; ý 
- Initially, however, we can say that this presentation of stasis differs from others 
in two significant respects. First, in contrast to 'The brandy glass' the moment is not 
presented as one 'in' time, where time itself is made to stop, or the attempt is made to 
make it stop. -Time here is 'away': using a spatial metaphor this incident, or this 
momenti takes place outside time, rather than commanding it from within. Secondly, 
for the first time in our discussion we are presented with the palpable entrance of the 
other: 'two people with the one pulse'. Later: 'time was away and she was here'. 
This detail adds significance to the position outside time, since it alerts us to the felt 
need for presence which, it is implied, time will deny. And moreover, a presence which 
time will destroy. So. - time is not 'stopped' by the will or desire of the isolated subject 
acting upon it, or within conceptions of it; rather it stops through the apprehension of a 
presence external to it, and which counteracts it. 
Moreover, - what we find in this position of stasis outside of time is a presence 
with a variety of its own ('two people with the one pulse'). A presence endowed, 
moreover with a sense of difference which contributes to unity, rather than unspecified 
variety: ', ' ", 'MA ý 
Her fingers flicked away the ash 
That bloomed again in tropic trees: 
Not caring if the markets crash 
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When they had forests such as these, 
Her fingers flicked away the ash. 'w 
God or whatever means the Good 
Be praised that time can stop like this, 
That what the heart has understood 
Can verify in the body's peace 
God or whatever means the Good. 
The absence of time imparts a vividness to the scene, and one which transforms figures 
previously suggestive of death into organicist metaphors for creation and life: the tolling 
bell becomes (momentarily) a flower, or 'brazen calyx', water flows from a rock, ash on 
: cigarette -'blooms' again., We have a presence, therefore, which time cannot supply, 
nd one which is not artificial or coercive, possessed of an illusory closure or stasis, - 
because of the presence of the other. The reference to 'God or whatever means the 
Good', alerts us to the transcendental quality of this moment, calling as it does on 
notions of Platonic ideals and, we should add, a plenitude of meaning ('whatever means 
the good'). - -I', -,, - 1ý1_ I ý, I. 9ý -ýý k 
However, as we have noted, time does not stop like this, and certainly not the 
time as difference with which we have become acquainted. -The implication that time 
can begin again should infiltrate this moment as it has done in other presentations of 
stasis. Yet to argue for this in this poem is really to miss the point. Because it is in the 
nature of the presence exhibited in this poem that the absence endured within 
temporality is understood. '' The fuller the presence of this transcendental moment, the 
greater the absence of the moment within temporality. It is this which undercuts the 
poem, the presence felt is to be substituted by the destruction of this moment, and by 
the structure of absence and lack which inhabits all inspected temporality. The presence 
of the other can serve as a metaphor for this presence - what was lacking within time is 
found outside it, and by another means (in intersubjectivity). Yet all the way through 
the poem the suggestion runs that there is no outside of time, that the transcendental 
ideal can only tell us of the cold temporal reality -a reality to which this ideal is a 
response, and one by which this response must be qualified and muted. 
! '' , 'Meeting point' is not, however, the only poem to endorse a movement towards 
the defeat of time. Indeed, it is possible to see this poem itself as a response to the 
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earlier 'Train to Dublin' (CP, p. 27). If 'Meeting point' seeks to examine a position 
outside of time, 'Train to Dublin' stays resolutely within, yet seeks to offer a sense of 
presence which comes through the progression of time -a presence achieved through, 
rather than in, time: 
Our half-thought thoughts divide in sifted wisps 
Against the basic facts repatterned without pause, 
I can no more gather my mind up in my fist 
Than the shadow of the smoke of this train upon the grass - 
This is the way that animals' lives pass. 
The poem's opening focuses on a notion of subjectivity as incomplete. Thoughts are 
'half-thought', and are then made to divide by the action of the train. We start, then, 
from a position of flux and deferment. Although apprehended by the speaker,, ýý, ý, 
experience is always beyond him, intangible. The familiar figure of 'holding' ('gather my 
mind up in my fist) is here used to resist any sense of full apprehension and control by 
the speaker. In this context the line 'this is the way that animal's lives pass'. seems 
odd. -, We are, perhaps more used to considering this kind of self-consciousness as a- 
uniquely human feature, one that distinguishes consciousness from the mental activities 
of animals. - It is precisely because animals do not possess this capacity for self- 
reflection that they are distinct from humans. But this stanza forms its meaning by 
focusing on the limits of this distinguishing cogito. It suggests that, although there is 
indeed this capacity for self-examination, this examination will always remain -- ý -w 
incomplete. Full self knowledge, in other words, will always be beyond the thinker. As 
such,, this distinguishing feature, when examined in itself, is an illusion. If animals lack 
this capacity,, so do humans. Paradoxically, it is through the exercising of this capacity 
that its claims to completion can be challenged. Through thought, the incompleteness 
of thought is discovered. 1 11 -11, -1 - 
It should come as no surprise that consideration of temporality is not far behind 
this analysis. 'The train's rhythm never relents', we are told, 'the telephone posts / Go 
striding back like the legs of time'. As in 'Now that the shapes of mist', the metaphor 
of a vehicle for the processes of consciousness is of vital importance. 'This poem is far 
more explicit about this figural device: -,, " 1- 1-"IýI 
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The train keeps moving and the rain holds off, 
I count the buttons on the seat, I hear a shell 
Held hollow to the ear, the mere 
Reiteration of integers, the bell 
That tolls and tolls, the monotony of fear. 
At times we are doctrinaire, at times we are frivolous, 
Plastering over the cracks, a gesture making good, 
But the strength of us does not come out of us., 
It is we, I think, are the idols and it is God 
'Has set us up as men who are painted wood. - 
'And the trains carry us about... ',, ýI" ýf ý;, 1 11, .I 
A number of recurrent features should be noted here., If we take the train as metaphor 
for conventional ordering or reality -a vehicle which 'carries us about', we should note 
the repetition of the notion of stasis mixed with that of movement-The train moves, - 
but the traveller is aware of stability, stasis, within the train itself., - From this position 
'inside' the vehicle come the observations of what is occurring 'outside'. As we shall 
see, ' the poem finally confuses and disrupts this sense of ! inside' and 'outside%- For the 
moment, however, we should be aware of the indications of repetition - those features 
which will later reappear in 'The glacier'. - Here the 'monotony of fear' allows a sense 
both of fear as a constant companion to this traveller, together with the 'fear' which is 
induced by the repetition of the one, -the identical, seeking to generate from itself a 
structure of differentiation in identity, rather than being the product of such a structure. 
This is, as we might guess, presented as an illusion. This 'one' is in fact the 'reiteration 
of integers' - items characterised by their relation to death (the tolling of the bell) and 
their hollowness, or absence. 
How might we characterize this fear more fully? What is the fear of? The 
reference to the doctrinaire and the frivolous allows a sense of this being the fear of 
leaving the train, of breaking with the conventions and procedures of established 
discourses. The sense of the doctrinaire and the frivolous indicates different positions 
within these discourses; they do not allow for any position outside it however. The 
strength does not come out of us. Any strength which does come out of us is not our 
own, but that of the discourses in which the subject exists. In addition, what potential 
for strength that the individual does possess lies dormant and useless. Hence the 
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inversion of the Idol/Man relation. This reversal at first glance appears to be presenting 
a conservative comment on the disruptions to this relation proposed by, say, 
Nietzsche. 27 In fact this is not the case. In considering the 'twilight of the idols' 
thinkers like Nietzsche provided a sense of the characterizing qualities of idols, as the 
result of human desires and, of course, fear. Against this revolt of the slaves should 
come the encounter of these idols with the Ubermensch. But MacNeice's poem offers 
no such resolution; Instead of considering the origins of the idols, and their demise with 
a new originating moment, the overthrowal of the ethics of fear, 'Train to Dublin' shows 
the previous genealogy of these discourses. Whether the idols are the invention of 
human will or not, subsequent human will is the invention of the idols. The 'men' who 
follow in the path of the idols live, in their identification with these idols, in their image, 
by following them, or by being subject to the will of which such idols are a metonym. 
And the effect of such an identification is the creation of a 'wooden' or inauthentic , 
being - inauthentic both by its identification with this representation, image or figure, 
and by the content of such a representation. ,--; 1! j1r- I- 
- The poem's own break with these discourses is different in character: 
... during a tiny portion of our lives we are not in trains, ý,. 
The idol living for a moment, not muscle-bound 
But walking freely through the slanting rain, 
Its ankles wet, its grimace relaxed again. 
All over the world people are toasting the King, 
Red lozenges of light as each one lifts his glass, 
But I will not give you any idol or idea, creed or king, 
I give you the incidental things which pass 
Outward through space exactly as each was. 
The mode of departure here is to concentrate on and render up the 'things themselves', 
rather than the things as they appear within established discourses. Such an enterprise 
implies that the discourse which conventionally represents things obscures their true 
nature. If we are the product of our own creations, so are the things which this 
production sees. - Notably, the things are represented in this new light as being in 
passage, or underwritten by their membership of a structure of difference. In this case 
the structure is both temporal and spatial: I AE 
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I give you the disproportion between labour spent 
And joy at random; the laughter of the Galway sea 
Juggling with spars and bones irresponsibly, 
I give you the toy Liffey and the vast gulls, 
I give you fuschia hedges and whitewashed walls. 
I give you the smell of Norman stone, the squelch 
Of bog beneath your boots, the red bog-grass. 
This detail is vividly rendered. ý; But there is a problem with this presentation which 
undercuts this plenitude and multiplicity. . MacNeice's use of the 
format of the toast ('I 
give you') introduces a moment which is both social and celebratory. The king is -ý 
presented and given approval by a consensus ('The Kingl'). - These performative and 
ritualistic linguistic moments recur in MacNeice's work. In this instance it is the 
communicative transaction between the speaker and implied reader to which our 
attention is directed. -- The detail is presented as a toast, to which we should assent. But 
It is presented also as a gift - the detail is rendered, given, by speaker to reader. *Yet, 
we are forced to conclude, we are not given the things, but signification of the things. 
And we are not given access to pure signs so much as to their representation in the 
speaker's discourse. And, - moreover, this detail is not provided to us when we are freely 
Inot on trains', it is observed, and passed on to us, from the train. Thus, the very detail 
which is supposed to liberate us from this vehicle is a product of it: 
I would like to give you more but I cannot hold ,IIIII 
This stuff within my hands and the train goes on; 
I know that there are further syntheses to which, 
As you have perhaps, people at last attain 
And find that they are rich and breathing gold. 
Within the rhetorical structure of the poem, the 'outside' of the train, where things 
appear both as presence and as themselves is an impossible ideal. We can only see 
within the train; the train of time is always moving, the mistake we should not make is 
to see things as identities rather than as difference. 
History and Difference: 'The heated minutes'. 'The sunlight on the garden'. 
MacNeice's movement, in 'Meeting point' and 'Train to Dublin', towards attention to 
communication and the other raises a significant issue. Previously we noted the 
possibility of seeing time conceived in terms of presence not as a natural phenomenon, 
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but as a historical, social, or ideological one., Time is characterised as the function of a 
particular social situation. MacNeice is far less explicit about precisely how a notion of 
presence or closure might interact with a particular social situation of which it is a 
product. Previously we have noted various departures from socially constructed 
closures within imaginary personal time into areas of time as difference which produce 
either a disturbing flux or a welcome multiplicity. - To see this multiplicity as something 
to be welcomed assumes a relatively stable subject position both to welcome it, and to 
have no fears of being overwhelmed by it. As the decade progressed, MacNeice's sense 
of this changed. Multiplicity gives over to flux when it threatens the subject. To see, 
history, entering this flux is, crucially, not to view it within the terms of subject, ý- 
pleasured or otherwise, 'but to see history entering this flux in its own terms. It is 
history which allowed the subject's departure into time as difference, but when history 
itself enters this realm, it is not the perspective of subject which is privileged, since this 
very subject position, marked out and constructed by history, is imperiled. Thus, the 
conclusion to lack, deferment, through time is not so much a completion in a final goal 
or 'synthesis,; but the radical destabilization of this subject within a structure of 
difference. ,-, -. Iý, I1 .1ý, .-_, - 
This historical quality of time; and its consequences for the subject, can be 
approached through 'The heated minutes' (Cprp. 86): 
The heated minutes climb, 
The anxious hill, 
The tills fill up with cash, 
The tiny hammers chime 
The bells of good and ill, 
And the world piles with ash 
From fingers killing time. 
If you were only here 
Among these rocks, 
I should not feel the dull 
The taut and ticking fear 
That hides in all the clocks 
And creeps inside the skull - 
If you were here, my dear. 
The now-familiar images for MacNeice's rendering of time-consciousness recur here: 
bells, ash, clocks, as in 'Meeting Point'. Indeed, the presence of the other is clearly-, 
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important in this poem too, exploring as it does a point in time when the other is not 
'there' in a moment outside time. She is away, we might say, 'and time is here., A 
sense of approaching doom pervades the poem. The nature of this doom, or the anxiety 
related to it, is unstated. We cannot be sure whether it is the result of some past - 
aberration, - known or unknown; or, indeed what the precise fate of the speaker is, and, 
how the other could offer a solution to this problem. ý, t Instead, we have a fragment, - 
without identifiable beginning or end, allowing a sense of groundless, or unexplained, 
anxiety. What this allows is the chance to consider a state of anxiety produced not 
solely. 
1by 
t ýhat is to occur, but by what is occurring at the present. A fear no of what 
time will produce, so much as the very stuff of time itself, - the vehicle in which this 
'producti I n' will take place. Such a production may be related to this condition, though 7 not ecessarily so. 
What characterizes this anxiety is the segmentation, martialling, or 'parcelling' of 
time. The filling of the 'tills with cash', the 'tiny hammers' with 'the bells of good and 
ill', both produce a sense of temporal progression noted in terms of the market. Time is 
both packaged and commodified in the terms of this poem. Fingers which 'kill time' 
suggests a nervous, but purposeless activity. We have a metonymic image of a 
cigarette smoker. They could equally be those of the till-operator, however, 'killing time' 
by imposing a certain type of closure upon it as in 'August', consuming it ('the world 
piles with ash') within an economy of expenditure. This enforced power over time, it 
would appear, is cause in itself for anxiety or unease. 'The taut and ticking fear / That 
hides in all the clocks' suggests a sense of tension and tense control. What the poem 
presents, therefore, is less a sense of an entirely 'temperate zone' being invaded by a 
destructive force from without, than a disruption from within. The anxiety of the 
moment implies that the apparently calm surface of this temporality which these devices 
martialled masked an enforced closure, a process of force or repression. This repressed 
other' is now revealing itself, as the 'fear which hides inside the clocks', exacting a 
force in turn, or simply revealing that the apparent serenity and stability of imaginary 
time is maintained by tension or control, in the closure of identity. Given this closure, 
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and the assumption of identity which characterized previous poems, it would not be too 
far-fetched to suggest that this 'other' consists of the knowledge that this stable identity 
is not self-originating, put predicated on difference; and that difference now threatens to 
reveal itself and engulf this identity. This aspect takes on a sinister edge as it 'creeps, 
inside the skull' - enters the subject; and enters as a predator against the identity which 
is now struggling so hard to defend itself. - This is not an act of human perception or- 
will, as in 'August' or 'Train to Dublin'. This is a motion of time itself, conceived 
synchronically, or impersonal history, if conceived diachronically. , Imaginary time is ... 
revealed to be incomplete in its notions of presence. This excluded other is now re- 
emerging in its own right to circumscribe identity in difference., 
It is this sense which should lead us to re-examine one of MacNeice's most 
famous thirties poems, 'The sunlight on the garden' (CP, p. 84). The poem is 
concerned, from the start, with the dynamics of temporal progression:,, --II 
The sunlight on the garden 
Hardens and grows cold, 
We cannot cage the minute 
Within its nets of gold, 
When all is told 
We cannot beg for pardon. 
We have the now familiar sense of time passing here. Initially we might feel that the 
poem reports nothing but the passing of a moment, the movement from daylight into 
night. Clearly this sense cannot be overlooked, particularly since it manages to place 
the action of the poem so effectively. But we should also direct our attention to the 
nature of the closing of the scene, with its mixture of a sense of stasis and progression, 
together with the sense of the intangibility of the moment. Hence, the moment 
'hardens' as daylight moves into the cool of the evening. Yet, we should note, it also 
'hardens' within the apprehension of the speaker, rendered as a presence within the 
perception of the present, and, of course, as a 'hard' and fast image within memory. 
With the image of the day fixed thus in consciousness, however, the speaker is also 
aware that this is merely the apprehension of the moment, and the sunlight, not 
necessarily the moment itself. 'We cannot cage the minute Within its nets of gold' - 
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we cannot fix or hold a passing moment; what we do fix and hold is not the moment 
but a representation of it. And, furthermore, this is a representation which, by its nature 
as static, reifies and falsifies the nature of the moment as passage or process., To this - 
we should add, of course; the poem's own status as representation, which 'cages' the 
moment at the same time as it denies that this can be achieved. Again, we are made 
aware that we have the sign and not the thing, and one of the qualities which imposes 
this gap between being and signification is the passage of the moment (where it is -- 
emptied of being) and the moment as passage, which representation for or in the mind 
cannot render. - Previously, images of 'hardening', in for instance 'August* and 'The 
Brandy glass', were associated with the 'stoppage* of temporality that occurs within 
imaginary time. - Here, it becomes a feature of its passing. Of course, imaginary time 
always made room for a type of passing, but failed to acknowledge that this passage 
had any effect on the moment as presence. - Instead, this change was either generated 
by identity, or used (nostalgically) to imply a presence now lost. -The difference in this' 
poem is that in 'August' the moment was, within imaginary time, 'hardened' as 
presence and the denial of passage or difference, from the beginning. An identity was 
established, and further moments engendered by such a moment. Here, the moment is 
felt to be in passage, and the 'hardening' which occurs is that of memory. The moment 
'grows cold' within the operations of memory, its 'freezing' is that of a remnant, or 
sign, emptied of being. Hence, the 'coldness' of such a memory serves to indicate the 
passage of the moment, rather than its continued, or past, presence. The speaker is 
under no illusion that the memory is to be mistaken for the thing itself or, indeed, that 
such a representation can offer us a sense of the moment as passage. It cannot offer 
us a full sense of the totality of time, or give a 'full' awareness of the 'full' moment, 
inhabited as this moment is by absence, and a place in a structure which eludes 
apprehension. It is this sense of the partial, illusory, and static nature of the 
representation in memory which distinguishes this 'hard' moment from that of the 
speaker in 'The brandy glass', where the identification was made by the speaker with an 
arrested representation of time, which he mistook for time itself. Here, there is no 
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expressed wish for the moment to return; the speaker knows it cannot. This does not 
mean that the relic is valueless., But with the value of this relic or sign goes the 
knowledge that it is a sign, its nature designated by the loss of the moment, and thus at 
a distance from this moment as passage. 
A further difference in this poem is the shift to an ethical, and by extension 
social and historical, basis for this time-consciousness: 'When all is told / We cannot 
beg for pardon'. That mention of 'pardon' raises the immediate question: pardon for 
what? Two responses suggest themselves - exoneration for a previously committed 
transgression or omission; exemption from a fate which is to befall the speaker. Both 
these senses are important for the poem, set up as they are as inevitable and 
threatening. Time is here moving forward with an inexorable and destructive 
momentum in which the representations of the speaker - as images or communicative, 
social, gestures, carry no power. The movement of time, and the impending fate, 
0 
exceeds the explanatory capacities of the speaker J'when all is told... '), and circumvents 
their human force: 
Our freedom as free lances 
Advances towards its end; 
The earth compels, upon it 
Sonnets and birds descend; 
And soon, my friend, -- 
We shall have no time for dances. 
The 'end' of the free lances offers a sense both of the closure of this freedom, and of its 
destiny - an end written-in to its beginning, or the nature of its existence. Again, we 
need not impute some organicist sense to this, so much as recognizing Mat1he fate 
awaiting the speaker is not that which awaits a 'temperate zone' of calm and stasis, but 
one which reveals what this appearance of calm excludes and represses, and what will 
inevitably return - the end is unavoidable, it is the earth, not human intention or will 
which compels this. And what it compels is intimately linked to the situation of the 
speaker. On the one hand, he and his addressee are intimately bound up in this closure 
and its impending consequences. But he is also at odds with such a position, and has 
been before. The earth compels a certain fate, causing all to 'descend' into it. But the 
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reason that these figures are air-borne to start with is their rejection of that which is ,t 
now being destroyed in this compulsion: IIIý .1 1- 
The sky was good for flying 
Defying the church bells 
And every evil iron 
Siren and what it tells: 
The earth compels, 
We are dying, Egypt, dying. 
The images of flight distance the speaker from the discourses of imaginary time that we 
encountered in 'August'. Yet the speaker is, whatever his previous position, fully 
imbricated in the destruction of this order. The quotation from Antony and Cleopatra, 
with its allusive capacities, only serves to ironically comment on this situation. Like the 
latinist in 'The glacier' this speaker has the capacity to dart around time in the shallows 
of the lexicon. Yet now this capacity can only be used towards elegy and the 
knowledge of destruction. 
The final stanza of the poem fully encapsulates the speaker's imbrication in, 
rejection of, complicity with, and innocence of, the closures of imaginary time, together 
with the fate which befalls these closures: 
And not expecting pardon, 
Hardened in heart anew, 
But glad to have sat under 
Thunder and rain with you, 
And grateful too 
For sunlight on the garden. 
This 'hardening in heart anew' may be read as an indication of a co-option into the 
structure of imaginary time, one 'hard' moment statically giving way to another in the 
perception of the present, rather than the past. But it could equally be read as a further, 
supplementary activity of memory, as the subject holds on to the memory because its 
passage, though acknowledged, has changed in character. Either way, this 'holding' is 
itself qualified by the 'gratitude' felt for the moment as passage -a gratitude which fully 
accepts this passage as unavoidable and necessary. Still, we need to have a sense of 
what the (unstated) end of the speaker might be. We have two indications of this. 
First, that time will not be separable, or observable by the speaker, so much as it will, as 
in 'The brandy glass, absorb him. Second, that the awaited fate indicates an 
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intensification of the structure of difference noted throughout this discussion. So much 
so, I think, that the notion of 'identity' recognised and enjoyed by the speaker within 
such a structure of difference, will be subsumed by absolute or pure difference. We 
have a threefold change in position, therefore. The speaker is circumscribed by a 
historical situation; this situation makes identity over to difference; this situation will 
absorb the speaker as subject. Hence, in this poem, history is not really 'trumped by 
time'. It is history which here does the trumping, absorbing the subject, together with 
the perceptions of time, as stable or unstable, equally. In this context, the refusal to 
retreat into the closures of imaginary time, to still be 'grateful' for the moment and its 
passage, marks a commitment to difference, and a rejection of inauthenticity, more 
complete than any we have so far seen. Here 'impurity', when set against the 
knowledge of 'pure' difference on the one hand, and the 'pure' presence of imaginary 
time on the other, becomes a commitment which is harrowing in its necessity. 
Hence, MacNeice's presentation and critique of temporality can hardly be said to 
retreat from the issues of thirties writers. Rather he engages with them from a different, 
more exacting position. Time is presented as one of the essential conditions of 
subjectivity; yet this subjectivity cannot be dissociated from a social, historical, and 
ideological context. That MacNeice did not share the optimism or easy assumptions of 
the mastering of history by the subject that we see in Cornford's poem does not mean 
that his analysis was any less thoroughgoing. Equally. 'the concentration on temporality 
does not reflect a retreat into abstraction or purely individual experience divorced from 
this historical context. Rather, by exploring such issues he presents their fully historical 
nature, together with the nature of the struggle that any engagement with history has to 
encounter. 
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Symbolic, but point, in the context of my discussion, to similarities between Derridean 
'presence' and the Lacanian 'Imaginary'. See Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (1199 1), pp. 91-2, 
98-102. 
24 John Montague, 'Despair and Delight', in Time Was Away., The World fo Louis 
MacNeice, edited by Terence Brown and Alec Reid (Dublin, 1974), pp. 123-27 (p. 125). 
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25 E. R. Dodds, 'Louis MacNeice at Birmingham', in Brown and Reid, pp. 35-38 (p. 37). 
26 See Alfred Brockman, The Movie Book: The 1930s (New York, 1986), p. 333. 
27 See Friedrich Nietzsche, TwAght of the Idoli and The Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 52-53. 
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Chapter Three 
ý,, The Look of the People: 
MacNeice, Writing and Society (1). 
I had never been to a communist meeting before, and what struck me 
was the fixed attention of the upturned rows of faces; faces of the Berlin 
working class, pale and prematurely lined, often haggard and ascetic, like 
the heads of scholars, with thin, fair hair brushing back from their broad 
foreheads. They had not come here to see each other or to be seen, or 
even to fulfil a social duty. They were attentive but not passive. They 
were not spectators. They participated, with a curious, restrained ,- 
passion, in the speech made by the red-haired man. He spoke for them, 
he made their thoughts articulate. They were listening to their own 
collective voice ... One day, perhaps, I should be with it, but never part of it. -- .1 
Christopher Isherwoodl 
In making external reality glow with our expression, art tells us about 
ourselves. No man can look directly at himself, but art makes of the 
Universe a mirror in which we catch glimpses of ourselves ... as we are in 
active potentiality of becoming in relation to reality through society. 
Christopher Caudwe112 
Rodd McGinn 
Dissecting correcting, peering, poking, analysing, revising, faking and 
falsifying - there you sit all day long goggling and giggling into your 
microscope. And there's one thing you always see when you look in 
your microscope. However long you look or however short you look, 
there's one thing you always see. You may have a thousand slides but 
you find it on every slide. It's infinitesimally small but you smile 
whenever you see it. That one thing's yourself. A little selfish self- 
deceiving bourgeois playing his tricks in the middle of a blob of scum. 
louis MacNeiCe3 
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One of the problems with modernism, it seemed to thirties writers, was that it looked 
like quietism. We have noted in the past that such an identification could be attributed 
to a misrecognition of modernism in an attempt to define an empirically-minded realist 
literary position, and to resist or ignore the challenges made to that position by 
modernism. Thirties writers, one might argue, thought modernism quietist because they 
didn't understand how it established a relationship between text and history. Nor did 
they understand how radically this relationship undermined their own. In the previous 
chapter we considered the relation between temporalt. ýand representation in 
MacNeice's texts, and how these two might in turn be related to historical context. In 
this chapter I will examine the question of representation and social context in its own 
right, so to speak. In this discussion I hope to take account of MacNeice as a thirties 
writer who nevertheless made productive use of modernist preoccupations - particularly 
the problem of representation - in his examination of text and history. 
We might begin this examination by suggesting that there is a less obvious 
account of the swing to a dominantly realist sense of the literary text during the thirties 
than the one above. This account is linked to the charge of quietism, though not 
identical with it. High modernism, we have been taught, was fascinated by the links 
between myth-'stories explaining and situating the subject in the world - and practice 
(the activity of the subject in the world). 4 Confronted with a panorama of western 
civilization as '... an old bitch gone in the teeth, a botched civilization', modernism 
placed itself at a distance from the dominant myths of such a civilization, whilst all the 
time remaining resolutely, sometimes joyfully, self-conscious of its own mythologizing. 5 
Fascination with the self-reflexive literary text, as a paradigm for all textual practices, 
stands as testimony to this. Instead of the old, failed, stories, we can have new good 
ones, which will remain conscious always that they are stories, unlike the older ones 
which mistook their illusions for the truth. 6 , In The Sense of an Ending Frank Kermode 
has offered a useful analysis of this project, using the term 'fiction' to describe what 
others have called 'myth': 
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We have to distinguish between myths and fictions. Fictions can 
degenerate into myths whenever they are not consciously held to be 
fictive. In this sense anti-Semitism is a degenerate fiction, a myth; and 
[King] Lear is a fiction. Myth operates within the diagrams of ritual, 
which presupposes total and adequate explanations of things as they are 
-and were; or is a sequence of radically unchangeable gestures. -- Fictions 
are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making 
change. Myths are the agents of stability, - fictions the agents of 
change. 7 
This dichotomy between the usefully fictive and the illusory truth has a parallel in 1. A. 
Richards's influential text for thirties writers, Science and Poetry 11926), which 
proposed a distinction between 'true' statements and 'pseudo-statements': 
A pseudo-statement is a form of words which is justified entirely by its 
effects in releasing or organizing our impulses and attitudes (due regard 
being had for the better or worse of these inter se); a statement, on the 
other hand, is justified by its truth, i. e.. its correspondence, in a highly 
technical sense, with the fact to which it points. 8 
On the face of it Richards may seem to be allowing for an understanding of the self- 
awarely fictive only if we can also be sure of some sense of 'truth', existing 'in a highly 
technical sense'. Kermode's analysis would tend to doubt this sense. Richards's 
comments, however, do throw some light on the simultaneously de-mythologizing and 
fiction-building strategies of modernism, in a passage following the one above: 
Statements true and false alike do of course constantly touch off 
attitudes and action. Our daily practical existence is largely guided by 
them. On the whole true statements are of more service to us than false 
ones. None the less we do not and, at present, cannot order our -- 
emotions and attitudes by true statements alone ... Nor is there any 
probability that we ever shall contrive to do so. This is one of the 
dangers to which civilisation is exposed. Countless psuedo-statements - 
about God, about the universe, about human nature, the relations of 
mind to mind, about the soul, its ranks and destiny - pseudo-statements 
which are pivotal in the organization of the mind, vital to its well-being, --, - 
have suddenly become, for sincere, honest and informal minds, 
impossible to believe. For centuries they have been believed; and the 
knowledge which has killed them is not of a kind upon which an equally 
fine organization of the mind can be based. (pp. 59-60) _I- 
Richards leaves unanswered the question whether these 'psuedo-statements' were 
believed as pseudo-statements, or as truth-statements, and whether they have been 
killed by enlightening truths, or by less useful pseudo-statements. - or both., In either 
case they are at an end, and Richards feels the need for more psuedo-statements to 
replace them, in thinking and living. 
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The question of thinking and living is an important one. The presence of sense- 
making structures in action as well as thought was an important feature of 'mythology'. 
Studies, like those of Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci, which insist on the nature 
of ideology as practice have tended to illuminate the relevance of this strategy: 
Accepting Croce's definition of religion as a conception of the world 
which has become the a norm of life (since the term norm of life is 
understood here not in a bookish sense but as being carried out in 
practical life) it follows that the majority of mankind are philosophers in 
so far as they engage in practical activity and in their practical activity (or 
their guiding lines of conduct) there is implicitly contained a conception 
of the world, a philosophy., The history of philosophy ... is the history of 
attempts made and ideological initiatives undertaken by a specific class 
of people to change, correct, or perfect the conceptions of the world that 
exist in any particular age and thus to change the norms of conduct that 
go with them; in other words, to change practical activity as a whole. 9 
This passage from Antonio Gramsci's 'Study of Philosophy' nicely emphasises the 
perceived link between thinking and living. 'World view' or 'norms of life', the 
'conception of the world' was nothing if it was not intimately bound up in practice,, or 
indeed a practice in itself. Hence it could be argued that although placing itself at a 
distance from bourgeois literary practice, and any other practices for that matter, the 
mythopoeic position cannot be easily seen as contemplative or quietist, since this re- 
interpretation and re-invention of ideological structures is itself a practice, an activity of 
change. The problem comes when one fails to be self-conscious of this invention or 
mythologizing, in the way that the bourgeoisie is, or indeed, as one might argue, in the 
way that thirties writers were. 
By this account, not only were thirties writers unable to assess the potency of 
fictions in life; in breaking with these practices. - swinging back to 'realism', they merely 
placed themselves within a different mythology. A mythology that had, in fact, ceased 
to be aware that it was a mythology. But if thirties writers can be accused of naivety in 
this respect, as they have been, in this study and elsewhere, such a naivety can be seen 
perhaps, as a mistaken solution to a genuine problem in modernism. For if modernism 
maintains a self-reflexively ironic stance to established mythological practice - placing 
itself either within a space separate from dominant ideological currents, or at an ironic 
distance from them - what happens to modernism when something happens within such 
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ideological parameters, which seems to demand some kind of statement or action 
precisely from within such parameters? Something like, say, the rise of Fascism, mass 
unemployment, or the Spanish Civil War? Kermode makes the point that his ., - 
'fictions ... are not myths, and they are not hypotheses; you neither rearrange the world 
to suit them, nor test them by experiment, for instance in the gas-chambers' (p. 41). 
The nature of the involvement of thirties writers within these causes could, it is true, be 
put down to their naivety. But equally, we might say that it was the failure of 
modernism to adequately theorise its own position in relation to such events which 
contributed to the swing to a naive social realism which dominated thirties writing. 
Ideology, mythology, fiction-making may definitely be conceived of as practices, and 
intimately bound up in all practices. But it is not always clear how the links between the 
practices of mythologizing and de-mythologizing and mythsl in (or of) practice can be 
established. Usually we make gestures in this direction, to something like 'a re-invention 
of social relations' and hope for the best. Or, like Kermode, we offer fictions as fictions 
precisely because they maintain some distance between themselves and the world, their 
fictive status guaranteed by their detachment from the impurities of actual action as 
much as by their rigoroas self-awareness and self-interrogation. 
We might, indeed, -see modernism's failure to allow some bridge between theory 
and ideology, and the reinstatement of realism as the dominant literary mode during the 
thirties as -a retreat from the questions which might have led modernism to establish its 
most urgent answers. This would be a retreat by modernism from new grounds of 
history, when history was entering with pressing urgency into the space of writing. The 
choice, in this instance, would not be between self-reflexivity and history, but how to 
examine self-ieiflexivity in history, admitting, in this instance, that there were powerful 
links to be made between the text (self-reflexive and otherwise) and history. Among 
thirties writers there were those who knew that such a choice existed, and that retreat 
was untenable. 
Reflecting on the Thirties. 
In a report by John Grierson on the growth of the Documentary Film Unit in 
Britain during the thirties we find one instance of the textual and the social coinciding in 
a most suggestive way. Grierson draws attention to accusations of 'subversion' which 
met the release of the first efforts of the fledglin. g unit: 
Though the Minister of Health expressed publicly his gratitude for the 
Nutrition Film, it is wise to remember that, when the film was first made, 
it was branded by political busybodies as 'subversive'. Silly enough it 
sounds, but obstacle after obstacle was put in the way of the 
documentary film whenever it set itself to the adult task of performing a 
public service. Sometimes it came in the cry of the Censor that the 
screen was to be kept free of what was called 'controversy'. 10 
What, we might wonder, was the cause of this 'controversy'? Grierson offers a clue in 
another essay on the same period: 
When the posters of the Buy British Campaign carried for the first time 
the figure of a working man as a national symbol, we were astonished at 
the Empire Marketing Board to hear from half a hundred Blimps that , we 
were 'going Bolshevik. The thought of making work an honoured 
theme, and a workman, of whatever kind, an honourable figure, is still 
liable to the charge of subversion. 11 
Perhaps the charge was not entirely without grounds. We should not just consider here 
what or who was being represented in these films, but to whom this representation was 
being made. And of course to what ends:: 
There are proper limits ... to freedom of speech which the cinema must 
regard. Its power is too great for irresponsible comment, when 
circulations like the March of Time has won the field for the elementary 
principles of public discussion. The world, our world, appears suddenly 
and brightly as an oyster for the opening: for film people - how 
strangely - worth living in, fighting in and making drama about. And 
more important still is the thought of a revitalized citizenship and of a 
democracy at long last in contact with itself. (p. 73) 
Noble aims perhaps. Of primary interest for this study however, is the co-incidence of 
textual and social innovation in this cultural moment. It is hard to say whether the 
effect of portraying the lives and experiences of ordinary people here serves to 
democratize the effects of cinema, or to raise 'the people' to the status of film stars. 
The former would open up the cinema to the vibrant world of everyday experience; the 
latter would transform this experience, through the 'dream factory' of the cinema, into 
the sfitus of myth. In both cases da'ily life is valo, ri2c-4ý It can'be seen as a subject 
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worthy of the cinema-goers' attention in its genuini 'democratic' form; equally, it can be 
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seen as a subject worthy of being seen in the same terms as any other Hollywood 
artefact. 
We can say that the position of the observer is of prime importance in this 
communicative transaction. 'The People', that's to say, are privileged to view 
representations of themselves; through this they are able to come 'into contact with 
themselves', recognizing this 'self' for the first time. And this mirror-image works in at 
least two ways. The 'worker' is presented individually, and as Grierson puts it, as a 
citizen, or a something entering into the space of citizenship. The viewed worker is in 
this space; the viewing worker is placed within it by identification with the viewed and, 
as Grierson puts it, by the very act of viewing. One comes into contact with one's 
citizenship simply by watching oneself. Or, crucially, by viewing oneself in a new light: 
part recognition, part construction, which in turn allows the creation of 'citizenship'. 
Documentary representation, in this account, could not 'present' the real without 
changing that reality and the perception of it by the viewer. Behind Grierson's account 
is the dim recognition that individuals are being represented as members of 'The People', 
and the audience is being interpellated as members of that same 'People'. It is, in fact, 
a strange mixture of construction and Narcissism, in which subject and object relations 
are re-defined as they are confused. It is not so much that the pre-existent 'citizen' is 
merely allowed wider contact with other citizens, but this very notion of citizenship is 
constructed from the raw material of subjective identification. It is, furthermore, a 
moment as powerfully textual as it is social. It is this admixture of the social with the 
textual which will, in different ways, occupy this discussion. 
One of the things Grierson is conscious of in his essays is not just marking out 
new representations, but the position of these representations within a new textual 
space. Primarily this is a cultural space, specifically that of the mass audience - hence 
there is a need for directorial 'responsibility'. Grierson makes the following interesting 
point about the responsibility of 'Realism': 
There are too many ... cosmopolites of the world's cities, to whom Lancashire is only Gracie Fields's hundred-thousand a year and the Clyde 
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not even a whisper in consciousness ... The West End Stage, for all the 
presence of Bridie and O'Casey, has lost the accent of the people. As 
for the literary men, half a dozen have the power together to blow the 
unreality to smithereens, but they are not so much in love with reality as, 
to think the explosion worth their effort. (p. 81) 
On the face of it, Grierson's comments rehearse the clich4rof 'literary men' inhabiting 
the Ivory Tower, cut off from the vitality of the real. But Grierson is making a less 
obvious point here. Literary men are in touch with this reality, closely_in touch to have 
the power and the insight to blow the unreality of film-life to smithereens if they so 
desired. What stops them doing so is not ignorance of the real, but a judgement on it. 
The real, he says, is 'not worth their effort'. Writing, we must assume, has the power 
to affect change, but at the same time engenders a bleak pessimism which renders such 
change, textual or social, superfluous. Far from leading to a state of blissful ignorance, ' 
writing is associated with a knowledge, or the construction of a knowledge; which puts 
into question the validity of Grierson's realist project. The aesthetic is not an escape 
from the real, but a judgement on it, or the construction of something which puts the 
real, its 'reality' or worth, in question., In this world, as we shall see, subject and 
object are similarly confused, the 'looking' of the people, together with the 'look' that 
would seek to constitute such a people, in addition to the implications of looking at that 
look, are all placed under examination. 
Looking at Otherness: 'Circe'. 
MacNeice's cryptic poem 'Circe' (CP, p. 19) May seem at first glance to be a 
long way from the concerns of Grierson and the DFU: 
Something of glass about her, of dead water, 
Chills and holds us, 
Far more fatal than painted flesh or the lodestone of live hair 
This despair of crystal brilliance. 
Narcissus' error 
Enfolds and kills us 
Dazed with gazing on that unfertile beauty 
Which is our own heart's thought. 
The poem seems initially to be working with the familiar themes of Circe as wildly - 
different from her observers in one sense, in another fearfully the same. The 
mythologies of the witch-enchantress Circe had received recent attention in the chapter 
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dealing with this mythology in Joyce's Ulysses. Here the transformative power of the 
witch-as-whore, '* changing Bloom into something different from himself, but the same as 
a 'deeper' self, ' is emphasised. 12 ,ýr, ,- 11 11-"I 
r- 
Prior to this articulation, the Circe myth had featured prominently in fin-de-siecle 
culture, as Bram Dijkstra has noted: ý-- 11 ý' -ý ,. 11 1- 1ý .'iI 
Given women's presumed regressive tendencies and their consequent 
interest in bestial relationships, it was ... not surprising that the painters of 
the fin do siecle were especially eager to use Circe as a cautionary ,Iý 
example of the eternal feminine. This Homeric witch's habit of turning 
men into swine was, after all, a clear indication of man's need to 
maintain his distance from the animal-woman. 13 
This analysis emphasises the difference between woman-beast and man. It is man's 
desire that implies some attraction to this beast, such desire is within him; but the myth 
shows that man can be transformed into something he is not, or indeed, what he never 
was. 
In MacNeice's poem this position is confused. The fascination of Circe emerges 
because of her status as fantasized other. It is not so much that this desire is shown to 
exist, brought to the surface, ý and man is transformed into something that he didn't 
know he was. Rather,, she exists because of this desire., In short, subject and object 
are interdependent in this poem. From the start, Circe's status as artifice, or 
representation, is emphasised. Circe possesses 'something of glass about her' (what 
kind of glass? opaque; transparent, reflective? ), which in turn is associated with 
stagnation ('dead water'), freezing, and possession: 'Chills and holds us'. The 
following two lines serve to further the definition of the status of Circe. She is 'far more 
fatal' than the painted flesh of 'made-up' women, or of women as represented in 
painting, or indeed than the 'draw' where lodestone indicates some kind of essentialist 
compulsion of living hair. In singling out 'hair' as a synecdoche of women, or of women 
as construction or signifier of male desire, the poem does, in fact, confuse the elements 
of 'nature' and 'artifice', 'in 'normal' or 'real' desire and its objects. Circe is not so much 
different in kind from these objects, as in degree. Hence 'this despair of crystal 
brilliance' - Circe emerges almost as a perfected representation of the imperfectly 
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organic, as the image forced upon us by despair at the imperfection of other forms of 
artifice Ithe made-up, the painted), itself forced upon the organic. Additionally, of 
course, Circe is the source of its own despair. Despair at imperfection is confronted 
with a new despair once some kind of perfection is reached, in the dazzling brilliance of 
representation, by the fact that Circe is a representation - an image, a frozen surface, a 
meaning without being. -ýIIIZI( ''I 
--. The particularly thirties sense of this poem might be seen as calling into question 
what Terry Eagleton has called 'the middle-class's pornographic appetite for the real'. 14 
Obviously all artifice is constructed, but not all artifice is overtly seen as wholly : 
mirroring the desire of the subject. MacNeice's speaker seems to invent his Circe. In 
this he differs from, say, Bloom, who runs across her. This 'finding' of the self- 
sufficient object is forbidden in MacNeice's poem: 
Narcissus'error 
Enfolds and kills us - 
Dazed with gazing on that unfertile beauty 
Which is our own heart's thought. 
These lines should introduce to us a confusion which has been troubling our reading up 
to now. Who is this Circe? If our gaze is that of Narcissus, are we Circe? And who is 
the 'we' that is cast in this role? Of course we should note that MacNeice is here 
assimilating a number of myths. Circe was not Narcissus, nor Narcissus Circe. But 
such a collapsing has to be mutually illuminating, at first at least, if this intertextual 
moment is productive. Narcissus, as one critic has reminded us, 'drowned for not 
recognizing solitude was vacancy and seeking to become identical with himself, or more 
precisely with what Lacan would call his specular image'. 15 This reference to specular 
image would seem to throw light on Circe's status as image or representation, as well 
as on the gaze, and the emphasis on death which pervades the poem. But still, how are 
we Narcissus? How can the otherness of Circe, which enthrals us, and which lies 
always beyond us in representation be the image of ourselves and our solitude? 
Here we come to the crux of Circe's otherness, and her emptiness. For the 
other' of Circe, as our construction, and construction-as-other, tells us not so much 
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about the other as about ourselves and our desire. The 'glass' of Circe allows us a 
mirror-image of our desire, when initially we thought this was the clear glass of our 
perception seeing the other as it is. Hence it is an image which 'enfolds' us, turns us in 
upon ourselves at precisely the point at which we thought we were reaching out of 
ourselves to grasp lovingly at the other., 'That unfertile beauty', then, offers us 'our 
own heart's thought' - we don't see the other, since the other can only be seen through 
the lens or glass of ourselves, or as our own construction. The infertility of the image 
suggests a newly-recognized sense of claustrophobic enclosure. What seemed to lie 
freshly beyond the self is in fact a stale projection from within. We do not look upon 
the other, but on the other as it exists as constructed object of our desire as subject. 
Given this sense of self-enclosure, where self and other are misrecognized and 
confused, we might see parallels between the self's inability to come into contact with 
the 'real' other and the subject's inability to coincide with itself, as in the myth of 
Narcissus. Circe appears as representation, image emptied of being, in the same way 
that Narcissus's imaginary other did. However, here the inability of Narcissus to 
become identical with himself, to achieve full self-knowledge, unity of subject and 
object, is linked to the subject's inability to possess Circe, to come into contact with 
Circe as herself. But the gap between subject and object which prohibited full self- 
knowledge in the myth of Narcissus must here be restated. Here, what lies beyond the 
subject is not so much the unity of subject and object, nor even clear knowledge of the 
'real' Circe, but the ability of the subject to come to knowledge of his own processes of 
construction, whereby the real other is known only as 'other'. This is his inability, in 
other words, to stand outside himself and fully look upon his gaze. The subject cannot 
look at what he looks with. 
Paradoxically, this situation, where the subject is split irrevocably and inhabited 
by an unfulfillable desire for unity or coincidence induces a wish for self-forgetting. This 
unselfconsciousness is manifested by an identification with 'the beasts' - the very thing 
to be resisted in conventional renderings of the Circe myth. As such, we might read it 
as a motion towards authenticity of a kind. If Circe mirrors the desires of the subject in 
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disguised form, becoming a beast, becoming what one really is, at least avoids these 
disguises: 
Fled away to the beasts 
One cannot stop thinking; Timon 
Kept on finding gold. ,-I ,ýIII- !ýýIIýI . ý,, .,. ý--, t_ 1, In parrot-ridden forest or barren coast 
A more importunate voice than bird or wave 
Escutcheoned on the air with ice letters 
Seeks and, of course, finds us 
(Of course, being our echo). 
However, the poem tells us that this hoped-for oblivion is impossible. The 'voice' which 
finds us out in our isolation, our being, in which we hope we will exist without thinking, 
will always be our own. The 'outside' will always be perceived through the lens of the 
'inside'. The 'inside' will always be inhabited by a space in which the subject appears as 
object to itself, always appears in terms the same as the 'outside: 
Be brave, my ego, look into your glass 
, And realise that that never-to-be-touched 
Vision is your mistress. 
The poem ends with a confirmation of the impossibility of healing this split within the 
subject. The vision which offers itself to be touched, brought into contact or unity with 
the self, must always remain out of reach. The object cannot coincide with subject in 
the self, one cannot 'know thyself', since this knowledge would have to include some 
perspective on that knowledge itself. However, this incomplete knowledge on the part 
of the subject must also include the -way in which the self comes to know the other. 
The poem mirrors the desire of the subject to coincide with itself with the desire of the 
self to come to knowledge of the other. The 'never-to-be-touched / Vision' is what is 
beyond the subject in both cases. Furthermore, what is beyond the subject is precisely 
that 'vision' (not merely the object of that vision) itself. 'Vision' appears in these lines 
as a means to looking at something else, but also as something which needs to be 
apprehended in its own right. The gaze can never complete itself since to do so would 
require it to look upon ltself. ý The impossibility of this ever being achieved, the 
impossibility of the eye ever seeing itself, achieves its particular significance through the 
fact that the eye is an agent of construction. These processes of construction are 
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among those things hidden in that part of this object ('vision'), the entirety of which 
must always remain beyond our grasp. ýIiII It* 
This kind of attention to the paradoxes of subject and object may seem a long 
way from any recognizable sense of the social, -or any historical context. And certainly 
the emphasis in 'Circe' on the nature of solitude does not imply a fully worked-out sense 
of the 'other' as social entity. However, in our examination of Grierson's account of the 
DFU we noted this kind of confusion between subject and object, which was intimately 
linked to questions of selfhood and otherness., It was, moreover, crucially linked to 
questions of construction within a social formation. The social implications of this, 
poem, therefore, are that this kind of construction and incompleteness experienced by 
the subject in isolation may extend to the subject within a social context. We should 
remember, therefore, that in a quiet though totalizing way Auden saw the characteristic 
world-view of the age to be 'the interdependence of Observed and Observer' and that 
the interdependence of subject and object formed the main thesis of Caudwell's Illusion 
Aad-Realit . 
16 Hence, - the preoccupation with self and other, linked to the problem of 
observation and representation cannot but have significance for the period. In order to 
consider the full 'social' implications of these preoccupations, we must look at this 
question of representation and the other a little more closely. 
Borders of Representation: 'Upon this beach'. 
In 'Upon this beach' (CP, p. 19) the problem of representation takes centre- 
stage: 
Upon this beach the falling wall of the sea 
Explodes its drunken marble 
Amid gulls' gaiety. 
Which ever-crumbling masonry, cancelling sum, 
No one by any device can represent 
In any medium. 
Turn therefore inland, tripper, foot on the sea-holly, 
Forget those waves' monstrous fatuity 
And boarding bus be jolly. 
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The poem establishes an opposition between the solitary romantic traveller, absorbed in 
a spiritual journey as much as an actual one, and the thirties tourist, or day-tripper. As 
we have seen in 'Now that the shapes of mist, the latter's journey is not without its 
metaphoric freight,, and tropes of the frontier and journey are clearly relevant to this 
travelleres experience 'upon this beachl. - But MacNeice's poem, obviously at odds with 
the romantic solitary, is not quite in keeping with the codes of the thirties day-tripper. -, 
What is striking about the poem is its contradictory affirmation of representation, and 
the simultaneous denial that such a representation can take place. The poem claims to 
represent what it says cannot be represented; it affirms what it denies and denies what 
it affirms. One way out of this paradox (or contradiction) is to see the poem offering 
some imaginative gesture towards a 'full' experience, which *we share by identification 
with the figure in stanza one, but which is emptied by time, or by the representations of 
the text., We know that this is but a representation of experience, not experience itself; 
but since we are 'experienced' readers we can make an identification with this 
experience, and with its loss, even though it would be absurd to claim that the 
experience is available to us in any way other than through the text. ' 
-I What this poem does, however, is to put this identification and shared 
knowledge into question. Such an identification is not merely hampered by the 
contamination of time or the text into unmediated subjectivity - we are not at a loss only 
because the moment is passed, or must be related by language. Rather in this poem the 
moment is privileged precisely because it cannot be narrated or communicated. 
Following this initial reading, therefore, we would have to assert that, not only can we 
come to this moment through the text, but that our identification is made possible 
because such an identification cannot be made. We do not wholly share in the moment 
and its loss, but we share in the impossibility of having such an act of sharing take 
place. Hence, by refusing an act of identification; but assuming that because we cannot 
know what we are identifying with we are able to understand it, we somehow smuggle 
this act of identification in through the back door. 
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Another reading might accept more rig arously the separation of the sign and 
meaning, or the sign and reference. We have the sign and not the thing. In the light of 
the injunction in stanza two that what is represented 'No one by any device can 
represent / In any medium' we might say that stanza one cannot re-present the failing 
wall of the sea, the gulls. What it does is to represent them in the sense that it gives us 
an image or figure of such things, never the things themselves. Meaning'without being, 
in fact. However, we must then question the relation between these two elements. ' If 
this 'being' is always already absent or 'beyond' us, how can we speak of it? What can 
be the status of the 'it' which makes reference to something we cannot fully refer to? - 
Doesn't the very awareness of this 'gap' imply some knowledge of the, 'full' being, of 
which we have only the empty sign? - Some privileged knowledge, that is, of the thing 
which our sign replaces or supplements? 
At this point we might object that MacNeice really is writing about time rather 
than representation. The moment is absent because it Is lost to time. Whatever 
MacNeice had to say elsewhere about time, here, at least it is used to suggest a 
moment which is irrecoverably lost because it was once there in its fullness. But we 
should note that this poem takes place entirely in the present. Our sense of the 
impossibility of 'representing' the scene must be infected by the sense of the ý- ý', 
impossibility of representation in the present, to the self as it were. Even if we were to 
allow this reading, it would not solve the problem of the nature of the 'it' to which we 
refer, which we cannot refer to, but speak of as though we can. 
,- It is clear-then, that rather than there being a 'something' which we cannot 
represent, we must conclude that there is only representation. ' It is not that the 
'original' of which we have the 'copy' has been lost, but that we can only see this 
original through its representation., Yet we talk about this original as though we have 
some knowledge of it,, even whilst stressing that the original is special precisely because 
such knowledge cannot be had. --The poem offers only a text, and in frustrating our, 
desire to see 'beyond' it, by denying that such a move can be made, yet all the while 
insisting that it in some way has been made, we are led to question our sense of the 
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status of this 'something', and are persuaded that we can come to it only through the 
text, or through representation. 
The poem leads us, then, in two directions. On the one hand, as in 'August', 
we are left in the double-bind of a representation which must always question its own 
representative status. A fiction, to use Frank Kermode's phrase, that is always aware 
that it is fictive., For reference to be made, there must be some existential reality 
beyond the sign. Yet we can come at such a reality only through, or more accurately in 
the sign. The beyond must always, it seems, remain beyond us. ' f 
- On the other hand,, it is possible to see this 'beyond', not as a something, but as 
a nothing. What lies 'beyond' representation, apprehension, - or contemplation, this , 
'ever-crumbling masonry, cancelling sum' cannot be represented because it would., by,,,, 
definition, put the whole status of that representation, apprehension, or contemplation 
into question., The speaker's object, the 'tripper', stands on the beach, Arnold-like, on 
the border between stability and instability, which would threaten to overwhelm him. 
The destructive energy of this sea would seem to indicate a force which cannot be 
represented by the speaker since it would itself absorb and cancel this speaker and his 
speech, and of course, the identification made within this reading. 
Such a force would help to explain the dichotomy of beach/bus in the poem: 
individual perception of bitter truth versus social forgetfulness. It is impossible for the 
'tripper' to speak of this nothingness. Therefore, to assume that such an act of speech 
can be made is to err. The tripper's bus journey is not made in ignorance of the solitary 
romantic*s perception of nothingness. Rather it exposes the illusory notion that the 
solitary has come into contact with this nothingness and could still be there to tell the 
tale about it. Such tale of the 'monstrous fatuity' of the waves would only keep this 
fatuity at bay, since it cannot be contemplated. Hence the jollity of the communal 
traveller is partly that of forgetfulness. Yet it is not illusion, since this environment is 
always circumscribed by the existence of the 'border', of which the speaker remains 
aware. At the same time, it allows a space for joy, knowing that joy is always similarly 
circumscribed. The 'foot on sea-holly', poised as it is on the edge of land and sea neatly 
97 
encapsulates this position., It is one of existing within the closures of the imaginary, yet 
allowing for the recognition that this is the imaginary. What seems stable is liable to 1 
undercutting, and to change. - To forget the absence of meaning is not to trust entirely in 
one's own meanings. The social nature of this situation must, therefore, raise questions 
about the social nature of this closure, these meanings, which the instability of waves 
would threaten to disrupt. 
I One way, 'therefore; in which this cryptic and densely packed poem would seem 
to raise questions about the social is through the interrogation of its own principles. It 
is aware of a 'beyond' to its knowledge, yet has no way of knowing such a beyond. In 
many ways this is similar to the speaker in 'Circe', questioning his Ego and gaze, yet , 
being unable to stand outside that gaze, or to look at that look., In turn, we should note 
the similarity between this and Grierson's implied viewer - looking at the self; unable to 
look at that look. 
Social Representation: 'Nature Morte', 'Birmingham', 'Christmas Shopping'. 
This sense of representation as a stabilizing, yet fragile, phenomenon is given an 
explicitly social angle in 'Nature Morte' (CP, p. 21): 
As those who are not athletic at breakfast day by day 
Employ and enjoy the sinews of others vicariously, 
Shielded by the upheld journal from their dream-puncturing wives 
And finding in the printed word a multiplication of their lives, - 
So we whose senses give us things misfelt and misheard 
Turn also, for our adjustment, to the pretentious word 
Which stabilises the light on the sun-fondled trees. 
Newspapers here allow both an escape from the quotidian in the vicarious fantasies of 
mass culture, and a further containment within it. The dream, which makes available a 
reality wider than the everyday, allows a vicarious enjoyment of this 'athletic' reality. In 
turn, this reality shields and protects the reader from the 'puncturing' of such dreams 
within the quotidian. But this text cannot help but be a 'shield' against the full force of 
this non-quotidian environment. The journal-reader is here caught. On the one hand he 
enters into a packaged imaginary 'other' world, which provides compensation for the 
absences contained in the quotidian. On the other, this identification forbids activity 
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within 'real' life and desire, forbidding in turn a proper appraisal of action within the 
quotidian, which is the only site for the application of these desires. The double-bind of 
'employment/enjoyment' -a contract established with pleasure - serves to emphasise 
this situation. Equally, the 'multiplication' of life implies the adoption of a second 
vicarious life with identification with the athlete, which also promises a supplement or 
addition to 'life' in images of individualistic endeavour. But this identification is, in fact, 
mirrored by thousands of others making the same identification. Paradoxically, in 
striving for transcendence and individuality, the reader only increases his uniformity. 
This is, perhaps, a familiar argument in the conjuncture of mass civilization and 
minority culture. Oddly, however, the category of language (a possible preserve of the 
I aesthetic' transcendence) is taken to form some kind of continuity with this practice. 
Certainly the speaker is in contact with a wider 'aesthetic' environment - his domain is 
that of creative nature, the sun and trees. ýA nature, in fact, infused with life, activity 
and sense. The sun 'fondles' trees. However, this wider, perhaps solitary, and more 
creative, scene is itself caught with the stabilizing 'pretence' of language. Phenomena is 
here 'stabilised' by this linguistic force. Language appears as an abstraction. 
The speaker is himself clearly caught within a double-bind. 'Outside' of 
language in a sensual domain the world is 'misfelt' or 'misheard'. It is unclear whether 
this deviation from some established 'norm' enjoys the approval of the speaker or not. i- 
The misrecognition might be a deviation from worn out conventions; or it may indeed be 
a kind of perception, outside language, which is indeed prone to indeterminacy and 
error. Equally, it is unclear whether a position fully outside language can be achieved. 
We cani however, be sure that one must abstract, within the 'pretence' of language, to 
make the world apprehendable. This, in fact, places us within the text, removed from 
vital experience, where language provides us with the 'ghost' of immediate experience. 
In its turn, the text provides us with the ghost of that text. The reference to 
'photograph' as a figure for 'realist' representation is, in context, highly telling. 
Language is, however, an ordering which places us at ease, simply given, providing for 
our contentment. But how far can this critique of the 'pretensions' of language extend? 
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Newspapers, signifiers of mass culture, and the 'death' of concrete individual , 
experience, are easy targets. Does this 'death' within the word (implied in the reference 
to 'ghosts') extend to deviantly 'aesthetic' productions, realist or otherwise? Certainly 
we cannot escape the implication that, dealing in language, " these productions must in -ýI 
some way partake of the qualities existing in the lines '... no matter how solid and staid 
we contrive / Our reconstructions. They suffer by the fact that they are 
reconstructions, and that they remain solid and fixed. 
But of course this is not the whole story: '.. even a still life is alive / And in your 
Chardin the appalling unrest of the soul / Exudes from the dried fish and the brown jug 
and Pho-6wl'The stability of the 'death' of the thing is here disrupted within the aesthetic 
object - what seems to be stable and 'held' within the construction of the 'still life' 
(where 'still' implies both 'stable' and 'as yet') is not what it appears. The homology of 
'life/death' which controls the poem is confused in these lines. Although a stabilizing 
force in daily life, the text is shown to have a radically destabilizing life of its own. In 
the same way that the 'death' of representation occasioned by abstraction is 
coterminous with our sense of experience as 'life', so this 'life' of disruption is not 
associated with an exhilarating energy, but with a restlessness. It is an energy removed 
from the subject-guided energies of 'life'. Furthermore, it is not a return to immediate 
experience. The speaker remains firmly within the confines of the representation. What 
that representation presents, however, is the inadequacy of its construction, the 'unrest 
of the soul' through fish, jug and bowl. Desire is seen to characterize the accurate, 
accurate because 'aesthetic', representation of objects. A representation, that is, which 
resists its closure and 'freezing' of the object within the image, or meaning within sign. 
A representation which allows us to see not the object but the text, whose temporary 
closure gives way to instability. 
What should also interest us in this poem is the sense that presumed deviations 
from certain norms are re-contained within other norms or substitutions. Deviation, it 
seems, might merely be an appearance. In this sense the category of 'aesthetic' as a 
form of liberation is under question in this poem. This must, of course, have important 
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consequences for a reading of the dominant pre-occupations of representation, and 
particularly realism, in the thirties. These consequences extend to our consideration of 
representation as social, of the representation of the social (in the literary text and 
otherwise). How might, for instance, a reading of 'Birmingham' (CP, 17) be influenced 
by this emphasis on the 'pretentious word'?: 
Smoke from the train-gulf hid by hoardings blunders upward, the brakes of cars 
Pipe as the policeman pivoting round raises his flat hand, bars 
With his figure of a monolith Pharaoh the queue of fidgety machines 
(Chromium dogs on the bonnet, faces behind the triplex screens). 
Behind him the streets run away between the proud glass of shops, 
Cubical scent-bottles artificial legs arctic foxes and electric mops, 
But beyond this centre the slumward vista thins like a diagram: 
There, unvisited, are Vulcan's forges who doesn't care a tinker's damn 
Birmingham was, we know, a thirties city. Home-town of Auden, source of 
instruction for his austere classicism, the entirely un-exotic, it was used by other writers 
as a source of instruction. J. B. Priestley used it to shake the complacency of southern 
expectations about the city and about the condition of England: 'Did all this look like the 
entrance into the second city in England? It did. It looked like a dirty muddle. '17 Which 
is, in itself, a significant question: How can the 'muddle' of the second city of England, 
be consistent with its status as signifier of Englishness? Priestley's task, it would seem, 
is one of de-mythologizing, using a new, authentic realism to replace the myths of 
Englishness and of Birmingham, the new city for the new light-industrial Britain. 
MacNeice's task is different, namely to call into question the perception of this social 
entity, in the process drawing attention to the social nature of this perception. 
The poem, in fact, plays with notions of the 'familiarity' of the social 
environment. This play includes received notions of what makes up such a landscape 
and of the observer within such an environment. The poem's initial negotiation is 
between Birmingham as familiar, and as phantasmagoria. The figures of smoke from the 
train, brakes of cars, traffic control serve as metonymies of the city, also of social 
realism. The characterizing quality is activity. This structure is then disrupted by the 
'figure of a monolith Pharaoh'. In a Dickensian manoeuvre, the familiar is rendered 
strange. This trajectory is continued in the lists of chrome, unknown faces, arbitrary 
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commodities behind shop-faces. ' The material is recognizable, but conceived of as 
possessing an arbitrary, 'contingent quality. In turn this leads off into the remote, again 
phantasmagoric 'Vulcan's forges' - known of, but not known about, or entirely 
knowable; familiar but alien. "It is not certain, therefore, whether this is the perspective 
of the outsider or insider. Use -of definite articles ('the') establish a familiarity, but this 
perspective is then undercut by- the phantasmagoria quality of the city-scape. As such, 
there is a move away from a perspec'tive on a finally 'knowable community', to the city 
as unknowable. 18 
This is also a move away from the tenets of straightforward 'realism' which 
would assert that: 'seeing is knowing; description yields meaning; representation 
involves faithful mirroring of what is seen'. 19 The jump into phantasy immediately 
marks a deviation from simple 'reflection' of a recognizable social scene. Even more 
vital to MacNeice's representation of the city is its domination by images of surface. 
The initial image offers us a sign for a train. Smoke from the train-gulf, obscured by the 
hoardings of mass-culture, allows a synecdochically'aware clue-finding 'detective's' 
knowledge of the train. This is the sure-footed presence of heavy industry, palpably 
there. Yet this clue is followed only by images of surface. The policeman's 'flat hand' 
is mirrored by chromium dogs, faces (behind screens), the 'proud glass of shops', scent 
bottles, artificial legs, and a vista that 'thins like a diagram' -a flat map pretending to 
depth. This catalogue of surfaces implies that the city is without depth. In other 
words, we are not merely seeing the surface of the city, which will reveal depths of 
various kinds by a certain kind of inspection by the adept observer. Instead, this is a 
city of surfaces. The 'depth' which we would seek, which we hope to be revealed in 
one way or another is continually insinuated, but withheld. The phantastic quality of the 
detail is not simply evidence of a neurotic observer. The 'unvisited' Vulcan's forges 
might seem to owe their alien quality to ignorance. If they were visited and understood 
they would become less strange, perhaps. The seemingly arbitrary justice of this Vulcan 
'who doesn't care a tinker's damn' might be explained or rationalized. Yet the constant 
reference to surface would seem to deny that such a depth, or explanatory knowledge, 
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can be found., The centre of Birmingham, characterized by surface, artifice and 
contingency seems to stand as the vacant centre of a centreless world. , 
This last detail most fully characterizes the perspective of 'Birmingham', where 
there is an element of familiarity, but where full knowledge of the totality is withheld. 
This withholding is caused, it is implied, by the absence of an explaining 'centre, or 
essence which would be vital for such an understanding. This is reinforced by the 
absence of a controlling understandable single 'power', ýwhich renders those-1 m-, - 
determinants which are familiar (policeman or forge) alien, or unpredictable. They seem 
to be a law unto themselves, not in keeping with familiar ethical understandings, and 
therefore known only to be alien in their power. ýI 
It is this sense of the city which is developed as the poem develops, drawing 
attention to the centrifugal topology of the metropolis, and to its dominant social norms: 
Splayed outwards through the suburbs houses, houses for rest 
Seducingly rigged by the builder, half-timbered houses with lips pressed 
So tightly and eyes staring at traffic through bleary haws 
And only a six-inch grip of the racing earth in their concrete claws; 
In these houses men as in a dream pursue the Platonic Forms 
With wireless and cairn terriers and gadgets approximating to the fickle norms 
And endeavour to find God and score one over the neighbour 
By climbing tentatively upward on jerry-built beauty and sweated labour. 
The 'splaying' of the city, read in context of the chaotic and depth-less centre 
introduces this centrifugal force or momentum, which is then reinforced by mention of 
the 'racing-earth'. Paradoxically, this 'grounding' of the suburbs, or the artificial, on 
'solid' earth only serves to compound this sense of decentring. The houses stand 'half- 
timbered' and artificial, but also 'seducing' in their operations, the seduction of the 
commodity. This seduction, we can assume, would make the inhabitants of the houses 
into commodities also. They too would be seduced into the kind of 'sight' that the 
houses themselves possess as they witness the movement of traffic outside. The ironic 
contradiction of the pursuit of 'Platonic Forms, the good beautiful and true, manifesting 
themselves within the 'fickle norms' of commodity capitalism is fully in keeping with this 
social environment. In view of the position of the speaker as insider, the implication is 
less that mass culture provides us with an impure, bastardized parody of these - 
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transcendental entities. Rather, 'fickle norms', - changing from time to time, and -- 
enwebbed within the reified economy of exchange, assume the qualities of absolutes or 
Forms, which disguise their transient character. The speaker attacks, therefore, not the 
travesty of these forms, believing they actually exist, but the misplaced notion that they 
exist at all, and that they are merely parodied in wireless; cairn terriers and gadgets. 
This attitude is clear in the contradiction of the search for God within the structure of 
competition ('score one over the neighbour), which in fact disguises the contribution of 
'jerry-built beauty and sweated labour'. God, beauty, truth cannot easily be used as 
sticks with which to beat this social structure; they themselves are too integral a part of 
this structure. All the speaker does is point out the contradictions. 
'Birmingham' is in a sense, then, an epistemological poem. But its stress on the 
known, the knowable, and the familiar (but alien) cannot be divorced from its status as a 
social statement. Moreover, the sociality of the observation reflects not just on the 
subjects of the poem; but on the status of the observer: 
The lunch hour: the shops empty, shopgirls' faces relax 
Diaphanous as green glass, empty as old almanacs 
As incoherent with ticketed gewgaws tiered behind their heads 
As the Burne-Jones windows in St. Philip's broken by crawling leads; 
Insipid colour, patches of emotion, Saturday thrills 
(This theatre is sprayed with 'June') - the gutter take our old playbills, 
Next week-end it is likely in the heart's funfair we shall pull 
Strong enough on the handle to get back our money; or at any rate it is possible. 
The validity of the speaker is here called into question. Most obviously questionable is 
the patronizing note of superiority which seems to inhabit these lines. The equation of 
girl's faces with glass could be taken to imply a continuity between the subject and the 
commodity in consumer capitalism. Both are reduced to surface, as part of a city of 
I- 
surfaces. But people are not things. And such a reading would claim a privileged 
knowledge that the rest of the poem denies - that is, that there is nothing beyond the 
surface of the face, since the speaker has been there and knows such absence. Almost 
instinctively we can challenge the certainty of this position. The statement reflects not 
so much on what the speaker describes, but on the speaker itself. It is one thing to 
speak of a city, socially and ontologically composed of surface. It is another, however, 
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to extend this to people. Surely there is a figure behind the face, a depth that, however 
it can be challenged as unified self; at least exists; Or, indeed, a culture, that has to 
exist even within such a situation. - The speaker, it seems, simply cannot see it. - Hence, 
the poem appears guilty of mixing social with ontological judgements. This is all the 
more shameful if, - based on this ignorance. - the speaker assumes a tone of 
compassionate superiority., Frank Kermode has offered some pointed criticisms of this 
tendency in MacNeice, among other thirties writers. Commenting on a description in 
The Strings are False of 'bliss in a celluloid world where the roses are always red and 
the Danube is always blue' (p. 138) he notes: 
You can tell from the tone that it was all the other people in the cinema 
who were experiencing this bogus solace and not the MacNeices, who 
were there with them, but not of them; almost nightly, being entertained, 
not seeking value where only the others could be deluded into thinking 
they might find it. 20 
That reference to 'Burne-Jones' might here seem to reinforce this sense of privileged 
cultural awareness which, in context, - compounds the speaker's distance and myopia. 
The speaker, in outlining a decrepit culture of thrills, insipid colour, patches of emotion, 
seeks to claim solidarity with the observed masses. This is our decrepitude. 1, like you, 
am a part of it. Yet this jars with the implicit judgement on the shop-girl's faces, and 
the unavoidable implication that, really, this is your city, and your culture. - Or, perhaps, 
if the truth be known, their city and their culture, or lack of it. - Paradoxically, the very 
description implies distance - that these colours are insipid implies that ours are 
sometimes not, their emotions run in patches because ours sometimes don't, - our visits 
to the Cinema are made out of choice, rather than necessity. 'Theirs' can be 'Ours' 1 
since, well, slumming is sometimes rather promiscuous anti-bourgeois fun; or because, 
in suitable liberal style, their fate is everyone's, or everyone's who has conscience to 
see it. - 
Such a reading, though far from irrelevant to our discussion, - forgets however 
that the status of the speaker has already been thrown into question by the poem. 
Rather than a straightforward enunciation of such sentiments, tested on good or bad 
assumptions, these sentiments and these assumptions form an integral part of the 
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poem's activity. Rather than the object of the look, ý which we judge on its own terms, it 
is the look itself which is under question here. Equally, we can claim that it is precisely 
because of this rhetoric of distance that the speaker is placed 'within' the structure of 
feeling, or not feeling, that he describes. For what is missing in the poem is the 
alternative, describing discourse, which would provide the speaker with his assured 
position of superiority. It is this which is implied in Kermode's comments. But ; 
whenever the horizon of surface is crossed, the speaker is confronted with opacity. The 
'depth' which would privilege his perspective on the surfaces of the city, recourse to 
real human values, real lives, real purpose (Marxist, liberal etc) is continually withheld. 
The imaginary discourse of identification, solidarity within the class struggle, or within 
the decency of liberal England, is of course implied in theses lines. But,, it is also 
implied, this discourse of depth, penetration, linked to a humanist and determining 
metanarrative, cannot be found within the poem. In keeping within the surfaces of city 
life -a subculture may be there, but it is unknowable, and cannot supply a revolutionary 
programme within such a structure - our sense of going 'behind' the surfaces of city life, 
of doing away with obstruction, entering the real 'within' from without is confused. -The 
outsider, separated by class and background may be guilty of myopia in not being able 
to see beyond the surface. Yet such a judgement implies a judgement in turn on the 
nature of that surface, and the depth which it conceals. In this poem the surface is 
shown to be all-pervasive, and the assumed 'depth' thrown into question. We deceive 
ourselves if we imagine that such a depth can purposefully exist, ignoring the amount of 
surfaces and their power. Surface and surface is the look of the insider; surface and 
depth that of the outsider who doesn't know about the real power of surfaces. The - 
insider is suspicious of the knowledge which would go beyond surface, and of the 
intelligence which would imply a distance between itself and the commodification of the 
city. Again, the implication that the perspective is maintained through ignorance is 
undercut by the insinuation and withholding of depth within the established urban, - 
environment. The city is known to be unknowable. -, II 'I, - _1 ý 
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This paradox is developed in the poem's last stanza. The 'horizons' of 
perspective are examined: 
On shining lines the trams like vast sarcophagi move 
Into the sky, plum after sunset, merging to duck's egg, barred with mauve 
Zeppelin clouds, and Pentecost-like the cars' headlights bud 
Out from sideroads and the traffic signals, crdme-de-menthe or bull's blood, 
Tell one to stop... 
The presence of the skyline seems to betoken a movement to transcendence, to a 
movement at once beyond the confines of Birmingham and its discourses. The 
emphasis on the vacancy of sky should not deceive us into thinking that this is' 
inevitably a movement towards further vacancy, further depthlessness. The intent of 
this perspective is to a heightened sense of being. - a gathering of resources, which ý 
would have very concrete manifestations within the consciousness of the city-bound 
subject. What is more significant is that this moment of transcendence is blocked. The 
Inatural' givenness of plum, duck egg, mauve - both given, and making reference to 
natural sensibility - is 'barred with mauve Zeppelin clouds'. The perspective of the 
speaker is blocked not so much by the clouds, but by their appearance as 'Zeppelin 
clouds' - the consciousness of the city is re-inserted in the poem at the very moment 
when an attempt is made to transcend it. This aspect of control is reinforced by the 
message from traffic lights, themselves taking on the aspect of intoxicating -- 
commodities, by the engine 'breathing' with a life of its own, and by the call of pipe 
organs to work: 
... like black pipes of organs in the frayed and fading zone Of the West the factory chimneys on sullen sentry will all night wait 
To call, in the harsh morning, sleep-stupid faces through the daily gate. 
The movement from centre to margin, from glittering effect to bleak cause is a repetition 
of the 'jerry-built beauty and sweated labour' mentioned in stanza two. The glitter is 
paid for by exploitation, and our joy in it is therefore chastened. Yet, again, we have the 
appearance of faces. The moment of identification with the exploited is denied. We can 
see only the faces, not the people behind the faces. And, moreover, these faces are not 
driven into righteous rage at their exploitation, the energy of the Working classes 
threatening to sweep over the stagnation of the bourgeoisie. Rather they are driven into 
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submission. Sleep, leisure, the supposed 'other' to exploitation and submission, renders 
them 'stupid' - the conditions of work are displaced onto the space of leisure, absorbing 
it within its structure. -11- 1ý -Ir, _ 11 1 9- 1, "', -ý I-.,, I 
I One way of explaining this preponderance of 'surface' in MacNeice's 
presentation is through the equal preponderance of the Commodity in his , 
characterization of the urban environment. The Commodity, we have been taughtf is 
robbed of immanent meaning, together with the connection with human endeavour 
present in its Use Value by its absorption within the structure of Exchange. 21 , The 
object's Value is thus present only in relation to other objects, as part of a wider 
structure whose ultimate meaning is always deferred.! - On the one hand a 'contingent' 
reality is absorbed in a organizing and homogenizing commodity structure; on the other, 
this very structure robs objects of whatever immanent qualities they may have, 
engendering a new kind of contingency, and a ceaseless search for this lost immanence, 
in a consciousness which does not accept the 'meaning' offered to the commodity as 
commodity. This situation has two main consequences for the subject. His or her 
relation to the object as commodity is always infected by this structure of exchange - 
objects assume importance, and a certain kind of importance. Equally, within this 
structure the subject is itself relegated to the level of the commodity, its essence 
prescribed by the buying and selling of Labour power. What is important in all of this is 
the existence of structure. Objects become signifiers of this system, and of other items 
within the system, including, of course, the subject whose very status as subject is put 
in question. 
The consequences for the notion and experience of the subject have been 
explored by Terry Eagleton in a discussion of the work of Walter Benjamin. Writing of 
the circumstances of the 'modern subject' he notes that: 
This period witnesses a turning away on all sides from the traditional 
philosophy of the subject of Kant, Hegel, and the younger Marx, 
troubledly conscious as it is of the individual as constituted to its roots 
by forces and processes utterly opaque to everyday consciousness. 
Whether one names such implacable powers Language or Being, Capital 
or the Unconscious, Tradition or the 61an vital, Archetypes or the Destiny 
of the West, their effects is the open up a well-nigh unspannable gulf 
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between the waking life of the old befeathered ego and the true 
determinants of its identity, which are always covert and inscrutable. 22 
What this situation offers then is a model of surface and depth in which the object is a 
surface or signifier, but the depth is not a thing but a structure which remains beyond 
conscious understanding. The problem comes when we have to decide whether this 
underlying structure has itself any determining and unifying element, or whether it can 
be best characterized by its absence. In such a situation the absence of depth would 
force us to conclude not that there are no surfaces, that the surface/depth model is 
useless, but as far as the subject goes, that there are only surfaces. This is the 
situation that Eagleton finds Benjamin articulating: 
If a world of intricate symbolic correspondences is to be constructed, 
some kind of mechanism or switch-gear will be necessary by which any 
one element of reality can become a signifier of another; and there is 
clearly no natural stopping place to this play of allegorical signification, 
this endless metamorphosis in which anything can be alchernically 
converted into anything else. The symbolic system, in short, carries 
within it the forces of its own deconstruction - which is to say in a 
'different idiom that it operates very much by the logic of that commodity 
form which is partly responsible for the chaos it hopes to transcend. It 
is the commodity form which at once fashions some spurious identity 
between disparate objects and generates an unstable, open-ended flux 
-which threatens to outrun all such scrupulously imposed symmetry. (p. 
320) 
At first sight this looks a long way from MacNeice's kind of social writing, usually 
assumed to be a mix between a kind of urban Romanticism, demotic chattiness and, to 
use one of Edna Longley's phrases, 'condensed SoCiology'. 23 But as our analysis of 
'Birmingham' showed, MacNeice cannot easily be st-ttv I,; -jacketed within the terms of 
social realism. His observation is peculiar, even neurotic. More importantly, the nature 
of the observation within the text is itself open to question. The kind of analysis which 
Eagleton introduces here can be applied usefully in MacNeice's rendering of social 
environments (surface/depth; commodity/structure; observer/observed): 
Spending beyond their income on gifts for Christmas - 
Swing doors and crowded lifts and draperied jungles - 
What shall we buy for our husbands and sons 
Different from last year? 
Foxes hang by their noses behind plate glass - 
Scream of macaws across festoons of paper - 
Only the faces on the boxes of chocolates are free 
From boredom and crowsfeet. 
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Sometimes a chocolate-box girl escapes in the flesh, 
Lightly manoeuvres the crowd, trilling with laughter; 
After a couple of years her feet and her brain will 
Tire like the others. 
These opening stanzas from 'Christmas Shopping' (CP, p. 95) seem to match the 
previous techniques of drawing attention to the familiar and unfamiliar - looking a the 
familiar in new ways, pointing to the unknowable in the known. The 'Swing doors and 
crowded lifts', signs of the known, are curiously mixed with the image of 'draperied 
jungles'. The familiar (fabric) is rendered unfamiliar or strange or unknowable or 
threatening with the references to 'jungle'. But far more interesting is the notion of the 
'gift'. Every year the buying is the same, it's just the gift which is different. Or are the 
husbands and sons 'different' from last year? This ambiguity reveals that the gift, 
different but the same, is used as an indication of the difference in the people. The gift 
is always the same gift. That is, the gift forms an index of the sameness or difference 
of the person. Their continuity or change is signified, expressed, or marked out, by the 
commodity; the commodity, whatever object it might be is always a commodity. It is in 
this concrete relationship of giving and receiving that the commodity inserts itself; 
relations between people are defined in terms of the commodity. So, there is apparent 
difference, with hidden continuity - what is free is rendered static. But this apparent 
continuity is undermined by the fact that continuity is part of an abstraction, the 
uniformity gives way to change within the instability engendered by the contiguity of 
exchange. 
The references to foxes and macaws displayed behind glass (site of 
representation, presentation and display, vehicles of the truth) offer a notion of this 
contingency, where disparate items are grouped together under the 'order' of the 
commodity. MacNeice's use of perspective seeks, by the presentation of these 
disparate images, to draw attention to its open-ended facticity. Most interesting about 
this passage, however, is its identification of the 'free' image on the chocolate box. 
Such an image is linked to the previous ordering. It is free in the sense that it is 
timeless; unfree in its status of representation. It is, of course, an aspirational image. 
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But once the aspiration 'escapes' its enclosures and takes on flesh, it is subject to time 
and will perish. - The image is, therefore, a representation that cannot grow with time. 
'Manoeuvering the crowd' the image keeps its distance from the living, whilst at the 
same time manipulating it. Equally, the image is perversely unobtainable, since the only, 
way of achieving this commodity is through the very processes that produce its . 
otherworldly appeal: labour. Hence, this culture grinds down the subject at the same 
time as it provides its own images of escape, transcendence or success. It is in 
pursuing those ideals, buying images of beauty through selling labour power, that the 
consumer is refused the promised goal of becoming the image. The image is refused by 
the very means by which it is to be achieved. 1- -. - It 
In 'Christmas Shopping' the characterization of a social world seems - 
synonymous with a recognition of its various representations of, and to, itself. Among 
'columns of adg! denoting 'the quickest way to riches' we learn that 'Christ is born'. 
Yet, birth of a saviour or not, this can lead only to the expectation of 'the accidental loot 
of a system'. It is perhaps this sense of accident which lies behind the description of a 
suburb which 'straggles like nervous handwriting, the margin / Blotted with 
smokestacks', whose 'welfare' is guarded by a lighthouse which 'Moves its arms like a 
giant at Swedish drill whose / Mind is a vacuum'. Here the social environment is 
described in terms of representation, of writing. It is, moreover, a kind of writing which 
gives no quarter to the conscious individual. It moves of its own accord, accidentally, 
without order. Its guardian is without consciousness, at its centre is an empty space. 
In these lines the subject can observe only its own erasure. 
We began this chapter with questions of myth and practice. 'Christmas 
shopping' offers one incident of the link between representation and social practice. In 
one sense the representations we have seen in this last poem convince us of a sense of 
their artificiality. In another, we cannot avoid the conclusion that they partake in the 
construction of any social reality. If this construction involves the 'pretence' of stability 
which we witnessed in 'Nature Morte', it also contains its own variety of 'unrest', its 
own kind of instability. But it cannot be described as an 'unrest of the soul', since the 
system responsible for this instability is also responsible for the disempowering of the 
$soul' or the subject, within its representations. Thus we cannot help but be sceptical of 
the subject's ability to transcend this system, not least because of the rigor-ov--. self- 
questioning by the subject in previous poems which denied any stable, coherent position 
outside of the environment, and its conditions, that was described and represented. 
But the power of the individual to affect change to one's environment might be 
described as one of the central preoccupations of the thirties. How can this sense of 
disempowerment before the text be consistent with such a conviction, with the 
necessity of the conscious individual to make change, to act within a particular 
environment? Questions of representation and history lead on,, therefore, to related 
questions of the subject 'in action' within the world. It is, consequently, to these 
questions which we now turn. 
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Chapter Four. 
-The Man of the People: 
MacNeice, Writing and Society (11). 
Coming out of me living is always thinking, 
Thinking changing and changing living, 
Am feeling as it was seeing - 
W. H. Audenl 
The Professor looked at the book on her lap and at the passage to which 
she was pointing with her finger. 'it is beautiful indeed, ' he said. 'This 
is what it means. ' He leant over her chair, and with his cheek close to 
her cheek began to translate, pressing his finger upon the paper by the 
side of her finger. 'No longer, maidens with throats of honey, voices of 
desire, are my limbs able to bear me. Oh would that I were a kerulos 
who over the wave's flower lies, having a careless heart, the sea-purple 
spring bird. ' 
'It is lovely, ' she said, and there was a silence between them. Then with 
a smile she turned her head sideways to him and said, 'is it escapism? '. 
Rex Warner2 
It is not fortuitous that the athesis is indefinitely suspended as concerns 
life death. It is not fortuitous that it speaks of the enigmatic death drive 
which disappears, appears to disappear, appears in order to disappear in 
Beyond .. I call it enigmatic because it appears disappears while telling 
many stories and making many scenes, causing or permitting them to be 
told. Occasionally these are called myths or fables. 
Jacques Derrida3 
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We could say, following Derrida, that in the literary text, the problem of representation, 
like that of language, 'has never been simply one problem among others'. 4 The previous 
discussion has been occupied with how representation became a problem for MacNeice 
in the thirties, and the consequences for notions of a 'realist' text. It would be - 
misleading, however, to suggest that the questions surrounding the issues of 
representation and writing can be read in isolation from other issues, some of which 
have traditionally occupied the 'realist' text: for instance, action within the world, the 
subject within society. What is important is that we recognize the changes to 
consideration of these issues attendant on the re-evaluation of writing, and how such 
1, - 
changes featured in a specifically thirties context. 
In this chapter I will examine the figure of the thirties T, of the subject 
represented as thinking and acting within society and within history. The preoccupation 
of thirties writers with action, political action for example, and with 'history' has been 
well documented and explored. Yet the category of the subject and representation is 
often reserved as an area of inspection featuring most prominently and complexly in 
modernist texts. I will show that, in MacNeice's texts at least, this is an oversight. It 
is, moreover, an oversight which obscures the contextual analysis of those very issues 
(action, history) which are supposed to most characterize thirties writing. ý -., v 
This is finally a question of meaning, of the subject within society also being 
within writing, or being-written. - It is also a question of how the infiltration of ,- 
representation into the subject throws into question that subject's relation to history. It 
is appropriate therefore to begin with the problems generated by notions in the thirties 
about the relation of writing to history, in particular, of the relationship between 
parabolic writing, its relation to the real, and of action within the real: 
Parables for the Thirties. II 
In The Strings are False MacNeice tells the story of an almost mythical encounter 
between thirties figures. Driving up to Birmingham, hung-over from a drunken attempt 
to outrage 'Dialectical Materialism' in Oxford, MacNeice picks up three hitchhikers. 
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They consist of a would-be Oxford aesthete from Birmingham, a hard-headed Cambridge 
undergraduate, and John Cornford, who was: 
[ClIever and communist and bristling with statistics.. -. he was going to 
Birmingham to stand trial for causing an obstruction while distributing 
communist pamphlets in the Bull Ring (where the Chartist Movement had 
beenlaunchedin 1838)... 
He and the other Cambridge undergraduate sat in the back seat 
and talked about Trade Unions; the Birmingham aesthete sat beside and 
talked about literary values. The Would-be Twenties and the Hard-Fact 
Thirties cross patterned in my mind as my forehead throbbed and the car 
swung wildly on the road; when we reached the Birmingham suburbs we 
found we had been driving for miles with a puncture. The Thirties at 
once jumped out, were cheerfully efficient; the Would-be Twenties stood 
listlessly by, composing his face to a deliberate disdain. This was the 
first and the last I saw of John Cornford., Later that year the war broke 
out in Spain and, being no careerist, he went out to fight there and was 
killed. 5 
The event seems almost too perfect to be true., MacNeice is the quixotic thirties 
traveller, his perspective spanning both the old and the new, encountering the 
archetypal figure of the 'ha"rd fact' revolutionary, who is himself in opposition to the 
aestheticism of the twenties. Faced with a task in hand, the thirties man gets on with 
the job, leaving the aspiring aesthete helpless. It's a parable for the thirties, with 
aestheticism hopelessly unable to enter into the necessary and the real. The young 
revolutionary makes his entrance without question - an entrance which later leads to his 
death, and which also leads, of course, to his entry into myth, or the aesthetic. 
Did this incident actually take place? In this way? It is difficult to say. ý- 
MacNeice's autobiography is sometimes untrustworthy. In the very same chapter it 
carries the claim that he began to 'feel free' after the departure of his wife. Period 
evidence suggests that this was not the whole story. 6 Maybe this incident didn't 
happen quite the way MacNeice tells it In an important sense it hardly matters, for this 
is a parable about parables, about two senses of the world, or two hermeneutic 
horizons, and their relation to history. An other words, it is about meaning and its 
relation to the world and to action within the world. -The fact that the story itself seems 
poised on the border between literal and parabolic only seems to enact this distinction 
between the real (the world of action) and the aesthetic or mythical (the world of 
meaning). 
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I The notion of parable was important for thirties writers, though the full -, 
implications of this concern have been curoisuly underrated., In The Auden Generation 
Samuel Hynes sees the parable form, in Auden's Paid on Both Sides for example, as 
crucial in defining the thirties generation: -- "I 
Paid on Both Sides is the first important parable of a political decade... 
[The] play is a parable of growing up, which embodies but does 
not explain the feelings of a young man facing maturity and afraid of it. 
This is an historical subject insofar as the problem was an especially 
acute one for Auden's generation, entering life in a world that seemed to 
be running down, and entering it without the support of inherited values. 
And it is this historical aspect that makes the play important to the critic 
considering the characteristic modes and themes of the 'thirties, as it 
was important to the young men of Auden's time. 7 !,, 
Earlier in his discussion Hynes provides some other reasons for the play's importance: 
[It) is a charade, to be played among friends, and Auden's friends are in 
it ... Their presence makes the play another 'myth of themselves', like Transitional Poem. But Auden's charade is more than a private game,, 
and a good deal more than a charade ... there are other parabolic forms involved: the saga, and the boy's school story ... the Mummers play, the 
dream vision,, and the chorus of classical tragedy. What all these ,, - 
disparate literary forms have in common with each other and with a 
charade is that they are all conventionalized, non-realistic presentations 
of meaning in action. They lead the imagination away from private 
feelings and from literal reality, towards those stylizations that generalize 
experience and carry abstract meanings. Auden, groping for a new 
form, mixed these elements up a bit uncertainly, and created a mixed 
and uncertain play; nevertheless it is an important first attempt at what 
he called 'an altering speech for altering things', a parable of his 
generation in the post-war world. (pp. 51-52) 
In many ways Hynes is at the heart of the matter here. He describes an emergent kind 
of writing intended to make sense of a public, or non-personal environment, in an 
attempt to find 'meaning in action'. Yet the problem with such a writing comes in the 
translation of such parables into action itself. The danger is that within the field of 
action they will become distorted or fallacious. , But an equal problem is that they will 
remain separate from any given field of action, passive and untested, bearing no real 
relation to the actual. Hence the 'myth of themselves' (the term is MacNeice's, who 
was the first to recognize this trend in thirties writing) cuts both ways. 8 I On the one 
hand, the subject stands apart from the world, immensely meaningful but doing nothing; 
or s/he applies the myth to the world, where it can be changed, transformed into, 
falsehood, de-mythologized in the cruellest of ways, diluted or contaminated by other 
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myths of practice, other structures of meaning already in practice. Auden's famous line, 
then, cuts both ways too, depending on whether we read 'altering' as 'changing with 
circumstances' or 'affecting change to circumstances'. If the former, the 'speech' lies 
passive, recording, making sense and order at some ideal distance from history. If the 
latter, it enters history, its context, and is subject to all the uncertainties, ambiguities 
and impurities inherent in that arena. -, , e, -- 
-ý, This condition, perennial of course, creates difficult problems for the literary text 
in general, and for thirties texts in particular. One ofthe oddest features of reading 
thirties writing is that it sometimes seems to depend on an absence. At another point in 
his discussion Hynes includes a list of what he considers to be fallacious, but 
commonplace, assumptions about the thirties: 
The fact that it ended in war may... be considered as a deserved destiny, 
a just punishment for moral failure; 
Its writers were all of necessity politically motivated; 
Their efforts to make literature a mode of action failed, and their writing 
shared in that failure. 9 
These assumptions, it's true, do sound questionable. But the last, about the failure of 
efforts to make literature a 'mode of action' begs another question. What would be a 
successfulfulfilment of this aim? How could we gauge that success? Wernighthavea 
sense of literature informing action, instigating action, making 'action urgent and its 
nature clear' as Auden put it. 10 But is this the same as literature, or any writing, being 
in itself a mode of action? 
We can gain a sense of the difficulty of this issue by suggesting that the most 
successful text would be one which is an act in itself: a performance, repeatable or not, 
a pure action which, like all other actions can be described, invoked by historians - 
literary or otherwise - but not read. Hence the sense of absence in thirties writing, or in 
discussions of it, as though its function lay not in the rendering or interpretation of the 
real, but in the modification of the real itself. Such a writing, in its purest form, would 
amount to an erosion of the signifier within the space of such action. The text could do, 
but once done, it could not mean. In the space of pure action the text which took 
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action as its prime function could only exist afterwards as a pale fragment or sign - the 
signifier of a moment lost to time. ' "', '-I-II 
, -The problem was familiar to thirties writers, although it has never been fully 
explored. Such an explorationA shall argue in this chapter, requires some examination 
of the question of parable. This consideration can be distinguished from the usual ,, 
thirties-based discussion of what literature can 'do' whilst still maintaining its specificity 
as literature. The usual answers to the questions, that is, about whether writers should 
'keep to their art', or go and fight in Spain, - usually resolved in some version of the 
affective fallacy - and whether such art can accommodate 'propaganda' or some 
external 'cause' and still remain art. For this is not just a question of the intended, 
'function' of art, but an issue involving (perhaps less obvious) questions of language and 
the text. As such, it is a question which can be seen as undergoing consideration 
within the text itself. -_ -I, IIýII-", .I 
,A recent discussion by J., Hillis Miller might make this aspect, and its relation to 
parable, clearer. In The Linguistic Moment Hillis Miller considers a problem raised by 
Kafka's short fragment 'On Parables'. The problem, Hillis Miller writes: 
... turns on the question of whether following the sacred parables - for 
example when they tell man to 'cross over' - occurs in parable or in 
reality: 'concerning this a man once said: "why such reluctance? if you 
only followed the parables you yourselves would become parables and 
with that rid of all your daily cares. ' Is what the man once said literal or 
parabolic? 
This f inal question concentrates the problem of the relation of 'parable' to 'reality' in a 
way which places us in an insoluble double bind: 
If you take the parable literally, then you must understand it as naming 
some literal crossing over from one place to another in reality, in which 
case you remain in reality ... so following the parable does not make 
anything happen. If you take the parable parabolically, that means 
seeing it as merely figurative. In that case neither the parable itself nor 
following the parable makes anything happen, and so you have lost in 
parable. Winning in parable could only occur if the crossing over 
promised in the parable were to occur in reality. Either way you lose, 
since to win in reality is to lose in parable, and the one thing needful is 
to win in parable. (p. 25) 1 
The distinction drawn is connected to two other oppositions: Between figurative and 
literal meaning, and between constative and performative language. The second 
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opposition is the most useful for our purposes: 'constative language names something. 
Performative language makes something happen' (p. 25). Hillis Miller's point is that 
although we would like to think we can easily move between these nicely defined 
oppositions, in practice this is fraught with difficulty. 
This difficulty comes as a result of the conceptual distinction between parable 
and reality either locking us irretrievably into one world or the other; or in practice 
undecidably merging, contaminating, the two types of discourse. ' A figure or parable 
hopes to explain and interpret the world. The literal and the performative (I promise, I 
bet, I declare) takes its function purely by context and by action in a context. 'One 
cannot promise except by saying 'I promise', yet such an act, this is the crucial point, is 
wholly empty outside this space of action. In contrast, naming; describing, interpreting 
the world establishes a space of meaning, but it does not do anything to change the 
world in any practical way. The distinction may be seen as a false one; the mutual 
exclusivity of the terms by no means certain. Contemporary language theory, for 
instance, stresses the performative quality of all 'speech acts', and has effectively 
collapsed the dichotomy of the constative/performative in favour of this notion of 
speech as act. 12 - Hillis Miller introduces this opposition' only in order to deconstruct it. 
But this deconstruction does not render it useless. Instead of seeing these oppositions 
as mutually exclusive, we should understand one as using and supposing the other. 
Any 'parable' or meaning is placed and interpreted in a real place; any real, material 
situation is subject to interpretation: 'Each opposition contaminates the other, crosses 
over the frontier into the region of the other, preventing clear understanding or a clear- 
headed option, just as the interpretation of the parables cannot be sharply distinguished 
from the knowledge they give or the action they instigate' (p. ^ 25)., 
The discussion remains useful for the light it throws on the complications arising 
from the thirties preoccupation with action within history. Embedded in Hillis Miller's 
discussion are a number of questions of language, which require some unpacking. For 
the account in fact includes in its designation of the 'performative' or 'literall a 
conflation of three linguistic elements which have figured prominently in language 
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theory: The pronominal, the performative, and the deictic (or the shifter). 13 What 
proves fascinating about all these categories is that they seem to demonstrate in 
different ways, serve as parables if you like, for. the notion that language is not a vehicle 
simply 'referring', one to one, to some pre-existent object. The pronoun, (1, You) does 
not refer to any classifiable and separate object in the world, like for instance a tree, but 
rather designates a subject position in relation to discourse. 14 Put another way, it ý, 
cannot refer to anything which precedes its utterance; in contrast, - the object to which it 
refers is constituted precisely through this utterance. The performative (I promise, I- 
declare) does not refer to anything, but performs a function entirely dependent on 
context. One cannot promise without saying 'I promise', and a promise cannot be 
referred to without it previously existing in context. 15 Thirdly, the 'shifter' seems to 
refer to something in the world (Here, there), but such reference is wholly unstable 
(Where is 'here'? ), and can refer to, or designate no constant 'thing'. 16 The figure thus 
serves as a device for showing the fundamental instability of language itself. So, 
language does not refer to pre-existent things, it constitutes them and their meaning. 
There is no reference without meaning. Yet this meaning does not exist in some pristine 
Logos removed from the world, but is context-bound. This context, however, is 
radically unstable, given to ambiguity and change, impure. - As Jonathan Culler puts it, 
meaning is context bound, but context is boundiess'. 17 
Hillis Miller is thus producing an allegory of language, and of reading. For 
although we might like to believe in some pristine realm of meaning, or Logos, divorced 
from the world, meaning is always worldly. As such, it is inherently given to instability. 
At the same time, although we think of language referring to things in the world, this 
reference is always a product of meaning. Hence the analysis of parable. Ontheone 
hand, we think of parable as some pristine kind of meaning divorced from reality, 
operating in the ideal space of the 'figurative. But such a realm can only function 
within the real, which inevitably modifies it. But this real is always imbued with 
meanings, which are inherently instable, yet given with certain circumstances to fixity 
and closure. In the simplest terms, one cannot ever 'become a parable' like the man in 
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Kafka's story urges us to. The figural is always finally out of reach of the literal, but can 
only be apprehended through the world of the literal. Furthermore, the literal, the real, is 
always in some respects imbued with the parabolic, the mythological or fictional, in 
representations within history. 
', - The question, for our purposes, is not how this allegory might alter our reading 
of thirties texts as a whole for whatever has become of them). Rather; ý it is how these 
questions of meaning, context (history), instability and closure; are themselves 
dramatized within MacNeice's texts of the thirties. In addition, the question is how this 
dramatization serves as a figure or trope for the activity of the subject involved with the 
impurities of history and writing. * 
The Subject of History: 'Carrickfergus', 'Belfast'. 'Turf-stacks'. 
'Carrickfergus' (CP, p. 69) is a good example of MacNeice's rendering of the individual 
within a social situation: 
I was born in Belfast between the mountain and gantries 
To the hooting of the lost sirens and the clang of trams 
Thence to Smoky Carrick in County Antrim 
Where the bottle-neck harbour collects the mud which jams 
The little boats beneath the Norman Castle, 
The pier shining with lumps of crystal salt; 
The Scotch Quarter was a line of residential houses 
But the Irish Quarter was a slum for the blind and halt. 
The brook ran yellow from the factory stinking of chlorine, 
The yarn-mill called its funeral cry at noon; 
Our lights looked over the lough to the lights of Bangor 
Under the peacock aura of a drowning moon. 
This is an effective piece of descriptive writing, in keeping with some of the 'realist' 
proclivities of the thirties. Mountains, Gantries, trams, houses - all are presented in 
stark detail, with a method which would seem aimed at demystifying the Irish 
landscape. Ireland, the poem implies, has its working industrial infrastructure as well as 
Britain. However, this is not only a poem about Ireland. It also dwells on living in 
Ireland, from a retrospective position. Autobiography, Virginia Woolf claimed, was a 
definitive mode for thirties writers, as they struggled to come to terms with class and 
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identity in a world where their upbringing rendered them culpable. 18 MacNeice was to 
make more use of this genre in Autumn Journal, but in this poem the growing self is 
hardly very'prominent. The opening line of the poem alerts us to its expected 
development; what we get is a series of industrial details. - It is'as if the self is somehow 
defined by such a landscape and its rendering, in a way which cannot provide any clear 
substance to this self. We expect the poem to talk about intellectual and spiritual 
development.: - Instead it talks about factories, chlorine and trams. 
This is not a comforting environment. 'There is a good deal of sensual 
awareness evident in the poem - sights are complimented by sounds and smells. Yet 
they are harsh sights, the sounds coNe ('the hooting of lost sirens') and the smells 
unpleasant. 19 As in much autobiographical writing, it is hard to tell the backward glance 
from the object of that glance. In this glance we should note the contingency of the 
1A 
represented detail. All scenic description i-yone sense metonymic, grounded in the 
associations of contiguity. Some writing attempts to locate'some unifying metaphoric 
principle in such description. This might be in the subject's consciousness, or in the 
perception of order within the environment itself. In MacNelce's description there is no 
such unifying energy. Instead, as in 'Birmingham', we find discontinuity and surface. - 
This is not the discontinuity of The Waste Land, we do not find chaos or radical-- , 
disorder. What we do find is the absence of any stated significance. Any expectations 
of some conclusive meaning in this description will be disappointed. The detail is just 
there., 
We can draw parallels between this scene and that of 'Birmingham'. There we 
saw that 'surface' was the look of the insider who resisted the establishing of unifying, 
metaphors (History, class, revolution) in describing a social situation. 'Carrickfergus' ý, 
continues this preoccupation: 1 11 ý, 
The Norman walled this town against the country 
To stop his ears to the yelping of his slave 
And built a church in the form of a cross but denoting 
The list of Christ on the cross in the angle of the nave 
I was the rector's son, born to the anglican order, 
Banned for ever from the candles of the Irish poor; 
124 
The Chichesters knelt in marble at the end of a transept 
With ruffs about their necks; their portion sure. 
Here there does seem to be some explaining historical context for the scene. But it is 
the subject's exclusion from this context that is emphasised. -The city of Carrickfergus 
is 'walled' by the Normans, ears 'stopped' against the slave. These details mirror the 
'blind and halt' of the Irish Quarter. MacNeice characterizes his environment as being 
one of isolation. This is cultural as much as psychological. The speaker is implanted 
within a cultural identity - born to an order - which is significant mainly for what It 
forbids: -the exclusion from the 'candles of the Irish poor'. Rather than reading this as 
just a synecdochic device we should be aware that this detail carries with it a good deal 
of social symbolism. The exclusion is that of a language - the 'anglican order' ' 
establishes an identity, but it is one which restricts, or delimits cultural meanings; The 
'Anglican' detail, we might say, denotes. . The Catholic detail, on the other hand, is . - 
understood to connote, to signify. Yet this signification remains silent. The reference to 
the Chichesters, static in marble, forms another indication of cultural understanding. But 
the stasis of these images, the fact that their, 'portion' seems sure, only serves to 
highlight discrepancy. The speaker seems aware of a position for himself, implied by 
the statues, but this is hardly a 'portion', a clearly defined identity or destiny. Much less 
the portion than was the enabling and empowering 'lot' of the Chichesters. In contrast, 
he is aware of absence. This cultural heritage seems dead, unusable in its 'certainty' 
and stasis. We find several senses of stasis in the poem. First, in that the images 
remain lifelessly of the past; second, that these images provide no model for change in 
the present; third, - that they serve to root the individual in an unchanging and 
unsatisfactory social position. Rather than explaining the cultural context, this reference 
to history provides images which refuse such an understanding. There are no lessons 
which can prompt a clear way forward., This is emphasised by the sense of 
unsettlement prompted by the war: 
I thought that the war would last for ever and sugar 
Be always rationed and that never again 
Would the weekly papers not have photos of sandbags 
And my governess not make bandages from moss 
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And people not have maps above the fireplace 
With flags on pins moving across and across - 
Across the hawthorn hedge the noise of bugles, 
Flares across the night, 
Somewhere on the lough was a prison ship for Germans, -, - 
A cage across their sight. 
I went to school in Dorset, the world of parents 
, Contracted into a puppet world of sons 
Far from the mill girls, the smell of porter, the salt-mines 
And the soldiers with their guns. 
The self is continually displaced in this poem. He is embedded in a cultural role that is 
alien to him, but which excludes him from other areas of social reality, as he moves 
from place to place within the role of son. He is exiled from a 'home' to which he never 
belonged, yet which continually works its influence on him. The only sense of the 
present provided by the poem is that it is 'not the war'. Instead of growing, the self 
encounters a developing sense of rootlessness as he is excluded from 'mill girls, salt 
mines' - features of his environment he had little real attachment to when there. The 
sense of school as 'contraction' of the adult world into the 'puppet world of sons'- 
enforces the element of control and production in the poem. Sons exist in a site of 
performance, ' the strings held by the parents, or indeed by the authority of the school. 
We can read this in i several ways: that the sons merely mimic the world of their - 
parents, or mimic it covertly within their own terms; that the world of sons seems new, 
different from that of the parents, yet is still in the underlying control of the parents and 
their authority. ' We might even read these two lines as drawing some analogy between 
the world of sons and that of the parents - in that they are both the same, except for 
the fact that the 'puppet' world of sons reveals its strings more clearly. In any of these 
cases 'contract' can be used to imply 'shrinking, reduction', or 'agreed to, written in'., 
Both senses serve to emphasise a narrowing of horizons as the subject Is inserted into a 
cultural environment described and defined by its use of significations which fail to 
locate the self in any meaningful and coherent relation to the world. 
'Carrickfergus' Is a relatively late thirties poem 11937). In 'Belfast' (1931 0- CP, ý 
p. 17) however we find the same fascination with social exclusion'and the landscape of 
signification in cultural environments. The speaker is, located amidst 'marble stores' 
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with 'celluloid, painted ware, glaring / Metal patents, parchment lampshades, harsh 
attempts at buyable beauty. This detail, similar to that of 'Birmingham', where the 
urban landscape is in part characterised by its commodities, is familiar by now. What 
we should note in this poem is its immediate contrast to a glimpsed. - enclosed figure: 
In the porch of the chapel before the garish Virgin 
A shawled factory-woman as if shipwrecked there 
Lies a bunch of limbs glimpsed in the cave of gloom 
By us who walk in the street so buoyantly and glib. 
Over which country of cowled and haunted faces 
The sun goes down with a banging of Orange drums 
While the male kind murders each its woman 
To whose prayer for oblivion answers no Madonna. 
MacNeice's relationship with his Irish background has been a source of controversy in 
readings of his work. 20. Important, however is the use in these lines (and in -- 
'Carrickfergus') of Ireland as a set of significations. What is on trial here, - as before, is 
the gaze. r The woman is fascinating for us because of her status as clichd. For the 
speaker she holds a quality of otherness, and marginality. She lies 'as if shipwrecked 
there' without, it seems, any sense of place or purpose. The fact that she is only 
'glimpsed', glanced at in passing, should alert us to the fact that we are not required to 
see this as an authoritative statement on the Irish environment. Rather she stands as an 
image telling us as much about the observer as the observed. The 'buoyant and glib' 
commentator is excluded from her realm of signification. He can only see it as 
signification. The women of Ireland, murdered by their men, are trapped inside a realm 
of signification, praying to the Madonna, which does not help them in their quest for 
'oblivion'. We encounter a double-bind here. It is as if the prayer for oblivion is 
somehow engendered by the cultural order which the Madonna stands to signify. The 
culture of the Madonna produces both a death-wish, or desire for oblivion; at the same 
time it refuses to fulfil that wish. The desiring subject is therefore caught in a space of 
refusal between life and death. Life is denied; death is refused. 
Clearly there must be problems here if we want to read this as a piece of social 
commentary. Is this the disaffected voice of 'Valediction' (CP, p. 52) ('This is what you 
have given me Indifference and sentimentality')? But who is MacNeice to write in such 
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a voice? ' Is this writing off a whole culture? On what basis? - And who is the 'us' that 
'walk[s) in the street so buoyantly and glib'? One answer to these questions might be 
that although valid in a way, they rather miss the point. - All of them can be included in a 
reading of the poem which in no way renders it unimportant. Rather they are questions 
that the poem established for itself, by interrogating its own look. The 'I' of the poem 
sets up no alternative standards to counter, legitimate, or distance himself from these 
observed details., In this sense, he, as much as anyone; is implicated in what he 
describes, albeit in a different way. He is not part of what he describes, but neither is 
he wholly apart.: -II 
It becomes increasi I difficult to misread all the attention in these poems to ýYjl 
cultural signification as simply 'background' material for a piece of social realism. As 
frealism', we could conclude, the poems are really quite unsuccessful, in their partiality, 
or even 'inaccuracy'. However this is to take a definition of the socially 'real' that 
would see the kind of detail upon which MacNeice focuses as being contingent in 
relation to some observing consciousness or self and its objects. These poems 
challenge such a position, noting that signification is not ancillary to culture and its 
products (one of which, we should note, is the self within such a culture) but is a 
fundamental part of it. What contingency there is can be seen as a function of such 
significations, either in their inability to produce the grounds for a coherent self, or by 
their exclusion and displacement of such a self. If this subjectivity is lacking in the 
culture under observation, it is also absent from the excluded, placeless, observing self. 
Another early poem can be usefully considered here: 
Among these turf-stacks graze no iron horses - 
Such as stalk, such as champ in towns and the soul of crowds, 
Here is no mass-production of neat thoughts II 
No canvas shrouds for the mind nor any black hearses: 
The peasant shambles on his boots like hooves 
Without thinking at all or wanting to run in grooves. 
But those who lack the peasant's conspirators, 
The tawny mountain, the unregarded buttress,, 
Will feel the need of a fortress against ideas and against the 
Shuddering insidious shock of the theory-vendors, 
The little sardine men crammed in a monster toy 
Who tilt their aggregate beast against our crumbling Troy. 
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In 'Turf-Stacks' JCP, p. 18) we find a clear departure from any recognizable 'social 
realism' in the depiction of a social environment. We should be prepared to read this 
poem as a departure from the literal to the figurative, from the real to the parabolic. For 
MacNeice's peasant has more in keeping with Yeats's fisherman or Wordsworth's leech- 
gatherer than any concrete social individual or type. , We have a figure who is profoundly 
rooted. His environment is characterized initially by its difference from the urban 
environment. ý The eyes of the poem are clearly those of a city-dweller; though 
interestingly the city is described as a kind of parodic pastoral environment., It is 
inhabited by 'iron horses' (of course, the stock Hollywood western phrases for trains), 
which form a parallel with horses of the country. , Such horses, their intertext with film 
clearly marking the provenance of the speaker, are said to 'champ' (munch; trample 
underfoot - OED) in a way which sees them devouring the subject within the crowd, and 
a function of the crowd itself. The iron horse 'champs' the crowd. The crowd 
'champs' itself and its other. Clearly there are other intertexts operating here - the 
Trojan horse, which makes an explicit entry in the later parts of the poem. Also 
Tennyson's 'Locksley Hall', and by extension, Auden's parody 'Get there if you can', 
published in his Poems (1930). 21 ý- These intertexts enter the poem through the 
preoccupation with the train which 'run[s] in grooves'. What we find, then, is a 
MacNeicean version of Auden's response to Tennyson's bourgeois optimism. 
, Plainly MacNeice views the city, or metropolis, as a vehicle for consumption, in 
more ways than one. As much as the city 'consumes' its inhabitants it produces them. 
'Thought' within the city is 'mass-produced' - in bulk, produced by the masses, who are 
in turn produced by such 'neat thinking'. In no real way, then, is the city a domain of 
freedom or liberation from the rootedness of the rural environment. Instead It is 
characterized by death: ý shrouds for the mind, black hearses. The Cartesian 'thinking' 
subject or cogito is clearly under threat in such an environment. , Here we get a different 
angle on the rootlessness which characterized previous discussions of the social 
environment. Where previously we might have considered the urban subject as a free- 
floating self, apart from both the stabilities of rural and cultural doxa, this comparison 
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with the peasant shows the absorption of such a subject within the domain of , 
signification in the City. 22 Here it is the peasant, rooted to his environment, who 
maintains freedom and life. - '''-iIIII 
tý "'There is, however, a'contradiction in the poem.: On the one hand the peasant is 
described as 'not thinking at all', on the other, the urban environment is considered to, 
be one where thought is killed, or at least 'produced' in a way which is inconsistent 
with the needs of the willing, intentional subject. What distinguishes these two 'IT 
positions is that the unthinking peasant is identified as being in touch with a creative 
principle in nature. In a natural habitat, he seems to occupy a space (a 'here') in which 
action is unified with being. ' ý His state is therefore the imaginary one of whole, pure, 
being. The speaker is; in contrast, resolutely fallen. But this fallen state, where thinking 
maintains itself at some distance from nature is not the same as the 'death' of thinking 
within the city. In the former, the mind achieves some degree of intentionality or will, 
some independence. In the latter, the mind is taken over by the 'thinking' of the city, 
giving the illusion or parody of free thought, when it is in fact the extinguishing of such 
thought. The paradox is that this separation from nature renders the speaker only too 
aware of his vulnerability to the false thinking of the city, only too aware of its distance 
from the being that the peasant enjoys in nature. So, not only is 'thinking' denied to the 
subject, but so toois the 'unthinking' life of the peasant which seems to reside in 
uncontemplative action. 
The poem seems to offer, then, two choices. If thought is extinguished in the 
city, leaving only its ghost, so to speak, the figure of the peasant offers itself as an 
identified, imaginary alternative. At least the peasant is free from the death of thought 
within culture; the parody of active thinking which offers itself as thought. Indeed, his 
unthinking can claim some connection with natural processes - the movement of hooves 
offering at least some alternative to the prescribed 'grooves' of culture. 
However, as the second stanza indicates, this is not a real alternative for the 
speaker. For he is a part of culture, and is therefore unable to move outside the 
processes of that culture. The peasant, we are told, is protected from this infiltration by 
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'tawny mountain' and 'unregarded buttress'. This protection seems to work in two 
ways. First, by not being an object of thought or contemplation for the peasant. 
Second, by eluding the gaze of the cultural 'eye'. The speaker, however, is in some 
need of a 'fortress against ideas'. - It is as if the cogito has become unthinkable here 
when confronted with 'theory-vendors' (theoros, seeing). The thinking which made up 
such a cogito has been invaded by the commodity form, which, in its furthest ,- 
manifestation operates as an 'aggregate beast'. -What seemed as the gift to liberalism 
within capitalism (rational thinking) has within it the seeds of its destruction in a Trojan 
horse of the commodity-idea: Theory vending. Thinking and being seem hopelessly at 
odds in this environment. - So what alternatives are open to the speaker?: 
For we are obsolete who like the lesser things 
Who play in corners with looking-glasses and beads; 
It is better we should go quickly, go into Asia 
Or any other tunnel where the world recedes, 
Or turn blind wantons like the gulls who scream 
And rip the edge off any ideal or dream. 
MacNeice's alternative seems to be one of escape. The reference to 'looking glass' and 
'beads' mark the speaker as possessed of a self-conscious cogito and of a predilection 
for ordering, abstract patterning. Even though these practices are seemingly marginal to 
real action (playing in corners), they are now rendered 'obsolete'. It is not clear whether 
this obsolescence comes as a result of lacking any social purpose, or whether they have 
been rendered obsolescent in their own terms: any kind of speculation, self-examination 
or *play' is now either useless or impossible within the domain of the commodity-idea. 
Maurice Blanchot has commented on a similar situation, drawing on a comment made in 
the thirties by Andrd Gide which may be usefully applied here: 
In 1934 Andrd Gide wrote, 'For a long time now, works of art will be out 
of the question. ' And the fact that Hegel, a century earlier,, at the 
beginning of his monumental course on esthetics [sic], pronounced this 
sentence, 'Art is for us a thing of the past, ' constitutes a judgement 
upon art which must reflect and which it will by no means consider 
refuted simply because since that date literature, the plastic arts, and 
music have produced substantial works. For at, Ke moment Hegel spoke, 
he knew full well that renewal called Romanticism. What did he mean, 
then, he who never spoke 'lightly'? This, precisely: that since the day 
when the absolute consciously became the active process ;S1,; 5 A,,, f 
haS, no longer been able to satisfy the need for an absolute. Relegate'd 
within us, it has lost its reality and its necessity; everything that was 
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authentically true and alive in it now belongs to the world and the real, 
purposeful activity in the world. 23 
Within this context, we can say that MacNeice's poem is indeed aware of the relegation 
of 'the absolute' in consciousness. ý But what the poem throws in doubt is the capacity 
for that which was 'authentically true and alive' to be displaced OAto action. - The 
peasant, we remember, acts within nature and is thus immune from the mental 
processes within history and culture. But this figural existence is not available to the 
speaker. And presumably the 'authentic' thinking of the cogito would not function in 
this way. Thinking is impossible in the city, the action of the peasant unavailable. The 
only possible activity for the subject is retreat. That is, to 'go'. The only positive action 
is in negation. In retreating from 'the world' to Asia or to 'some other tunnel where the 
world recedes' the speaker effectively exempts himself from action., In so doing the .: 
integrity of the self is maintained. By implication, any action within the city would fall 
short of this maintaining of integrity, though it is not clear whether action would be 
absorbed within the structure of the commodity-idea, or, whether it would simply be 
dumb action. What the poem offers in return is a category of seemingly pure action: 
'turn blind wanton like the gulls who scream / And rip the edge off any ideal or dream'. 
This is not quite the same position as the peasant, for at least two reasons. First, the 
speaker's identification with the gulls as 'wantons' represents a wholly destructive ., 
attitude. - There is no natural 'support' for this activity as there is with the peasant. As 
such, the speaker is not returning to nature so much as establishing an anti-cultural 
position. He resists the false meanings of the city by identifying with a meaningless 
scream, which is closely tied to a form of action. Both of these relations of ., - 
'meaning'/meaninglessness and thinking/acting are crucial here. - The Peasant does not 
contradict culture, so much as simply ignore it. Instead, the speaker's identification 
with the gulls is from a position within culture, or its commodity form. The second -- 
difference follows from this. The gull is not ! acting', but screaming. It is this which 
'rips the edge' off ideals and dreams. A scream, we should note, is a verbal sign, an 
indexical sign to use C. S. Pierce's terminology. 24 Such a sign differs from the iconic, 
which resembles its referent in some respect, and from the symbolic, whose meaning is 
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established purely by convention, in 'pointing' to its object which is in some way 
contiguous. Sm'oke for instance. 'signifies fire; animal tracks indicate an animal, as does 
its scream. The scream, as this kind of signin itself means nothing; its meaning is 
wholly dependent on context, and on its function within that context (to warn; to 
express without semanticity). It refers, then, without meaning. Unlike a constative, a 
scream cannot 'name' or describe anything. Like a performative, its function is entirely 
bound by context. This provides us with a better idea of how the scream offers a 
challenge to the commodity-ideal, or to the commodity-dream. For it refuses their status 
of effective 'meaning', empties the sign of its semanticity, and grounds it in a context, 
like a deictic. 'At the same time it engenders a mode of doing which seems in itself to 
be a parody of the parodic 'meaning' of the city. This action is not only that of refusal. 
In addition, it returns to the sign some quality of performance, via its grounding in 
context, which it previously lacked. Moreover, it restores a quality of reference, even of 
the most basic form. But we should also note that this action is accomplished only at 
the cost of the extinction of the thinking, speaking, cogito., It is the linking of action 
with a parody of 'meaning' which gives the identification with the gull its significance 
or, in the context of the poem, its absence of significance. ' .- 1ýý ., III 
This emphasis on meaning, therefore, would seem to engender a pessimism out 
of keeping with the times. This is not because of a questioning of meaning per se, but 
because there seems to be no alternative , to the weightless commodification of ideas, 
or the agonized scream of the subject. This might seem a strange perspective for any 
who would want to argue for the new importance of the social. If there are such 
alternatives, they might lie in a view of the social which does not perceive it as this field 
of commodification, and which instead provide some purposeful space for the subject. 
If the stuff of 'Turf-stacks' is, bV implication, language, we might consider an example 
of MacNeice's presentation of language as a social phenomenon as a means to 
establishing this middle-ground. 
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The Seduction of the Literal: --Homage to Clichds'.,,, 
In 'Homage to clichds' (CP, p. 59) it is the apparently meaningless phrase which, initially 
at least, is cause for homage or celebration: 
With all this clamour for progress 
This hammering out of new phases and gadgets, new trinkets and phrases 
I prefer the automatic, the reflex, the clichd of velvet. 
the foreseen smile, sexual, maternal, or hail-fellow-met, 
the cat's fur sparkling under your hand 
And the indolent delicacy of your hand 
These fish coming in to the net 
I can see them coming for yards 
The way that you answer, the way that you dangle your foot 
These fish that are rainbow and fat 
One can catch in the hand and caress and return to the pool. 
The poem begins with an attack, as in 'Turf-stacks', on the new-fangled, the invented. 
Clich6 seems to offer some alternative to this practice. Tom Paulin has written about 
MacNeice's own 'technique of setting clich6s dancing to a hurdy-gurdy rhythm'; this 
poem might be seen as a justification, as well as an example, of this technique. 25 The 
clich6 might seem to be, of course, a distinctly unpoetic medium, whether for 
Romantically derived explorations of consciousness, or simply in the description of any 
poetic space. ' -'A poem paying homage ('Acknowledgment of superiority; dutiful respect 
or honour shown' OED) to clichd could, therefore, strike us as containing something of a 
joke. - Such an ironic play with the status of the poem is preferable to, say, a reading 
which would stress its democratic urge to acknowledge the importance of the 
commonplace or the ordinary over the elite. Although one could applaud the intentions 
of this reading, it is finally self-defeating, since the role of the clichd is to render this 
commonplace or ordinary a site of the banal. -" Clich6s, in this case, muster the variety 
and multifacetedness of the everyday into pre-existent meanings and structures, forcing 
the user to re-orientate further action in line with these elements of the banal. In fact 
the poem is far less easy to pin down than this. Its perspective is continually shifting 
between commonplace settings, 'casual meetings', the discourses which define and 
enable these settings., and a dream-like 'other' environment, which is indefinite, gloomy, 
and unknowable. Throughout, it is hard to say which of these scenes is commenting on 
the other, to which one the speaker owes allegiance. - -1 1-ýI. 
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The speaker's defence of clichd comes in opposition to a 'clamour for progress' 
manifested in phases, gadgets, trinkets, phrases. We can easily read this as a-, - 
straightforwardly reactionary aversion to the abrasively 'new' in favour of the banal. -- 
Certainly the poem plays with this voice. The lines might also read as a parodic .- 
comment on the nature of liberal 'progress', placing on the same level the classifying 
and explaining discourses of liberal thought (phases/phrases) and the trinkets and 
gadgets of consumer capitalism. This sense would accord with that of Jean Baudrillard, 
who notes: 
[The] gadget is the emblem of post-industrial society. There is no 
ri, 5proa5. - definition of the gadget. But if we can agree that the object of 
consumption is defined by the relative definition of its objective function 
(as a tool) to the benefit of its function as a sign, and if we can agree 
that the object of consumption is characterised by a kind of functional 
uselessness (since what is consumed is precisely something other than 
the ' useful') then the gadget is indeed the truth of the object in 
consumer society ... The definition of the gadget would 
be its potential 
uselessness and its ludic combinatory value. 26 
Baudrillard's sense of the 'ludic' is of a scene wherein an object is robbed entirely of its 
actual use-value, and where it can function only as a sign or simulation of use, the truly 
purposeful. This authentic use is continually withheld in the domain of signification. 
MacNeIce's lines seem to share a similar scepticism of the actual purposes served by 
'phases/phrases'. --11, 
I- The speaker at first invokes clich6 as a more reliable guide to the real. Clichd 
serves as a metaphor for the controlled, the familiar, predictable and, importantly, the 
communal. Such a space provides the subject with stability, and appreciation of the 
particular and sensual. - Hence the speaker offers a sense of clichd as the control of - 
nature, of 'fish coming into the net',, a taming of the wild without the strained activity of 
the subject. The net is already made, the fish enter, observed by an almost passive 
figure who 'can see them coming for miles'. I say 'almost passive' because, in addition 
to the pleasures of such ordering of disorder, the accommodation of the world to human 
purposes, the speaker allows pleasure to arise from the contemplation or exploration of 
the 'caught'. The 'indolent delicacy of your hand': there is indolence, but there is also 
delicacy., This isolation of the hand, serving as a figure for the productive or active, the 
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useful, is mirrored in the hand of the speaker: 'These fish that are rainbow and fat 
One can catch in the hand and return to the pool'. Clichd provides the speaker with the 
stability to explore, and by doing so enjoy, the familiar. It serves as a metaphor for the 
orientation of the subject in the world within existing discourses. Clichd here is not 
regarded as an escape into the banal, but as a forum for the speculation of order in the 
world,, for the organising within society, and for the pleasure within this stability: 
This is on me this time 
Watch how your flattery logic seduction or wit 
Elicit the expected response 
Each tiny hammer of the abbey chime 
Beating on the outer shell of the eternal bell 
Which hangs like a Rameses, does not deign to move 
For Mahomet comes to the mountain and the fish come to the bell. 
What will you have now? The same again? 
A finger can pull these ropes, 
A gin and lime or a double Scotch - 
Watch the response, the lifting wrist the clink and smile 
The fish come in, the hammered notes come out 
From a filigree gothic trap. 
MacNeice here weaves around his various tropes, seeing one in terms of the other, * 
mixing his metaphors. As such, the poem enacts the relaxed mode of its opening. 
Clichd is a space in which discourse has a momentum of its own, the images of the 
poem seem to mingle of their own accord, yet always under the manipulating hand of 
the subject, safely in control of this pattern-making. The poem illustrates the double 
sense of, clichd as a structure in place, lending stability to the speaker, but one which 
that same speaker can control and manipulate. , Consequently, the speaker is relatively 
empowered by the activity of clichd. We have a number of images for this: the bell of 
an abbey, an 'eternal bell', the figure of Rameses, immortal in stone, the mountain to 
which Mahomet must travel, fish entering a bell. These are images for phrases such as 
'this is on me', or 'the same again', the expected gesture, the foreseen smile. All serve 
to locate and order the subject's perspective, which he can control almost effortlessly 
('a finger can pull these ropes'). These pre-given, ordered utterances operate like a bell, 
which is hit, sounding of their own accord. The place of the subject is indicated by the 
notions of 'tiny hammers' on such a bell, the 'filigree' or jewelling on a pre-existent 
object, and the reference to 'patina: 
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These are the moments that are anaplerotic, these are the gifts to be accepted 
Remembering the qualification 
That everything is not true to type like these 
That the pattern and the patina of these 
Are superseded in the end. 
The 'anaplerosis' I'the filling up of a deficiency' OED) of the moments emphasises them 
as source of comfort. However, As the poem develops this notion of the subject acting 
on a pre-existent structure, the status of this structure is thrown into doubt. The fact , 
that 'everything is not true to type like these' is a cleverly placed clichd in itself. We are 
to understand that the 'patterning' or ordering of clichd, on the surface of things (patina) 
is one type of stability or fixity in an otherwise incoherent environment. Stasis, we 
must remember, is not the whole story. Yet it is a clichd which tells us this. The choice 
that the poem provides, then, is seemingly the taking of the pleasures of clichd when 
they are needed. We accept that the clich6 is not the whole reality, and that the subject 
can move out of these pleasures when they are exhausted. However, the poem , 
suggests that the subject does not have this capacity as much as may be supposed. In 
fact, these orderings and movements of the structure, themselves clichds, 'are 
themselves subject to change, and to change in a way that gives the subject no kind of 
real control. - 
So, the supposedly useful qualification on the limits of clichd, that they only 
serve limited uses, that they are counterposed by something else, which is knowable 
and usable, is itself qualified by the remainder of the poem: 
I see eight bells hanging alone. - 
Eight black panthers, eight silences 
On the outer shell of which our fingers via hammers 
Rapping with an impertinent precision 
Have made believe that this was the final music. 
Final as if finality were the trend of fish 
That always seek the net 
As if finality were the obvious gag 
The audience laughing in anticipation 
As if finality were the angled smile 
Drawn from the dappled stream of casual meetings 
IYet oh thank God for such) 
The poem suggests that, instead of clich6 providing only a respite from an otherwise 
active, inquiring discourse, the stabilities and pleasures of clichd in fact induce their own 
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logic, almost inevitably, which would persuade the user that such meanings, drawn from 
ecasual meetings' are final and unchanging. The discourse, that is to say, will not allow 
a knowledge that accounts for change. Hence the 'impertinent precision' of hammers 
on the bell are now dwarfed by the sense that the bell is not fixed and immutable, but 
may change of its own accord, or at least by powers which take no account of the self. 
The dream-logic of 'eight black panthers' gestures towards a foreboding of change, but 
the details are themselves seemingly arbitrary, and resistant to any meaningful 
interpretation - why black panthers? why eight? what are eight silences? We can 
suggest some reasons for this detail shortly; what we should note now is how this 
extra-ordinary detail modifies our sense of clichd that the poem has established. 
Finality, or the apparent finality of the clichd, is now 'the obvious gag / The audience 
laughing in anticipation', where the 'gag' is clearly a joke, which one can see coming for 
miles, and whose adumbration is part of its pleasure. It is also the 'gag' of the obvious 
- pleasurable in itself, but imposing severe restrictions on speech and knowledge. The 
'gift to be accepted' now seems to be emerging as a 'given', something which is pre- 
supposed without authentic grounding or base, and which MacNeice satirizes in another 
thirties poem, 'Taken for granted' (CP, p. 83): 
Taken for granted 
The household orbit in childhood 
The punctual sound of the gong 
The round of domestic service. 
On the knees of bountiful gods 
We lived in the ease of acceptance 
Taking until we were twenty 
God's plenty for granted. 
As a satirical poem this is certainly successful, drawing a witty parallel between the 
social 'givens, the sureties of early twentieth century bourgeois life, and the fact that 
these they were 'given', achieved, or as the poem implies, faccepted' as the result of 
privilege, rather than through any personal endeavour or labour. 
Given these modifications in 'Homage to clich6s', one might argue that by 
challenging uses of clichd as guides to the world, the poem really only returns us to 
another clichd - the clich6 about clichds not being very good guides to reality. There are 
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a number of qualifications we ourselves need to make here, however. First, although 
the speaker is powerfully aware of the limitations of the clich6, he still cannot reject its 
necessity or the pleasures of stability: 'yet oh thank god for such'. In a way which is 
now becoming typical, the self is divided between the recognition that an intellectual 
position is untenable, and the desire to remain within the certainties of that position. 
Clichds are lies, but they are nice lies, particularly when one considers the alternatives, 
which are not different positions for the self, but difficult and, more to the point, 
destructive ways of selflessness, or perhaps 'unseifness'. As ever, moving out of the 
conventional confines or positions of the self is a difficult, but necessary, task for 
MacNeice. 'The poem carries an implicit critique of notions which would claim to do so 
easily. The poem is distinctly unclear about what lies outside clich6. 'The 'eight black 
panthers' imply some kind of order, but one whose full explanatory meaning is withheld 
from the subject., Later in the poem we find that the bearer of clich6 has 'shut up the 
gates under padlock / For fear of wild beasts'. The wild is what is outside culture. The 
irony of the lines should be that what is 'wild' to the user of clich6 is only wild because 
that culture is so limiting in its ideological closures. But the poem provides no r 
metalanguage to include such wildness - the 'eight black panthers' are just as wild to 
the explaining subject as they are to the clichd-user. In addition, the 'eight silences' are 
just as silent., Hence, 'although the poem is indeed aware of the shortcomings of clich6; 
it is by no means sure of the alternatives. As such, it carries the implication that all 
discourse draws upon clich6, or is itself a clichd, a kind of gadget, when confronted 
with an 'other' which threatens to dwarf or overwhelm the subject. Even, that is, the 
clich6 about clich6s. 
, In drawing this kind of analysis the poem robs clichds of their original 
pleasurable purpose. -The notion of finality, when confronted with change, becomes an 
almost hysterical, desperate running together of commonplace meanings and certainties: 
I have shut the little window that looks up the road 
Towards the tombs of the kings 
For I have heard that you meet people walking in granite 
I have shut up the gates under padlock 
For fear of wild beasts 
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And I have shut my ears to the possible peal of bells, 
Every precaution - 
What will you have, my dear? The same again? 
Count up our fag-ends 
This year next year sometime never 
Next year is this year, sometime is next time, never is sometime 
Never is the Bell, Never is the Panther, Never is Rameses 
Oh the cold stone panic of Never. 
The poem layers irony on irony; and we would do well to recapitulate. We know that 
the world of clichd has been singled out for praise because of the stability it allows the 
subject. This stability has been described in terms of an 'eternal bell', as fish entering a 
net, as the immutable and immortal figure of the Rameses. Such elements are supposed 
to carry the qualification that things are not as final or fixed as this. However, it is 
implied that clich6 inevitably carries with it the assumption that a given stability, - 
intended to be temporary, is final. - We run into difficulties, however, when we attempt 
to imagine the change that clichd will not allow. Such a change will destroy the whole 
basis of clichd; yet it is itself seen only through the lens of clich6 - the bell moving, the 
Rameses walking. However, this perspective is shared by the perspective which 
attempts to account for this change. What is 'beyond' is as mysterious to the figure 
who attempts to account for the limitations of clichd as it is to the clichd-user. This 
user is still seduced by the lure of clichd, still working within its closures., 
Such a situation invites us to consider that there are fewer differences between 
the 'banal' orderings of clichd and those of the 'non-clichd'. The language of clichd 'the 
same agaid, 'this is on me', 'sometime', 'never', is a part of a non-clich6d critical' - 
discourse just as it is a part of clichd. 'The point is not that the clichd is counterposed 
with some definable position outside clichd, which is less preferable to the banal. Nor is 
it a simple parody of our propensity to use clichd when other alternatives are available. 
The poem is not arguing that the knowledge of clichd is a final knowledge, that all 
attempts to go beyond the banal are vain. Rather, it implies that the claims of discourse 
which are 'outside' such knowledge are themselves open to inspection, in their claims to 
a higher 'order', or in their attempts to avoid the contemplation of a nothingness which 
is quite capable of absorbing their truth-claims as such as it does the world of clichd. , It 
is not that there is only clichd, but that any discourse partakes in a stabilizing of the 
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world. The point is to recognize this stabilization, and its ephemerality, without failing 
into the alternative trap of imagining, as in 'Upon this beach', that this instability can in 
some way be fully known, understood and martialled. -. 1, _ 
This situation is reinforced in the final lines of the poem: 
The ringers are taking off their coats, the panther crouches 
The granite sceptre is very slightly inclining 
As our shoes tap against the bar and our glasses 
Make two new rings of wet upon the counter 
Somewhere behind us stands a man, a counter 
A timekeeper with a watch and a pistol 
Ready to shoot and with his shot destroy 
This whole delightful world of clichd and refrain - 
What will you have, my dear? The same again? 
So the inability of clichd to adapt to change is the inability of all discourse to do the 
same. We know that clichds lie, but we still want to use them, still enjoy their illusory 
stability. Further, the language or discourse which we employ to distance ourselves 
from the limitations imposed by clichd may itself be open to question, relying on notions 
which have no final grounding, no superior knowledge of change. ýý Indeed, it may even 
use the language of clichd to explain the inadequacy of clich6 and the supposed distance 
between it and 'high' discourse. 
We gain a sense here of the propensity for discourse to function with a 
momentum of its own, which pays no respect to the intentions of the subject. Indeed, 
the control of the subject over discourse is an illusion which is generated by that , 
subject's interaction with language. This illusion is revealed by the assumption of stasis 
which does not allow for change, and which is only dimly apprehended, in arcane signs. 
These are not only unknowable, they actually seem to threaten the subject, both in his 
role of intentional, controlling being, and, in fact, completely - outside culture is 
wildness, which you may not control, and which may be wholly destructive. -, ' - 
Included in this attack must be the 'phases/phrases' of supposedly 'progressive' 
emergent discourse, but it must also include the metadiscourses of high culture with its 
own categorization of 'sometime', 'never', 'the same again', of what is I onus'. The bell 
does not allow for change, yet the discourse which would point this out, and argue for 
this change, cannot do so either. This is not because such a discourse is absent, but 
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because of its growth out of the limited discourses of clichd - the 'womb of stone', the 
'cold stone panic of Never'. As before, the language and imagery of clichd is used to 
indicate the limits of clichd, or to take account, from a supposedly higher position, of a 
reality which clichd cannot accommodate. The Rameses may move, but it is still a 
Rameses., The situation, then, is close to that described by Fredrick Jameson in 
commenting on the 'erosion of the ... distinction between high culture and so-called 
mass or popular culture' in postmodern responses to the world: 
... many of the newer postmodernisms have been fascinated precisely by 
that whole landscape of advertising and motels, of the Las Vegas strip, 
of the late show and Grade-B Hollywood film, of the so-called 
paraliterature with its airport categories of the gothic and the romance, 
the popular biography, the murder mystery and the science fiction or 
fantasy novel. They no longer 'quote' such 'texts' as Joyce might have 
done, or a Mahler; they incorporate them, to the point where the line 
between high art and commercial forms seems increasingly difficult to 
draW. 27 
This is one of the most important elements of thirties writing, and one which is often 
obscured. Usually the incorporation of the 'demotic' in this writing is read as a faith in, 
to paraphrase Jameson, the clarity and communicative power of a linguistic norm, 
'ordinary language' of the kind celebrated by Orwell, for instance (P. 16). In some cases 
this was of course true (Orwell, for instance). Read this way 'Homage to clichds' would 
seem to approach the most banal of poetic statements. In pointing out the deficiencies 
of clichd the poem cannot be seen to endorse such a programme. But it is in its refusal 
to accept the veracity of clichd, whilst at the same time I refraining' to provide any 
higher discourse, that the poem achieves its most important effects. Equally, it is in 
involving its own ironic undercutting within the language of clichd, and by using clichd 
as a metaphor for techniques of ordering the subject and the world, that it raises 
questions about discourses which would claim to transcend the banal truths of the 
commonplace. These too, it is suggested, are agents of stability, where their stabilizing 
force may be disguised, and, indeed, where their claims to represent knowledge of 
change, and to be rigourously self-inspecting as such, is illusory. 
We might say, then, that 'Homage to clichds I is less about the pros and cons of 
certain clichds, f-h64 about the propensity for all discourse to be, itself, a kind of clichd. 
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The poem reflects the kind of confusion that Jameson describes because of a scepticism 
about transcendence which is linked to a loss of faith in the originary powers of the 
subject. In a sense this is a compromise with 'Turf-stacks', or at least with the bleak 
alternatives which that poem offers. Here there is little faith in 'theory vendingý. 
but no screaming., If the poem avoids the impassioned horror of the subject that 'Turf- 
stacks' presents, it is perhaps because there is less confidence in the status of the 
subject who screams; 'Theory vending' might be clichd which does not recognize itself 
as such, but then so might certain discourses of selfhood. They too might be illusory 
forms of stasis placed over a finally unknowable flux. This flux might be the only thing 
truly outside the closures of clichd, or any ordering discourse. This conclusion must 
have consequences for notions of an originating, acting subject, whose status seems 
again hopelessly circumscribed by determining forms of illusory closure on the one hand, 
and destructive flux on the other. We should examine these consequences more 
closely. 
The Death of the Subject: 'Eclogue for Christmas'. 
We have so far discussed MacNeice's presentation of the social in terms of exclusion, of 
the location of the subject within a domain of cultural signification, of the limits of such 
signification, the threat to the subject within these limits, and the contradictions that can 
arise in attempts to distance oneself from such a situation. These are the features 
which inform MacNeice's long poem of 1933, 'Eclogue for Christmas'. 
In his autobiographical work World Within World Stephen Spender wrote about 
the implications for certain kinds of generic writing in the mid-1 930s: 
The sense of political doom, pending in unemployment, Fascism, and the 
overwhelming threat of war, was by now so universal that even to 
ignore these things was in itself a political attitude. Just as the pacifist 
is political in refusing to participate in war, so the writer who refuses to 
recognize the political nature of our age must to some extent be refusing 
to deal with an experience in which he himself is involved. But why 
should he not refuse? No reason, except that the consciousness of 
excluded events would probably affect the scale of his writing. A 
pastoral poem in 1936 was not just a pastoral poem: it was also a non- 
political poem. A poem that rejected the modern consciousness of 
politics as a universal fate. 28 
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Spender, as he admits, is using politics here 'in a very wide sense' (p. 249). Other 
thirties writers were not always so eclectic in their definitions. Yet he is also perhaps 
using 'pastoral' in a very narrow sense, to denote the Georgian genteel tradition that 
thirties writers still sometimes saw themselves challenging. 29 Spender's view is 1, 
essentially that of the gran rekuta that the avoidance of politics is essentially a politics 
by default. In a sense, then, MacNeice's 'Eclogue', part of a series of such poems 
written in the thirties which explicitly drew on the pastoral tradition, might be seen as 
what Mikhail Bakhtin called a 'hidden polemic'. This has been described as a type of 
represented speech 'in which a speaker not only refers to an object in the world but 
simultaneously replies to, contests, or makes concessions to some other real or 
anticipated or hypothetical statement about the same object'. 30 In using a pastoral 
mode, then, we might see MacNeice as baulking against the emergent stress on 
'political writing', participating in or initiating a counter-discourse., Whilst this contextual 
feature should not be ignored, it can be overstressed. For pastoral writing, from Virgil's 
Eclogues onwards, has often been used as a vehicle for political comment, direct or 
otherwise. 31 In this sense MacNeice was not different, although he did employ a genre 
that avoided the excesses of Spender's neo-romantic expressive realism in poetics, 
together with the constraints of satirical verse. Instead, MacNeice allows himself a form 
marked by its artifice and rhetoricity, which can still offer a forum for comment without 
being bound by it. 
Features of the MacNeicean social landscape clearly abound in the opening to 
'An eclogue for Christmas' (CP, p. 33): 
A. I meet you in an evil time. 
B. The evil bells 
Put out of our heads, I think, the thought of everything else. 
A. The jaded calender revolves, 
Its nuts need oil, carbon chokes the valves, 
The excess sugar of a diabetic culture 
Rotting the nerve of life and literature; 
Therefore when we bring out the old tinsel and frills 
To announce that Christ is born among the barbarous hills 
I turn to you whom a morose routine ' 
Saves from the mad vertigo of being what has been. 
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We are introduced to a melancholy conversation. The poem continues in the same way, 
with long lists of complaint and comment, in a long poem. This is not a poem which 
thrives on lyric intensity. This kind of intensity would seem oddly inappropriate, as if 
the speakers are attempting to account for its loss, its impossibility. Neither does it 
offer a sharp polemic critique, although this too is a voice which informs the poem. But 
this distinctly rhetorical poem connects with one characteristic gesture of the thirties, 
often misread as a simple variety of commonsensical realism, typified by the opening of 
Christopher Isherwood's Goodbye to Berlin: 
From my window, the deep solemn massive street. Cellar-shops where 
the lamps burn all day, under the shadow of top-heavy balconied 
facades, dirty plaster frontages embossed with scrollwork and heraldic 
devices. The whole district is like this: street leading into street of 
houses like shabby monumental safes crammed with the tarnished 
valuables and second-hand furniture of a bankrupt middle class. 
I am a camera with its shutter open, quite passive, recording, not 
thinking. Recording the man shaving and the woman in the kimono 
washing her hair. Some day, all this will have to be developed, carefully 
printed, fixed. 32 
Roland Barthes has called this piling up of contingent detail, of the type used by Flaubert 
Weffet du reeP, in which the blank, meaningless detail is used to construct a code which 
emits the signal 'this is real', or 'this is realism'. 33 But we can also see such a depiction 
as a departure from the form-finding of nineteenth century realism - where 'seeing' was 
order and knowledge - into a less determinate mode. As in MacNeice's 'Carrickfergus', 
the detail is just there. It means nothing in and of itself. The observer, in much the 
same way as the thirties Mass Observer, is just observing, not imposing any form on his 
surroundings, resisting the impulse to 'think' - like the peasant in 'Turf-stacks'. Just 
recording, with no real hope that reality will somehow be revealed through this detail, in 
and of itself. Someday, as he puts it, this might become 'fixed'; but by someone else. 
And the slightest knowledge of photography tells us that a camera with its shutter open 
will reveal nothing but a formless blur, which would be hard to recognize as 
'photographic realism'. In an important sense this is a condition of the speakers in 'An 
Eclogue for Christmas', as they lethargically reel off the facts of their predicament: 
Jazz-weary of years of drums and Hawaiian guitar, 
Pivoting on the parquet I seem to have moved far 
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From bombs and mud and gas, have stuttered on my feet 
Clinched to the streamlined and butter-smooth trulls of the dlite, 
The lights irritating and gyrating and rotating in gauze - 
Pomade-dazzle, a slick beauty of gewgaws. -. Iý"I 
These lines would seem to offer a simple, if rather unimpressive, critique of twenties 
aestheticism, or modernism, from the standpoint of the thirties. We are familiar with 
this perspective: modernism is guilty of abstraction and formalism in art, aestheticism 
and stylization in life. The self is separated from itself; the subject, robbed of life, is , 
therefore unable to 'be himself'. A kind of foppish weariness pervades these lines. ' It is 
as though the speaker has discovered too late the limits of style, the consequences of 
giving in to its seduction. He now realises the importance of 'being oneself', and how 
this is somehow now impossible. We should be wary, however, of identifying this 
foppishness as essentially characteristic of twenties aestheticism or dandyism. Martin 
Green has pointed out how the dand; vs of the twenties quite deliberately distanced 
themselves from fin de sMele lethargy, and associated their aestheticism with all that 
seemed bold and neW. 34. But for this aesthete, at least, the party seems to be over. 
The fact that we can associate this voice with that of a class, of course, adds to its 
potency, and relevance for the thirties. One can imagine an Orwellian conscience 
nodding approvingly, if rather superciliously, at these lines. ', Style takes the form of a 
particular dance, of jazz and Elav-14Nd. % guitar - the new and the artificial, which has now 
almost inevitably exhausted itself, since it is ungrounded in the life of the self. - 
I, The artificiality of a class, indicative perhaps of the artificiality of a class system, 
is demonstrated in the artificiality of its cultural practices. - Covert references, indicating 
the identity and cultural od; ea, of the speaker, abound in this poem. - The mention of 
'stuttering', identifies the speaker as a twenties Oxford aesthete, whose reputation 
Auden I. had to deal with. One notorious stutterer was Brian Howard, whose stutter 
was mimicked by intending aesthetes, and who formed the basis of the character of 
Antony Blanche in Brideshead Revisited. Indeed the whole Eclogue shares a frame of 
reference with the sense of the deliberately purposeless play, the ethical wilderness and 
of the rather listless tragedy which Waugh presented in, Vile Bodies 11930) and A 
Handful of Dust 0 934). 
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What complicates this reading, however, is the final line of his speech. The 
cultural landscape contains within it a revelation. The Speaker is not wholly blind to his 
position. He can understand that what is, or was, wrong with bourgeois life is, or was, 
the absence of self. This is perfectly clear-cut; moreover it is potentially liberating. - 
Why, knowing this, knowing the limitations of style and what should replace it (being 
oneself), does the speaker feel he must 'foreswear thought and become an automaton'? 
The statement reads as if it were the logical conclusion of both his life-as-style, and, - 
crucially, of his understanding of the alternative perspective of a 'natural' self-fulfillment 
which challenges this artificial wilderness. However, the more reasonable conclusion 
would surely be the opposite - in a wholesale rejection of the tired conventions of 
aestheticism, and the embracing of the new life of the self. 
One solution to this problem may be that this is the voice of a dying class. The 
speaker, individually and as part of a social group, quite simply lacks the energy or 
means to make this transformation. The forgetting of self in style has Led to the 
situation where that self cannot be remembered. Or, if remembered, cannot be 
established in reality. 'Being oneself' was what they should have been doing. Now he 
realizes this restriction, and its consequences, but one of these very consequences is 
that there is no 'self' for him to be. Moreover, properly being oneself would mean 
taking on the identity of another, of one from another class or structure of feeling. This 
becoming someone else would be contingent on the death of this self and discourse of 
selfhood-as-style. Though this is not without interest, there is another, more suggestive 
reading possible; which grants more firmness to MacNeice's use of the critique of pure 
form/aestheticism in these lines, and the relation to the poem as a whole. 
The poem tempts us to engage in an absurdity or aporia. We are encouraged, 
on the one hand to view the speaker as a wholesale tragic victim of aestheticism, - whose 
ý'ýIfhood has been totally extinguished. However, we must also suppose, on the other, 
some outraged alienated self which protests at its suppression, its own inability to be. 
This contradiction allows us to inspect this passage more closely. - If 'pure form' is such 
a patent absurdity, such a self-evident denial of the privileges and practices of selfhood, 
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how does it manage to gain so much power over the self, to forbid this self from 
'being'? The absurdity of 'abstraction' within pure form is contradicted by the seeming 
fragility of the self set against it. - To put it another way, the 'self' which enables us to 
see pure form as absurd, which thus stands as a mark of value, is unable to defend 
itself against being undermined by this absurd phenomenon, together with the resulting 
absurdity of this undermining. This may well lead us to question, not so much the 
limitations of pure form, but the validity of the self which considers it absurd, but which 
cannot ground itself in defence against this absurdity. ý One could argue that the passage 
does not suggest the absurdity of this doctrine of abstraction (though this is implied 
throughout), but its insidiousness. Because something is absurd does not mean that it 
lacks power. -Yet still the question must remain - if the speaker is properly aware of a 
sense of self, why is this selfhood relinquished in favour of 'automata'? This passage 
argues less for the absurdity of pure form than for its power; less for the strength of the 
self which would prove this absurdity than for its fragility. When reading this poem we 
must keep in mind that these conditions may apply to the voice, perspective, or self of a 
particular class. Yet they might equally well apply to the voice which hopes to distance 
itself from that class, and indeed to criticize it, but which still employs this discourse of 
selfhood, which can be challenged. 
ý Hence, the sense that the imputed absurdity or paucity of the practice of 
aestheticism as artistic practice, when set against the claims of the self, is contradicted. 
If absurd, it would not threaten the self. If the self were so evidently robust, and it 
were this robustness which accounted for the absurdity of the doctrine of aestheticism, 
this doctrine could offer no threat. In this way the statement 'abstracting and dissecting 
me / They have made of me pure form, a symbol or pastiche... ' reads at least two ways. 
The first, from the voice of the emergent or residually authentic self: 'they have made 
out of me, they have made from me, pure form'. Such form is both an abstraction, - 
since it is a representation of the embodied self, and furthermore a representation which 
is fragmented. Such a reading holds the palpability of 'soul and flesh', the stability of 
the self, in full esteem. But, as stated, the fact that this 'thinking' self gives up the 
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struggle and renounces its power and claim to authentic will in 'becoming and -, ý,, 
automaton' suggests that this is not the whole story. A second reading, more in 
keeping with this sense would be: 'they have made me into pure form'. Here the 
abstraction of the artwork offers itself as the signifier of abstraction and reification - 
representation and fragmentation - within life, or within life as style. This second 
reading not only suggests a critique of the pure form aesthetics, but sees no defence 
against this process within the claims of the self.,. ýThis process of reification is not made 
any more attractive, but its lack of appeal cannot be explained or condemned in the 
name of 'being oneself'. Again, this is not because of the essential insidiousness of 
such a doctrine, but because this doctrine effectively demonstrates the fragility of such 
a subject, and includes within this demonstration any discourse which would centre 
1 tself upon the claims and power of the subject. Rather than dismissing pure form in the 
name of a subject, these lines throw into question such a subjectivity, and discourses 
which offer themselves as defending such a subject. This questioning must include, of 
course, the standard thirties objection to aestheticism which these lines initially 
proposed. 
Clearly one could argue that we are still here dealing with a class perspective - 
the death of this class is superseded by a new one, which will capitalize on this 
blindness, this inability to be oneself, and make this blindness its insight. The speaker 
cannot be himself because he doesn't know how, yet this does not stop other people, 
who do, from doing so. The above suggestion oF - the attack within the poem on all 
self-centred discourses would put this assertion in dispute. One discourse, however, 
which informs the poem powerfully, and informs the reading we are now questioning, is 
the subject-based discourse of life/death applied to a cultural context. This discourse is 
one of organicism. As such, the apparent discontinuity of the 'death' of a class issuing 
in a new beginning masks the notion that from the death of one class will emerge the 
life of another. In the rejection of 'pure form', modernism and aestheticism, thirties 
writers were in fact arguing for a continuity with 'being oneself'. --The continuity with 
the previous order is therefore twofold: in maintaining the discourse of selfhood, and in 
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linking this discourse to modes of development which stress change through continuity, 
the life of the new contained within the death of the old. A distinction can be drawn, 
therefore, between organicist notions of history and progression, and its attendant 
subjectivity, and a notion which stresses discontinuity and negativity, and deconstructs 
such a subject. ý These two modes have been helpfully distinguished by Paul de Man in 
the following way: 
[The opposition] resides in the nature of two movements confronting 
each other. The historical movement is that of becoming: being 
consciously created, whether as the work of art or historical deed in 
general, is unstable in its essence, and it denies itself to be reborn in 
another being. The two are separated by the abyss of a negation (in 
organic language: a death), and the passage from the one to the other is 
essentially discontinuous. The movement of the ancient tree, on the 
other hand, is a growth: its being remains immediately identical with 
itself ý and its movement: is only the extension of what is and always will 
be. 3ý 
In the terms of this poem, the speaker's inability to 'be himself' may be due both to the 
usurping forms of abstract, and to the paucity of that selfhood. Both these are 
characterized as deathly. Out of this death, it is argued, come new forms of selfhood 
(since no self-respecting thirties Marxist really wanted members of the ruling class to 
really be themselves), and a newly invigorated sense of what being oneself can do. 
Both these notions rely on organic notions of change. Both are put into question in the 
poem, as are the terms of life/death which they rely on. 
Speaker B's response to the above passage is also concerned with the question 
of consciousness and death, though in a slightly different way: 
There are in the country also of whom I am afraid - 
Men who put beer into a belly that is dead, 
Women in the forties with terrier and setter who whistle and swank 
Over down and plough and Roman road and daisied bank, 
Half-conscious that these barriers over which they stride 
Are nothing to the barbed wire that has grown around their pride. 
Again, a seemingly innocuous, well intentioned, liberal criticism attacking the dangers of 
the sensibility of 'pride' in the name of communality and fellow-feeling can be put into 
question. Because the speaker's objects, swanking women, are 'half-conscious' about 
their pride. They are aware of an absence which, presumably, only intensifies their 
sense of enclosure in the failure to form links with anyone outside these enclosures of 
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pride. We take, that is to say, 'pride' as an index of a sense of self, which has closed 
off contact with the other and which, like the aestheticism of Speaker A, continues in a 
self supporting manner in a claustrophobic re-confirmation of self, to the extent that 
'pride' becomes synonymous with self. - But this cannot be described as a unitary 
enclosure of the self, since the speaker suggests that they are 'half-conscious' and that 
such a situation is impoverishing. As well as this impurity within the self, which -, 
detracts from or negates the positive value of 'pride', we must also admit that to be 
fully conscious of this condition would, rather than introducing a state of pure ý 
consciousness, 'or of full communion with the other, introduce the demise of the subject 
of pride: the subject who has become, that is, synonymous with pride, with the 
hierarchic denigration of the other. Again, no alternative sense of selfhood, one that can 
resist these problems, is introduced. What should concern us now, therefore, is how 
such a self might be legitimately inferred in a reading, and whether, or how, it is 
inferred, only to be blocked-off by the poerqs discursive and rhetorical forms. 
The figures of the 'swanky' country dwellers are immediately paralleled by the 
city dweller: 
And two there are, as I drive in the city, who suddenly perturb - 
The one sirening me to draw up by the kerb 
The other, as I lean back, my right leg stretched creating speed, 
Making me catch and stamp, the brakes shrieking, pull up dead: 
She wears silk stockings taunting the winter wind, 
He carries a white stick to mark that he is blind. 
Like the 'evil bells' which introduced the poem, we are plainly being asked to consider 
these figures as signs of demise. In the light of the previous discussion, we cannot help 
but read these details as overdetermined. The image of the speaker 'creating speed', 
vividly portrayed in terms of cinematic-like montage, links him with the aestheticism he 
was previously describing. This is the sense of the driver 'creating speed', rather than 
simply making a car go faster. In this sense, it is the voice of aestheticism. It is, - 
however; absolutely undecidable whether to locate this voice within the narrator or the 
narrated. The first would mark a distance between the 'aesthetic' driving, the second 
would support this aestheticism in describing it. Equally, the first would imply an 
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aestheticization of life in the pursuit of pure 'speed', the second in description, using a 
formalist rhetoric which allows making a car go faster to be seen as 'creating speed'. 
This sense of undecidability is matched by the details of siren (prostitute) and blind man. 
'Sirening' mixes registers and meanings - classical mythology, images of seduction, 
signs for alarm. The speaker is, of course, describing himself as looking for signs, or 
even looking for signs in his description. The attempt fails in a most suggestive way. 
His figures, we should note, 'Farluriand halt' - introduce a sense of crisis and alarm, yet 
fail to adequately describe that alarm. They point to commodification (prostitute) and 
lack of insight (blindness). As signs, therefore, they point to the demise or degradation 
of the self, or a lack of perception. What we perceive through these signs, that is to 
say, is the failure of the self, the failure of signification. The seduction of the 
commodity, so to speak, is a blind alley. This sense is quite in keeping with the hint of 
arbitrariness, foundness, in these signs - they are singled out, and as such significant, in 
marking out the failure of signification, yet they do not possess any special authority as 
signs, any access to a privileged controlling intelligence, or way forward for the subject: 
... in the heavy shires Greyness is on the fields and sunset like a line of pyres 
Of barbarous heroes smoulders through the ancient air 
Hazed with factory dust and, orange opposite, the moon's glare, 
Goggling yokel-stubborn through the iron trees, 
Jeers at the end of us, our bland ancestral ease; 
We shall go down like palaeolithic man 
Before some new Ice Age or Genghiz Khan. 
This passage is thick with contemporary references: the Audenesque glacier, the 
paleolithic, whose recent importance for modernist writers has been noted by Hugh 
Kenner, and seems to fill out and locate the sense of dissolution. 36 Equally important, 
however, is the anthropomorphism in this passage. The sky indicates, forms an index 
of, death and barbarism, which is then linked to contemporary culture, and to a sense of 
a historical wisdom in the 'ancient air' frustrated by the moon gazing 'yokel-stubborn'. 
These details emphasise the reading of meaning into the landscape - but that reading of 
meaning, looking for signs, can only prophesj - the 
loss of the self that does so. 
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- Hence it should come as no surprise that the poem goes on to offer the most 
thoroughgoing discursive critique of the intentional subject that we have so far 
encountered: 
A. It is time for some new coinage, people have got so old, 
Hacked and handled and shiny from pocketing they have made bold 
ýTo think that each is himself through these accidents, being blind 
To the fact that they are merely the counters of an unknown Mind. 
B. A Mind that does not think, if such a thing can be, 
Mechanical Reason, capricious Identity. 
That I could be able to face this domination nor flinch - 
A. The tin toys of the hawker move on the pavement inch by inch 
Not knowing that they are wouild up; it is better to be so 
Than to be, like us, wound up and while running down to know - 
B., - But everywhere the pretence of individuality recurs - 
Speaker A admits that it is time for change, but his means of doing so is more - 
interesting than the sentiment itself. The figure of 'coin' suggests an arbitrary, socially 
agreed, token or sign. An abstraction, in fact. The notion of currency was, of course, 
an important one for modernist writers like Pound. Yet, later in the thirties Christopher 
Caudwell used the notion of money as part of his aim at describing the function of 
language: II 1ýý I-, I 
The word is not fully reallsed except as a dynamic social act. We 
overlook this just as we overlook that a pound note only exists 
importantly as a social act, because the complexities produced by the 
division of labour delay the impact between producer and consumer by 
the interposition of the market. The pound note, like a word, is only the 
expression of a transfer between one man and another ... but the 
conditions of commodity production give them a mysterious existence in 
their own right as concepts - the concept of 'value' in the one case, the 
concept of 'meaning' in the other. 37 
Caudwell's analysis is more interesting for its use of the figure of currency than the light 
it throws on language, or indeed on money and the commodity for that matter. The 
item operates as an abstraction, but one which is linked to human and social productive 
forces. Almost certainly Caudwell is using this as a metaphor for codes or signs 
produced by convention, if not by consensus. - MacNeice, however, goes one stage 
further, and presents the dying social process as an abstraction which has been taken 
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for a concrete reality. ý Indeed, the sense in this poem is closer to the famous definition 
of 'truth' expressed by Nietzsche: 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and ,-, 
anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have 
been enhanced, transposed and embellished poetically and rhetorically, 
and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to people: 
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they 
are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins 
which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer 
as coins. 38 
We encounter a double movement in the poem, therefore. The imputed concreteness of 
'being oneself' is rendered ineluctably into an abstraction, this abstraction (the sign) is 
then taken for the concrete. As in the above extract from Nietzsche's discussion, the 
transformative power of metaphor is rendered static. Moreover, it is unrecognizable as 
construction, but poses (like the harlequin) as 'truth'. But again, MacNeice goes a stage 
further, in insisting within the poem that this 'truth' cannot maintain itself as a self- 
sufficient absolute. It must, in its turn, become commutable to exchange within aa 
system beyond itself. 
Here, we can profitably recall two points made in previous discussions. One, 
Raymond Williams's description of a Jamesian sense of fear of the social as an 
inherently 'abstract' construction. This fear would seem to have an equivalent in these 
lines. The second, Terry Eagleton's description of commodification as the introduction 
of a system in which objects are never properly themselves, but are always commutable 
to others within a structure of exchange. This is a system which is at once rigidly all- 
encompassing and radically contingent. Commodification inhabits everything, nothing is 
ever quite itself. These are the terms used to describe that subject in the above 
passage. It is the subject who is described as a counter, as part of a structure of 
exchange: people figure as cyphers. As in 'Now that the shapes of mist', life is 
described in terms of accident, thereby denying any self-originating sovereignty to the 
self. However, in this poem this 'accidental' quality is not the product of radical risk or 
contingency. Rather it is the contingency of the subject within a system of exchange, 
which diminishes this subjectivity - illusory or not - to replace it with a system which is 
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both radically unstable, and radically fixed. This is, in fact, the subject of the r* ,, "' -, 
commodity - always different, yet always identical. This is not the sameness which can 
be described as a function of diffir-ance. 39 -Instead of identity being predicated on 
difference, where the sameness of diffdrance admits no sense of identity which is not 
subject to change, the sameness of the commodity works by absorbing all difference 
into the structure of the identical. " everything is always a commodity., One must note, ' 
at this point, that there do, however, exist relations of difference within the commodity, 
a sense of identity in difference which the commodity exploits - one commodity which 
one does possess gains its identity by virtue of not being a commodity that one lacks. 
Such a system however, can only operate once the 'spurious identity' between objects 
as commodities has been established. To be different commodities, objects must first 
be commodities; for their identities to be predicated on difference, ' objects must first -ý. 
exist through relations of identity established by their commodification. For objects to 
appear identical as commodities; they must first appear identical with themselves., - 
Hence, the commodity always presents itself as self-sufficient, which is how it is 
allowed to exploit its inherent absence within the structure of exchange. It posits an 
identity which must covertly be always held-off, but which does not admit this deferral. 
The speaker's sense of identity of in terms of 'counter' represents the recognition of this 
structure, and the parody of identity (everything is identical to everything else) within it. 
-, As a result, speaker A is aware, like the 'swanky' dweller of the country, of a 
diminution of the trust in,, or powers of, thought. If thinking is overcome, 'It is also 
unthinkable that the thinking self could be fully aware of this. He is irrevocably trapped 
in a system of double-bind and aporia. One can describe one's misrecognition. - offer 
some approximation of it, but one cannot think or know it, since doing so involves 
partaking of the powers of the 'unknown mind'. This sentiment is not that of the 
observer in 'Birmingham, who was keen to limit the powers of knowledge, - eager to 
privilege the recognition of surface over depth. Conversely, this speaker sees not the 
absence of a determinant so much as one which is 'unknown'; to which one must 
remain blind, even whilst attempting insight by describing this blindness. It is, we 
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should note, 'people' who suffer this affliction, not the speaker. ý Yet in describing this 
desire, as with his previous sense of 'pure form', he implies the need for a redemption 
of the conscious ego whilst all the time denying that such a redemption, such a saving, 
could take place., I--I-.., II 
, It is hardly surprising, then; that B replies; half in agreement, half in rebuke, by 
suggesting that the 'thought' of this 'Mind' is hardly knowable by the conscious subject. 
It maintains itself at a distance - it does not 'think', if that can 'be', yet it contaminates 
thinking and being. It establishes itself as Reason and Identity.., This capitalization 
imparts a fine Hegelian register in these lines. But what we find is not the power of 
consciousness, but its demise. We do not have reason but mechanical reason; not 
identity but capricious identity. We find the misrecognition of these things within the 
guise of the absolute: identity is not Identity since it is 'capricious', ý yet it still manifests 
itself as Identity. That is, the problem is not that identity is open to change, but that 
this changing entity always masks itself as an Absolute, a fixity: - It always gives itself 
as unchanging whilst changing constantly. A's heroic injunction to 'face this .1 
domination' carries with it an irony that undermines his heroism., ý This heroism would, of 
course, be a function of the very 'I' which is under question. It comes as no surprise 
that he is interrupted. Interruptions pepper this poem, as though the speaker's , 
discourse is exhausting itself - at once urgent and garrulous, ý but saying almost nothing - 
piling detail on detail and coming no nearer to the truth., 
I. Indeed, we must conclude that finding any kind of coherent 'truth' must be 
unthinkable, as the analogy with the 'tin toys' of the 'hawker' (commodity) indicates. 
These toys are wound up but do not (cannot) know it. The speakers are similarly 
wound up, and do know it. But in what way? Only that they are wound, the 
implication goes, nothing else; not how or why, or where this could lead them. And this 
is much like their sense of 'the pretence of individuality', which carries with it a careful-, 
irony., On the one hand, the line implies that what they describe is the mere shadow of 
individualism, which cries out for an authentic form of the same in a newly rejuvenated 
form. On the other hand the line carries its opposite meaning, that individuality is itself 
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a pretence. First, because its functioning cannot be distinguished from the T given by 
the unknown mind. Secondly, because the pretence is indistinguishable from the real 
thing, because its grounds for establishing any sense of authenticity have been eroded. 
At this stage of the poem, therefore, we find a number of contradictory claims. 
These consist of a desire for identity, concomitant with the recognition that this wish is 
subject to both exploitation and undercutting by the structure of exchange, which is the 
structure of the commodity. For the commodity asserts ostensibly that each object 
within its structure is self-present, or self-identical. However, within its system of 
exchange, as Terry Eagleton puts its, it 'fashions some spurious identity between 
disparate objects', by making one object equivalent or commutable to another. 40 
Hence, the logic of self-identity within an object, and identity between objects, is at 
once asserted and undercut. This undercutting occurs by the repressed structure of 
difference within the systern:, one object is not equivalent to another if the consumer 
does not possess it, and the desire to possess is articulated as desire within the 
commodity structure which is limitless. For if the hoped-for presence and self-identity of 
one commodity is implied, yet continually withheld, this is displaced metonymically on a 
chain of commodities, all of which, individually, would promise to cease this desire, 
offer themselves as the transcendental signified of this system of exchange. Yet all 
must fail in this promise. One cannot possess all commodities. 
The alternative to this process might seem to be the return to the immanence of 
the object, its authentic self-identity, and an identity between objects which is never 
'spurious'. However, this would only inscribe the structure of imputed presence and 
continual undercutting or denial of presence in exchange (one object is identical to 
another) that the commodity thrives on. So, instead of resisting the 'seeping' of 
meaning between objects which are endlessly commutable to one another by virtue of 
their self-identity which is then disrupted within a structure of imputed identity, one can 
assert the fundamental non-identity of objects, the impossibility of exchange by 
asserting a structure of identity by difference. Of course, this will not return us to an 
originary moment of the immanence of objects. The identity of the object will always be 
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inhabited by absence, never self-identical or self authenticating. It is tentative and - 
subject to change, never existing as a presence. Yet it is precisely because it cannot 
exist as presence that it cannot then offer itself within an ostensible structure of 
difference predicated on identity, and the subsequent undercutting of this within the 
unconscious of identity within the structure of exchange. Hence the problem with, - 
'capricious Identity' in the poem is not identity as such, or change as such, but the 
notion of self-same identity which is continually exploited within a structure of identity 
which, in fact, is one'of difference, but which does not declare itself as such. 
In addition to this attention to identity, there is also the contradiction of the need 
to comment on and explain the contemporary crisis, and the difficult sense that this 
description will always be redundant, apparently useless. This occurs in two ways. 
First, because the speakers are part of what they describe. Secondly, because relations 
of part to whole (synecdoche), and equivalence (metaphor, asserting motivation and 
necessary identity within systems) are disrupted. In describing their environment, the 
speakers present a sense of inadequacy, of falling short. Detail is placed upon detail, 
comment on comment, yet it seems to progress nowhere, to offer no satisfactory 
conclusion, explanatory system, or position to judge the contemporary, or the speaker's 
position in relation to it. So controlling metaphors fail; they fail in the failure of 
synecdoche, but not because the speakers can somehow distance themselves from 
what they describe, become apart from it, but because their place within their situation 
cannot offer any privileged insight, since relations of part to whole are disrupted and 
confused. Hence, when the speakers attempt to characterize their contemporary ills 
through the figures within it these details lead nowhere: 
A. Old faces frosted with powder and choked in furs. 
B. The jutlipped farmer gazing over the humpbacked wall. 
A. The commercial traveller joking in the urinal. 
They offer some characteristics of the conditions, they register a sense of disaffection 
and unease, but they can supply no clear cut system or way forward, no means of 
finding order or properly describing disorder. Hence, though this relation is necessarily 
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synecdochic in that the speakers are a part of what they describe, this synecdochic 
relationship is not one supplying order, but only describing the lack of it within the very 
attempt at its description. --I--4,1 1" 
- This produces a sense of impurity between inside and outside, the resultant 
division within the speakers between recognition, strangeness, acceptance and rejection 
of what they perceive. But this sense of impurity and division is, quite logically, capable 
of perceiving scenes of beauty, albeit qualified and ambiguous, within the environment: 
... not till the Goths again come swarming down the hill Will cease the clangour of the pneumatic drill. 
But yet there is beauty narcotic and deciduous 
In this vast organism grown out of us: 
On all the traffic-islands stand white globes like moons 
The city's haze is clouded amber that purrs and croons, 
And tilting by the noble curve bus after tall bus comes 
With an osculation of yellow light, with a glory like chrysanthemums. 
This is a wonderful piece of city writing. It is also, and perhaps wonderful because of it, 
a piece which offers itself as writing, reveals its status as discourse, most immediately 
by the assertion of 'beauty' and by the attempts to describe this beauty. ý Moreover, the 
mixing of organic and non-organic register here invites questioning of this perception. 
Surely the city does not only 'grow out' of its citizens; they too grow out of it? Indeed, 
given the dislocated order which the speakers have hitherto been labouring to assimilate, 
is it appropriate to describe this in terms of 'growth'? Any beauty here is a hybrid, 
crossing the boundaries between country and city, culture and nature. In addition, it 
crosses the boundaries between the specificity of the bus as bus, concrete object and 
pragmatic vehicle, and bus as form: operating within the 'noble curve' of the road, 
presenting an 'osculation' - kissing, but also 'to have three or more coincident points in 
common ... as two curves, two surfaces, or a surface and a curve' (OED). Buses aren't 
just buses,,. they are colour and light. 
However, this mixing of response and discursive position cannot provide a 
straightforward enjoyment of spectacle. As we noted earlier, the speakers are - in part 
at least -a part of what they describe. At this point in the poem the problem becomes 
not simply the changing environment, but the inability of those within it to change: 
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The country gentry cannot change, they will die in their shoes 
From angry circumstance and moral self-abuse... 
... they will prove their lives to be An ever-diluted drug, a spiritual tautology., 
We can gain a sense of what this 'spiritual tautology' might be from MacNeice's later 
poem 'Plain speaking' (11940; CP, p. 187), where the commingling of clichds ('In the 
beginning and in the end the only decent / Definition is tautology: man is man..! ) is 
skilfully manipulated to suggest the seeking of identity between disparate things and 
enunciations, and how this 'forged' identity can lead only to facile repetition and, 
indeed, inarticulacy in the face of death: - 
-But dream was dream and love was love and what 
Happened happened - even if the judge said 
It should have been otherwise - and glitter glitters 
And I am I although the dead are dead. 
The tautology of death here is distinct from the other repetitions, since it ruptures the 
complacent sense of self-identity within repetition, which will not allow things to be 
'otherwise'. If death is death, that is to say, how does that complicate our sense of the 
'I' which is always 'I', and which the country gentry 'find themselves to be'? We shall 
have more to say about this later. What is surprising here, however, is that although 
this poem is seven years later than the 'Eclogue', we find the same preoccupation with 
the question of identity, repetition, and the overriding question of 'what will happen? '. 
'What will happen to us? ' speaker A asks, 'who go to the theatre': 
... where we feel That we know in advance all the jogtrot and the cake-walk jokes, 
All the bumfun and the gags of the comedians in boaters and toques, 
All the tricks of the virtuosos who invert the usual. 
Theatre, it seems, simply provides more of the same, repetition of identity, or inversion 
of the same, without proper challenge or transgression. This stubborn holding to 
identity, when all around is given to change, renders the conditions of the speakers 
prone, on the one hand, to petrifaction, on the other to a condition of change which 
would attempt to maintain this identity, in the activities of the gangster and the 
totalitarian: 
What will happen when the sniggering machine-guns in the hands of the young 
men 
Are trained on every flat and club and beauty parlour and Father's den. 
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Fv- In answer to this question, however, - speaker (B) would seem to fall back on 
tautology: ' 'what will happen will happen'. He is then accused of 'being [his) own 
vulture' - employing the discourse of self-confirmation, which locates him within the 
historical moment he describes, yet by implication indicates the inadequacy of this 
tautological enunciation, forms its own commentary, in the wider context of the poem, 
on the failure of looking for affirmation in this self-identity. However, there is another -- 
sense in which this tautological statement has a ring of truth about it., Speaker A ends 
his comment on 'being one's own vulture' with the observation that 'over the randy of 
the theatre and cinema I hear songs / Unlike anything'. This would seem to beckon in a 
new direction, the ending of identity between objects. - As such, the tautological phrase 
is a means of indicating this change, which undermines the reliance on identity, the kind 
of identity we assume in 'I am 1', but lacks the capacity to predict what will happen., , 
Speaker B has told us of a 'new regime', - yet there is little authority to his description. it 
is possible to suggest therefore that the ending'of the poem shows the decline of certain 
ways of thinking, and would see the continuation of this thinking in a new and perverse 
form (Fascism), or in newly formed versions of the same illusion (Stalinism). It also 
indicates a change which is, by definition, unpredictable. Robyn Marsak has noted how 
'it is doubtful that 'An Eclogue for Christmas' offers potential for change, the speakers 
appear to accept their doom with a kind of morbid relish ... In the end both speakers 
determine to indulge themselves in ways of life already established, finding refuge in 
living for the self'. 41 In a sense this is true, although the poem has shown us that the 
idea of the self is open to question in a number of ways, one of which, perhaps, does 
provide some sense of change in the poem which is not that of utter demise, death, 
chaos or anarchy: -711 
A: I will gorge myself to satiety with the oddities 
Of every artiste, official or amateur, 
Who has pleased me in my r6le of hero-worshipper 
Who has pleased me in my r6le of individual man- 
B. Let us lie once more, say 'What we think, we can* 
The old idealist lie. 
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Certainly we have a sense here of an imperiled way of life, set of assumptions, way of 
thinking. However, the question still remains whether we should interpret this as a 
descent into chaos, the birth of a new form of idealism, new forms if individuality, or 
some other, 'Iess tangible, change or development, which although less tangible, is 
necessary for a full reading of the poem. Hence, we can read the lines above as a 
simple act of bad faith, a retreat into inauthentic activity because the alternatives are too 
terrible to contemplate. This terror may emerge as a result of the failure of the speakers 
to see beyond their own narrow circumstances in their sense of what it is to be an , 
'individual', or how this individuality might develop in more profitable ways not wholly in 
keeping with the current state of affairs, which includes their own privileged status. It 
is, however, possible to read in these lines a kind of departure from these values which 
is not a departure into, say, Fascism. Such a perspective involves a recognition of the 
reassessment of 'individual man' which has already taken place in the poem. With this 
in mind, we can say that these lines, for all their unavoidable implications of bad faith, 
do indeed recognize that 'individual man' is a role, and moreover, one quite compatible 
with that of 'hero worshipper'. That this role should be in place is in itself aý- 
contradiction - 'individual man' should be precisely the opposite of a role, it should be 
the expression of self. Furthermore, it is described as a general condition - it is one 
speaker's version of a role that offers the only ground for authenticity. Hence, the 
alternative to this is not the notion that some other sense of individuality is possible 
which is not a role, but that any form of existence necessitates the playing of roles. The 
proper conclusion of which is not to be under the illusion that this does not take place. 
ý- Moreover, it is surprising that the avowed intentions of the speakers are by no 
means absolutely in keeping with these declarations. Speaker B's desire to mount 'the 
bare and high / places of England' with feet on turf, eyelashes stinging in the wind, do 
indeed convey a popular sense of high romantic challenge, yet he is also aware of '... the 
sheep like grey stones / [which] humble my human pretensions'. Aware, that is, of a 
materiality his sense of 'idealism' must deal with, and which haunts this poem in a way 
which the final lines make more explicit: 
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A. Let the saxophones and xylophones 
And the cult of every technical excellence, the miles of canvas in the galleries 
And the canvas of the rich man's yacht snapping and tacking on the seas 
And the perfection of a grilled steak - 
B. Let all these so ephemeral things 
Be somehow permanent like the swallow's tangent wings: 
Goodbye to you, this day remember is Christmas, this morn 
They say, interpret it your own way, Christ is born. 
In a way this detail is quite in keeping with the sense of the commodity form which we 
have developed in the chapter. An abundance of apparently indiscriminate material 
(saxophones, xylophones) making up a cultural mode of production under the regulation 
of the identical: the canvas of art is that of the luxury yacht, perfection is measured in 
terms of a grilled steak. Everything is granted the identical measure of value by the 
terms of exchange. But there is also an important feature of these lines which is 
intimately related to the attack made on the 'idealism' of the cogito, the thinking 
subject, by the commodity, but is not identical to it. That is the materiality of all these 
items. Is there, then, some sense in which this materiality might challenge the activity 
of both the commodity and the cogito? One sense whereby this might be so is in the 
final very figure of a permanence within the ephemeral, which is hardly a permanence: 
'like the swallow's tangent wings'? This is a permanence of difference - fleeting and 
context bound, always the same where it insists on the necessity of difference in 
establishing identity. 'The import of the final speech, then, is a recognition of the 
materiality of things - including the cogito- but a materiality which is capable of marking 
out specific and fleeting, accidental, transient, moments of value. This is a kind of value 
which is drawn out of the melancholy horizon of the pure matter, meaninglessly there, 
and the uniformity of the commodity. 
7 It is possible to read an enactment of this sense of difference, the fundamental 
instability of this moment, its transitoriness and refusal of presence or prediction, in that 
statement 'this morn, / they say, interpret it your own way, Christ is born'. 'What 'they 
say' could be that Christ is born this morning, the word made flesh, the divine existing 
within the temporal, the now. Alternatively, the lines may read: 'this morning they say 
that Christ is born'. This is, of course, a matter for interpretation. In the same way, 
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we are told, that the birth of Christ is a matter for interpretation. Yet even this state of 
affairs is open to interpretation - whether challenge to the authority of the divine by 
making it a matter to be interpreted according to 'our own way' is a cause for liberatory 
analysis, or the secular relativizing of all that is important. These are, quite simply, 
undecidable within the poem, matters of context or interpretation. In this way the 
poem can enact the sense of radical indeterminacy it describes. This is an 
indeterminacy which proceeds from the materialization of the cogito within the 
commodity form, but works against this form in asserting the fundamental instability of 
identity in difference, rather than (commodity) difference through identity, be it that of 
the identity of the self-same, identity between objects, or the search for presence in 
difference 
It is through this double sense of potential meaninglessness, and radical 
indeterminacy, that we can best understand MacNeice's presentation of subjectivity and 
action in the thirties. This meaninglessness itself is composed of two features -a given 
material world which is uninhabited by any pristine, immanent meaning; a world which 
is necessarily given meaning by the perceiving subject. But this subject is itself put 
under question by such materiality, its own reliance on interpretative systems, 
discourses, signifiers. It is contaminated by their impurity within its very constitution. 
Hence, death figures here both as a fact and as a value. Certainly the 'death of a class* 
was an important informing influence of MacNeice's response to the thirties. 42 But 
such a notion also had to take account of the fact of death, the materiality of the 
essentially human, which puts in question the prerogatives and claims of the sovereign, 
autonomous self. As such, death figures as what Ronald Schleifer has called 'negative 
materiality': the potential for meaningless which is not the opposite of a self-sufficient 
condition of 'life'. Instead of an absolute negation, established between life and death, 
it is a condition within life, a negativity which inhabits the very conditions of 
subjectivity, forcing a reassessment of this subjeCtiVity. 43 If the commodity forces the 
specificity and differences of objects into a particular relationship of difference under the 
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rule of identity, it also mounts an attack on subjectivity that can be carried out by other, 
different, means. 
One such means returns us to the question of parable, and interpretation. For if 
we cannot see parables existing in some pure ideal space, but determining and 
constituting the activity of the subject, who in turn determines the meanings of various 
parables, neither can we grant either this subjectivity, or these parables, sovereign 
authority independent of their material circumstances, their context ('now'), their 
functioning within an environment which always renders them radically unstable, 
radically impure. This is the condition of writing, and the subject is placed firmly within 
this condition. As we have seen, MacNeice was to engage with this problem 
throughout the thirties. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that it constitutes a 
substantial informing presence, and in turn is given substance, in his major thirties work, 
Autumn Journal. 
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Chapter Five. 
Everyday Writing: Impurity 
in Autumn Journal. 
With the alibi of a pulverised discourse ... one arrives at the regular 
practice of the fragment: then from the fragment one slips to the 
"journal'. 'At which point, is not the point of all this to entitle oneself to 
the 'journal"? 
Yet the (autobiographical) "journal" is, nowadays, discredited. 
Change partners: in the sixteenth century they were called a diary: 
diarrhoea... 
Roland Barthesl 
Not so Mr. MacNeice, who remains a shadowy figure and stimulates 
speculation. He appears to wear a kind of beard and to have a taste for 
bilberry soup ... He makes an 
intriguing contrast to the elaborately over- 
self-explanatory personality of Mr. Auden. I like to think that, all the 
time, he was keeping a little journal of his own, for he has a sly look in 
his photograph. 
Evelyn Waugh2 
The poet's first business is mentioning things. 
Louis MacNeice3 
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Autumn Journal JCP, pp. 101 -53) is often regarded as MacNeice's key statement of the 
thirties, sometimes as one of the key statements of the decade itself. Samuel Hynes 
has written that it is 'the best personal expression of the 'end-of-thirties mood', and as 
Edna Longley writes: 'All the currents of MacNeice's writing during the 1930s flow into 
Autumn Journal and find a new dynamic there: lyrics, eclogues, prose, the Audenesque 
play Out of the Picture, images, strategies, tones of voice. His entire creative 
kaleidoscope breaks up and reforms'. 4 This is an exhilarating description, stressing, 
change, disruption, re-examination. However, given the nature of MacNeice's attention 
to thirties problems examined in the previous chapters, the end result of MacNeice's 
'creative kaleidoscope' might seem surprising: that the poem is based on, and fulfils 
itself, in statements of assertion of 'mood' and 'human values' in a poem which is 
essentially determinate and straightforward, and can be read in a more or less 
straightforward and determinate manner. As Hynes puts it: 'Autumn Journal is, most 
simply, what its title says it is: a personal record of the period from August through 
December 1938'. 5 The poem, these readings would suggest, means what it says. And 
what is says can be fairly and squarely placed within the assumptions and agendas of 
liberal humanism: 'Hatred of hatred. assertion of human values', the 'liberal-humanist 
agenda' which Edna Longley finds 'central to the assertions of Autumn Journal. 6 Even 
Longley's attention to 'self-referring' strategies in the poem confines this attention to 
such assumptions and agendas. 7 What such readings ignore, I would suggest, is the 
way in which this poem, far from just 'asserting' various positions, works as a poem by 
questioning its own assertions and conditions, questioni[ithe act and means of 
assertion, placing them in doubt in a manner which interrogates such assertions of 
'human value' as constructions. This chapter will seek to explore this questioning 
activity, together with the implications for the poem as a thirties text, and its status as a 
statement of the values and strategies of liberal humanism. 
MacNeice described his poem, among other things, as a 'confession of faith'. 8 
These two notions, 'confession', and 'faith', can be seen to have special significance for 
thirties writing, and for the poem as a thirties text. Autumn Journal is, certainly, 
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continually insistent on the questions of sin, guilt, omission and responsibility. The 
thirties ended with questions of guilt and re-examination, which MacNeice, perhaps -- 
surprisingly, attacked in a response to Virginia Woolf's 'The Leaning Tower'. 9 One 
might sometimes have a sense of many thirties concerns being motivated, obscurely, by 
feelings of guilt. 10 A confession might want to excuse these feelings, acknowledging 
responsibility and shame, making amends, asserting the need for a new faith. 
It would be perverse to ignore the amount of attention within the poem to one 
form of assertion or another, the need for such a faith, something one can trust in. In 
this context, Paul de Man has written well on the links between confession and guilt: 
To confess is to overcome guilt and shame in the name of truth: it is an 
epistemological use of language in which ethical values of good and evil are 
superseded by values of truth and falsehood, one of the implications being 
that vices such as concupiscence, envy, greed and the like are vices 
primarily because they compel one to lie. By stating things as they are, the 
economy of ethical balance is restored and redemption can start in a 
clarified atmosphere of a truth that does not hesitate to reveal the crime in 
all its horror. II 
This description is useful in that it reveals a connection between this interest in 
'confession' and another preoccupation of the thirties: that of truth and lies. The 
notion of 'telling lies' might be re-stated in a number of ways, not all of them primarily 
linguistic: 'Telling lies to order' in favour of a political cause was certainly a problem, 
but so too was lying to yourself about your place in the world, pretending to be 
someone one wasn't, pretending things were fine when, for all kinds of reasons, they 
weren't. 1 2 Autumn Journal is as concerned with this kind of lying as any other: these 
crimes, their horror, and the circumstances of their horror. As such, it partakes of that 
part of a confession in which the necessities of the moment require the simple, 
straightforward telling of truth without fear of the consequences. Credo - not merely 
what I believe', but in this case 'that I believe'. As stated above, it would be perverse 
to ignore this aspect of the poem. Possible accusations of the poem's banality which 
one might hope to explaine away by reference to the special circumstances of its 
composition (mounting crisis, Europe sliding into war), ignore therefore the way in which 
these circumstances enter the poem itself. 13 In times of crisis, it is perhaps the simplest 
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truths that are the most telling. But such truths do not enter, I would argue, as 
statements to be taken purely at face value. This would ignore the performative aspect 
of the poem whereby various assertions are made only to be examined as assertions in 
various contexts. In this way, although the need to confess, own up, state the case 
clearly and effectively, is pressing in the poem, it is noticeably unconfident, as we shall 
see, about 'a clarified atmosphere of truth', which will grant such assertion 
unquestionable validity. 
The obscuring of this self-questioning aspect of the text, or to be more precise 
the way in which it questions its own procedures, may be due in part to MacNeice's 
own, frequently cited comments about it: 
A long poem from 2,000 to 3,000 lines written from August to 
December 1938. Not strictly a journal but giving the tenor of my 
intellectual and emotional experiences during that period. 
It is about nearly everything which from firsthand experience I 
consider significant. 
It is written in sections averaging about 80 lines in length. This 
division gives it a dramatic quality, as different parts of myself (e. g. the 
anarchist, the defeatist, the sensual man, the philosopher, the would-be 
good citizen) can be given their say in turn. 
It contains rapportage [sic), metaphysics, ethics, lyrical emotion, 
autobiography, nightmare... 14 
Such a description, from a 1938 letter to T. S. Eliot, is certainly appealing, and serves 
I 
well enough the function of explaining the poem in the Faber Spring catalogue of 1939; 
but it will not do as an overall description of the poem's effects. Indeed, MacNeice's 
own unease about the poem would seem to be reflected in his desire to preface the 
poem with an explanatory 'Note', rather than let the poem speak for itself: 
I am aware that there are overstatements in this poem ... there are also 
inconsistencies. If I had been writing a didactic poem proper, it would 
have been my job to qualify or. eliminate these overstatements and 
inconsistencies. But I was writing what I have called a Journal. In a journal 
or a personal letter a man writes what he feels at the moment; to attempt 
scientific truthfulness would be - paradoxically - dishonest. The truth of a 
lyric is different from the truths of science and this poem is something half- 
way between the lyric and the didactic poem ... It is in the nature of this 
poem to be neither final nor balanced. I have certain beliefs which, I hope, 
emerge in the course of it but which I have refused to abstract from their 
context. For this reason I shall probably be called a trimmer by some and a 
sentimental extremist by others. But poetry in my opinion must be honest 
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before anything else and I refuse to be 'objective' or clear-cut at the cost of 
honesty. (CP, p. 101). 
In this description MacNeice seems less concerned with the 'different parts of myself' 
politely waiting to be 'given their say in turn' than with the status of the poem as 
historical record. He suggests, that the poem should not be read as attempting an 
analytical description of 'how things were' during the months of its composition, but of 
'how things looked'. Paradoxically, it is the very embroilment in history that tends to 
discount its status as reliable record. The poem itself does become part of a historical' 
project in the sense that it is part of the historical scene to be viewed from the calm 
distance of the present. The poem is not concerned with merely reporting events and 
facts, but of how such events and facts were viewed and received within the private 
domain, and how such a domain was seen to be affected by them. All done, MacNeice 
claims, with attempts at impeccable honesty, holding nothing back, letting 
overstatement and bias remain overstatement and bias. 
However, this deliberate departure from an 'objective' historical position cannot, 
in itself, be seen as unproblematic, nor can the assumption of 'honesty' fully explain the 
poem's effects. We are, we should note, dealing with a poem, not a court report or a 
signed confession. To be sure, the description does guard against interpretations of the 
poem which no serious reader might now feel inclined to make: that of 
'misrepresenting' the Spanish Civil War, Oxford, Ireland. Equally, the notion of a space 
'half-way between the lyric and the didactic poem' serves as a general indication of the 
wish to connect private concerns and public affairs, private and public discourses. But 
does this provide any real sense of the poem's activity as poem, rather than as a more 
or less 'honest' report on 'what went on and how I felt about it', the world as I found it, 
to be taken purely at face value? To look at it another way, if the poem cannot be read 
as a wholly reliable guide to historical events, should such events then be read only as 
reliable guides to the feelings of the individual subject? As MacNeice says, an individual 
in history 'feels', s/he also observes, judges, reasons, reflects in and about history. 
MacNeice's description of the passages of the poem dealing with Ireland, Oxford and 
Barcelona emphasise not a retreat into lyrical space, with history somewhere in the 
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background, but a recognition that this writing partakes of the discourse we might 
recognise as 'didactic'. In this case, then, how are we to account for the supposed 
'lyrical' qualities of the poem, of the values which distinguish it from 'scientific' or 
'objective' truth?. 
This matter is significant because it concerns not merely the content of the 
poem, but its status as discourse, and our assumptions in reading this discourse. 
Tilottama Rajan has offered an analysis which can be usefully applied here: 
A serniotics of genre, to complement the structural study of genre begun 
by Aristotle and the thematics of genre completed by Frye, would see 
the pure lyric as using its proximity to song in order to mute the gaps 
between signifier and signified by conferring on the words the illusory 
unity of a single voice. By contrast, narrative, which dramatises the 
gaps between what is told and the telling of it, is always already within a 
world of textuality, of interpretation rather than origination. A more 
complex case is that of drama, which at first sight seems to share the 
lyric proximity to the order of voice. In fact drama deconstructs that 
order, and reveals the textuality even of voice. For ... it discloses the 
unitary voice as an illusion and forces us to question the idea of the 
speaker as a unified person realizing himself through his language. 
Individual utterances are shown as enmeshed in a language world 
beyond them, the world of preexisting meanings and of differing 
intentions present in the other person in the dialogue. This larger 
language world, moreover, is already present within the individual 
utterance, because the latter is oriented toward the complexity of this 
world even as it seeks to minimize its interference. 15 
In view of Raian's analysis, MacNeice would seem to be using categories to describe his 
poem which the poem itself puts in question, even as he claims such categories are 
valid, but merely require modification. For the description of the poem as a messy grab- 
bag of 'rapportage, metaphysics, ethics, lyrical emotion, autobiography, nightmare' 
implies a text in which the lyrical self is hardly a self-present 'unified voice' which then 
seeks to look out, anxiously or complacently, on a world beyond it. Rather the subject 
is always already constituted through 'a language world beyond [it), the world of 
preexisting meanings and of differing intentions present in the other person in the 
dialogue'. In attempting to describe this negotiation, therefore, MacNeice makes use of 
the very terms and categories which his poem seeks to question as valid or useful terms 
and categories. 
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of being dramatic, are ironic, in the old Greek sense of 'dramatic irony'); the 
poet and reader both know, consciously or unconsciously, the rest of the 
truth which lies behind the lines. And finally the lyric, which is thus 
dramatic and ironic, is also - it should go without saying - from the first and 
above all, symbolic. 18 
In fact the contrary would seem to be most likely: that Autumn Journal is not less 
dramatic than MacNeice's 1934/35 comments would indicate but more so, in at least 
two ways. First, in that the 'creeds' presented in the text are to be understood as ends 
in themselves, not as simple indications of a 'state of mind', emerging from a speaker 
whose very act of assertion can be inspected as such within a given context. This does 
not mean that it is simply to be read as one view among others. Rather the poem 
inspects the very constitutions and assumptions within various contexts, allowing us to 
inspect their status and truth value as constructions. Secondly, this process of 
construction takes place within a space which cannot allow for an autonomous lyrical 
self', but which is concerned to s ee subjectivity put under question within the space of 
text, signification, writing. Hence, rather than a simple enunciation of the terms and 
assumptions of liberal humanism, such assertions are placed, cited so to speak, 
'mentioned' rather than 'used'. This distinction between 'mentioning' and 'using', 
which derives from Speech Act theory, has been helpfully described by Jonathan Culler 
in the following way: 'I use ... expressions insofar as I seriously intend the meanings of 
the sign sequences I utter; I mention them when I reiterate some of the signs (within 
quotation marks, for example), without committing myself to the meaning they 
conv ey'. 19 This accords with MacNeice's sense that 'poets... put facts and feelings in 
italics, which makes people think about them and such thinking may in the end have an 
outcome in action'. 20 However, rather than a straightforward path to action, in Autumn 
Journal utterances are placed within a context which calls into question such utterances 
as utterances, together with the subjectivity which would seek to define itself through 
them. 
Autumn Journal begins, Edna Longley has noted, with 'two largely 
unpunctuated sentences (which) encompass a seasonal, geographic, historical and social 
transition', the first sentence being: 21 
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Close and slow, summer is ending in Hampshire, 
Ebbing away down ramps of shaven lawn where close-clipped yew 
Insulates the lives of retired generals and admirals 
And the spyglasses hung in the hall and the prayer-books ready in the pew 
And August going out to the tin trumpets of nasturtiums 
And the sunflowers' Salvation Army blare of brass 
And the spinster sitting in a deck-chair picking up stitches 
Not raising her eyes to the noise of the 'planes that pass- 
Northward from Lee-on-Solent. 
(CP, pp. 101-02) 
But how might these various points of transition be related? In particular, how might ' 
they illuminate us to the ways in which the poem presents a commenting level; a 'cross- 
talk, backwash, come-back' on the speaker? From the beginning, the poem poses a- 
difficulty in interpretation. Does that first line, dependent on the first word, read 'Close 
and slow' (the act of closing, conclusion, end) or 'Close and slow' (in immediate - 
proximity, very near). Either meaning would suit the phonic patterning of this line - 
creating an assonance with 'slow'. The former meaning would imply a drawing to an 
end, literally the ending of a season, also conveying a sense of a period, a way of doing 
things, a decade. In the poem's historical context, the second meaning, suggesting 
proximity, would follow on quite neatly from this sense of ending. Events are near to, 
close by, compelling and involving everyone, including the 'retired generals and admirals' 
who would seek to insulate themselves from the world, whether they know it or not. 
But there is, of course, a second sense to 'close' (near to) which deviates from these 
meanings in an interesting way. This is the colloquial one of: hot, muggy, , 
uncomfortable. Is the initial line, then, a statement about Hampshire, England, Europe, 
or is it about the weather? This disjunction between what might be called figurative and 
literal is itself unstable, since both uses of the word 'close' can carry literal or figural 
suggestions: close of summer, close of Europe; Europe's crisis is close, in concrete 
political terms, the weather is close - and is that literal or metaphoric? What these 
slippages should alert us to, therefore, is the propensity of the text to generate 
meanings which themselves thernatize the distinction between figural and literal. On the 
one hand, we are aware of the end of a season, yet we are also aware of the end of a 
way of doing and interpreting, of explaining certain events and their significance within a 
historical context. To use a slightly different terminology, the text hints at becoming 
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self-conscious of its own textualizing, its own methods of description and observation, 
and, by implication, the defining discourses that these methods utilise. 
This may seem an excessive amount of attention to pay to one line, particularly 
in such a long poem. It is,, however, necessary to do so, because of the implications 
that this kind of analysis has for our sense of 'Summer', and by extension, 'Autumn'. 
The significance now available to us is to see a distinction between a mere reporting of 
events, and an attention to what, and how, such events are seen to signify. Already we 
have a question forming, perhaps one of the central questions of the poem, and indeed 
the thirties: 'what does all this mean? '. In addition to simply posing the question, 
Autumn Journal asks questions about this very act of posing, the devices employed in 
doing so,, and the answers which can be supplied. 
How can this kind of attention, -then, be seen to link up to notions of 'discourse' 
within the poem? The stress on seasonal change and its meanings calls to mind the 
attention to mythic archetypes, meanings generated out of natural cycles and applied to 
other fields of human activity advanced by Northrop Frye, already mentioned by Rajan. 22 
However, in an analysis of a poem by Baudelaire by Fredric Jameson, we find a method 
of analysis which can be applied much more specifically here. In discussing the first 
part of 'Chant d'automne' Jameson notes: I 
[Two] 'experiences' lend their raw material to this text, and we must 
now register their banal, informing presence: these are, evidently, a 
season - fall, the approach of a dreary winter which is also and even 
more strongly the death of summer itself; and alongside that, a physical 
perception, an auditory event or experience, the hollow sound of logs 
and firewood being delivered in the inner courtyard of a Parisian 
dwelling. Nature on the one hand, the city, the Urban, on the other, and 
a moment in the interrelationship of these two great contraries in which 
the first, the archaic cyclical time of an older agriculture and an older 
countryside is still capable of being transmitted through what negates it, 
namely the social institutions of the City itself, the triumphantly un- or 
anti-natural. 23 
Jameson goes on to argue that in this meeting of culture and nature within the poem, 
sound and bodily sensations (in this example it is the sound of chopped wood), form a 
space which is outside our usual sense of things as 'meaningful'. Sounds emerge as a 
bracketed referent, represented in language but always in some sense unnameable. 
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Within such a system the referent is produced by language and its referential properties, 
yet this production can never coincide with the object to which reference is made. 
Bodily sensations, therefore, offer a resistance to the propensity of objects to 'mean' 
within language. Objects remain stubbornly meaningless, or at least possessed of 
qualities which always defy the sign's attempts to coincide with its referent. 
Jameson's sense of the loss of the referent, the stubborn meaninglessness of 
the material world, suggested by the conjunction of nature and culture in this poem has 
parallels in Autumn Journal. - However, our immediate insight can be attained by , 
attending to an aspect of 'Autumn' which is implied in Jameson's discussion, but whose 
full implications are overlooked. Namely the potential of 'Summer' and 'Autumn' (and 
the change between the two) to mean something, and the opportunity for reflection 
upon this meaning by mentioning them in the text. In a sense this is an explanation 
which goes beyond Jameson's discussion, in a movement from the meaninglessness of 
objects to their absorption into the meaning-structures of the literal, which in turn 
develop into the figural. Thus, it is not a question of Autumn in Baudelaire's poem 
merely being the occasion of reflection on raw 'nature' entering 'culture' by the 
rudimentary practice of literal signification. One could argue that the poem draws 
attention to the potential of seasonal change itself to be understood in various ways. 
This change may be used figuratively for other areas of experience, and for the reflection 
on this aspect of meaning-production within a context which is itself subject to change 
and transformation. Moreover, this transformation may occur in a manner which 
exceeds the truth-value of this initial meaning-production. In presenting a notion of a 
change from older agricultural practices to high capitalism, therefore, 'Jameson overlooks 
his own use of the cultural apparatus he identifies in Baudelaire's poem, namely cultural 
understandings of material change. One reason for this, perhaps, is that it would put in 
question the hinted plenitude of a 'Summer' of social relations which stands distinct 
from the Winter of reification and late capitalism. .I 
In Autumn Journal, however, 'Summer' signifies, as does Autumn. This opening 
passage alerts us to the sense of a season passing, together with the passage of a 
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particular political order. Additionally, of course, it questions the ordering of reality by 
such figures, the cultural allocation of meaning to natural processes. We can extend 
this further. What is the status of the speaker in all of this? -Does he take the ending of 
the summer as the beginning of a new social order? Where are his loyalties? - In this - 
context, we might say, 'Autumn' is a space between an ending and a beginning, in 
addition, it is a space mapped out between sign and meaning, world and fiction, in 
which the production of meaning is cited only to be put into question as such. 
This analysis helps to clarify the particular mixing of rural and urban, natural and 
cultural codes in these opening lines. As stated earlier, retired generals and admirals, 
owing their identity to social institutions, insulate themselves against the environment in 
which those institutions operate by the planting of 'close-clipped yew' - the cultivation 
of natural objects within an urban environment which acts as a shield against history. 
'Spyglasses' and 'prayer-books' serve as signifiers of sight and cultural explanations. 
Lines of sight, observation, were never neutral terms in MacNeice's thirties work. Here 
they carry connotations of observation and knowledge without engagement - the view 
from afar, a privileged position of the bourgeois authorised by a supposed link with the 
divine. This position, we should note, may soon be untenable - its security imperiled, 
along with the culture which produced this class and its specious sense of detachment. 
Both, we remember, are cultural products reasserted in accusation of complicity and 
collusion, whose vengeance is the end of a historically situated class, its way of seeing 
and knowing. 7, 
This attention to the cultural and natural, and its conjunction within ideology, is 
implied in the mixing of register in the description of 'nasturtiums'. - Natural objects form 
part of a cultural environment whose 'natural' properties are described in terms of 
objects from this man-made environment:, 'tin trumpets' of nasturtiums, sunflowers 
'Salvation Army blare of brass'. We have encountered this device before in 'Eclogue for 
Christmas'. Clearly we can take such devices as simply effective techniques of 
descriptive writing, yet it makes more sense to consider these details as devices which 
reveal their own rhetoricity. That is, the implementation, in pure 'description' and 
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observation, of culturally informed and informing meanings: nasturtiums seen as blasts 
from a Salvation Army band. 
Before leaving this passage. - we should consider the figure of the spinster. - 
whose eyes follow the noise of a plane. This is cited as Summer 1938, a year after the 
aerial bombing of Guernica. 24 Within what one might call the rhetoric, or text, of the 
thirties, planes carry particular significance. They function as signifiers within the 
paradigms of travel, the journey - quest myths re-stated variously within political and 
cultural terms. Socialist progress is seen as the journey to the new country of re- 
invented social relations, the crossing of frontiers between classes and class identity. 
This is, of course, heavily metaphoric. Travel, crossing over, the establishing of identity 
in difference - of solidarity between one class and another - run parallel with the 
description of a political goal in terms of an actual 'journey'. Planes also function as 
signifiers of fear - bombing, annihilation, the destructive element. 25 MacNeice's spinster 
is, of course, following signs - her eyes are raised to the noise of a plane, not the plane 
itself. Looking, observing, she is a thirties figure in at least two ways. First, the (not a) 
spinster - the use of definite article indicates a shared, collective knowledge, in addition 
to implying the organisation of data within such knowledge. 26 Secondly, she can 
function as the inverse paradigm of Auden's 'helmeted airman' - seeing, yet seeing from 
beloW. 27 
A further detail, of particular significance for this poem as thirties text, is the use 
of the place name: 'Lee-on-Solent'. On the one hand this is simply a naming of a real 
place in England. And place, where you speak from, geographically, socially, and 
politically, matters in the thirties. We have seen MacNeice's exploration of this in 
'Birmingham', in which it is shown that where you speak from makes a difference to 
what you see. But here we can add another twist, related to this first notion, and to 
that of parable discussed in the previous chapter. For place names, like other proper 
names, are not merely locations in space, but in language. Jean-Franvis Lyotard has 
commented on the fact that names, like deictics (there, here, now) are 'designators'. 
That is, they designate without describing, or as Geoffrey Bennington puts it: 'deictic 
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terms have the peculiarity of not having a stable and specifiable signification within the 
language system, and of depending on the immediate context in order to signify at 
all'. 28 However, unlike deictics, names are 'rigid designators', hence: 'a word such as 
'this' or 'that' changes its designation according to the sentence in which it is being 
used -a name does not. The name is like a deictic in that it designates, but unlike it in 
that it retains its value from sentence to sentence - only a name can specify the 
reference of a deictic and allow the 'same' thing to be referred to in different sentences, 
of different types'. 29 But, as Lyotard explains, this rigidity is the cause of an important 
degree of instability in signification: 
[The) 'possible universes'... the proper name traverses without being altered 
by it are not merely those in which descriptions that can be attached to it 
are different: Kant, the author of the Critique of Pure Reason; Kant, the 
author of the Critique of Judgement; Kant, whose dying days arerecounted 
by Thomas de Quincey... They are above all those phrase universes in 
which the proper name inhabits different situations among the instances: 
name you Kant; Dear Brother, I embrace you, signed Kant; It sounds like 
Kant, Kant was then writing the Observations on the Feelings of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime. 30 
In other words, because the designative force of a proper name is not emptied, like a 
deictic, within a particular instance of enunciation Vnow' is always somewhere in 
particular, and not somewhere else), the signifier 'Kant' maintains its capacity to signify 
the 'real' Kant. However, the meaning of the 'real' Kant is liable to change, slippage, 
disruption, within different utterances, contexts, and between speakers. So, 'Lee-On- 
Solent', and 'Hampshire', 'Guernica', 'Spain', like 'Hitler', 'Stalin', whilst always 
designating real places and people, change their meanings according to different 
utterances between different speakers. This will have particular importance in Autumn 
Journal. 
What I want to suggest, therefore, is that, as stated earlier, MacNeice is less 
@using' particular thirties figures and tropes within these lines, as simple aids to his 
description, than 'mentioning' or 'citing' them. This citation draws attention, within the 
context established by the ambiguity of 'close', to the production of meanings within a 
particular context. The speaker is fundamentally reliant on such discourses and their 
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attendant meanings, even as they are cited and inspected as productions in context. ' 
This attention to meanings in context, and the consequent role of the observing subject, 
is continued in the lines which follow: 
... Macrocarpa and cypress And roses on a rustic trellis and mulberry trees 
And bacon and eggs in a silver dish for breakfast 
And all the inherited assets of bodily ease 
And all the inherited worries, rheumatism and taxes, 
And whether Stella will marry and what to do with Dick 
And the branch of the family that lost their money in Hatry 
And the passing of the Morning Post and of life's climacteric 
And the growth of vulgarity, cars that pass the gate-lodge 
And crowds undressing on the beach 
And the h, iking cockney lovers with thoughts directed 
Neither to God nor Nation but each to each. 
But the home is still a sanctum under the pelmets, 
All quiet on the Family Front. 
(CP, p. 102) 
This is a characteristic piece of thirties descriptive writing. What characterizes Such 
writing is the synecdochic signification of class identity and social situation. The 
characterization of a particular social environment is juxtaposed in a panoramic sweep of 
other social groups and practices. The bourgeois are set against 'hiking cockney lovers' 
- thirties ramblers establishing a competing, active, reality to the 'insulated' private 
concerns of the bourgeois, and their attendant concerns of 'God' and 'Nation'. There is, 
of course, a sense in which connections are being made in these lines, for example in an 
ironic citation of Remarque's A# Ouiet on the Western Front. The citation draws 
parallels between bourgeois engagement in World War One and the subsequent attempts 
at isolation from history within the discourse of the family, which subtly introduces 
connections between private and public realities precisely at the point where such 
connections were to be repressed: at the 'front' or frontier between private and public 
worlds, between the individual and history. 'Home' is still a sanctum, but 'home' is 
defined among discourses which are historical through and through. The 'retired 
generals' who attempt to 'insulate' themselves from history draw their status precisely 
from their involvement with that history. Moreover, the connection between 
'Home/God/Nation' within this ideological structure points to a way of seeing 
connections, of linking the private to the public, which may be under threat. To put it 
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another way, the suppressions which made possible the separation of 'home' from the 
public sphere, instead of it being seen as a space constituted by such a sphere, may be 
drawing to a close. At the same time, the ideological links between God, Nation, and 
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home, which mark out a connection between4the individual and history, only to 
then insulate it from real historical events, may also be drawing to a close. However, it 
may also be that the privileged space of the rambler, deviating from established doxa in 
the life of leisure and the body, might also be subject to a similar closing by the 
closeness of history. 
However, this subtle undercutting of middle-class divisions and connections is 
itself undercut by the description itself. The list, as is often pointed out, in a recurrent 
thirties trope. 31 What this list does, however, is act against itself through the , 
characterising of given social details with that paratactic 'And'. In our discussion of 
'Eclogue for Christmas' we noted how detail was piled metonymically upon detail in a 
rhetoric which implied the prohibition of a unifying totality, controlling metaphor, or Ego. 
We are not quite in the domain of Isherwood's notorious opening of 'Berlin Diary' where 
connections and hierarchies within selected detail is prohibited. As was pointed out, 
connections are established in these lines which are suppressed elsewhere. However, 
there is no confidence that, with the making of connections otherwise denied within a 
historical context, any new order can be achieved through these connections. In a kind 
of parody of a Mass Observation report, detail is piled upon detail, implying that search 
for order and stability is doomed to failure, yet still proceeds. One reason for this might 
be that the narrator can only narrate the closing of particular modes of comprehension 
under the sign of 'history'. Once history is admitted, a necessary admission, which 
always deserves a mention, the subject is powerless to provide any discourse which will 
replace the certainties of the old. 
MacNeice's lovers then, may be seen to enunciate a kind of private space which 
is outside the discourses of bourgeois Hampshire, like his own. As a field of action and 
the body, it is a space which is made up of precisely what is lacking in such an 
environment and its discourses, lying, by implication, outside its ken. The trippers, the 
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'rebels and young', we are told, 'Have taken the train to town or the two-seater 
unravelling rails or road, / Losing the thread deliberately behind them -/ Autumnal 
palinode'. The scene is one of forgetfulness in action, a mode of being which has 
interested MacNeice again and again ffrain to Dublin', 'Turf Stacks'). The description 
of such activity as 'Autumnal palinode' ('poem or song of retraction') encapsulates the 
attention both to change and the sites or production of meaning within the poem. The 
description applies both to the narrator and narrated. His discourse is one of retraction 
of older symbolic and cultural orders. 'The activity of the lovers, their commitment to 
action rather than thought, though like others neglectful of their position in history, lies 
outside both bourgeois Hampshire and passive observer. Yet the speaker cannot take 
on such a state of forgetfulness; cannot stop looking for signs of the end, nor stop his 
attempts to define the nature of the ending. Equally, he cannot avoid attempts to define 
his place within it: 
My dog, a symbol of the abandoned order, 
Lies on the carriage floor, 
Her eyes inept and glamorous as a film star's, 
Who wants to live, i. e. wants more 
Presents, jewellery, furs, gadgets, solicitations 
As if to live were not 
Following the curve of a planet or controlled water 
But a leap in the dark, a tangent, a stray shot. 
(CP, P. 102) 
These observations are described as being 'learnt after so many failures' - the discourse 
of loss again, of things which no longer make sense in the way they used to, but whose 
lack of sense can only be described within these failing discourses. The narrator's dog 
is a symbol of the abandoned order in two ways. First as a symbol of a way of living 
and knowing, where anything else might have done as well. Second, as a sign of a type 
of control in the taming of nature by culture, the supposedly harmonious co-existence 
with nature in 'following the curve of a planet', the control of flux in the control of 
water. Instead of this control there is the 'stray shot' of the film star. Her desires are 
simply to have 'more' of whatever. Here the structure of exchange, the making over of 
difference to identity within the commutability of exchange described in the previous 
chapter is associated with an 'icon' who is both the representation of the structuring of 
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desire within the commodification and a part of that commodification itself. 32 The 
speaker's frame of reference (dog's eyes/film star's eyes) reflect his position within the 
structure of passive signification and desire which he denounces. Hence the rebel's 
'palinode' is supplemented by one from the speaker, the retraction of previous songs in 
favour of new ones. This palinode, rather than marking out a pure privileged space in 
which to view the surrounding malaise, parody the singer and his desires, his 'fading 
airs of sexual attraction', as much as he parodies them: 
I loved my love with a platform ticket, 
A jazz song, 
A handbag, a pair of stockings of Paris Sand - 
I loved her long... 
I loved her with peacock's eyes and the wares of Carthage 
With glass and gloves and gold and a powder puff 
With blasphemy, camaraderie, and bravado 
And lots of other stuff. 
(CP, P. 103) 
This is a palinode which inscribes the desire for the commodity and the desire for the 
other in a common bond. It is, of course, the desire of the contingent, of the 
metonymic. That 'And' again: 'And lots of other stuff'. 
But there is, of course, lots of other stuff in the poem. This is one voice, 
but it is far from being the only one. Perhaps one of the reasons for commentators to 
view this as straight parody, where the speaker exists somehow outside the structures 
he parodies, in some pure space of subjectivity, is the poem's apparent ability to insist 
on 'human values' which, properly asserted, can transcend the values of the above 
song. Where properly redefined, one might say, such values can help to provide signs 
of the new in the end of the old. Section 11 of the poem takes an important step in 
establishing the activity of this voice, and its assumptions: 
Spider, spider, twisting tight - 
, But the watch is wary beneath the pillow - 
I am afraid in the web of night 
When the window is fingered by the shadows of branches, 
When the lions roar beneath the hill 
And the meter clicks and the cistern bubbles 
And the gods are absent and the men are still - 
Nolime tangere, my soul is forfeit. (CP, p. 103). 
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The speaker is here in a kind of negotiation with various intertexts: Blake's 
'Tyger', the Gospel of St. John ('don't touch me'), and for that matter, Thomas Wyatt's 
'Whoso list to hunt. 33 Enwebbed in a powerful sense of isolation, he attacks, by 
inversion, Christian theology and classical mythology: 
Glory to God in the Lowest, peace beneath the earth 
Dumb and deaf at the nadir; 
I wonder now whether anything is worth 
The eyelid opening and the mind recalling. 
And I think of Persephone gone down to dark, 
No more a virgin, gone the garish meadow, 
But why must she come back, why must the snowdrop mark 
That life goes on for ever? JCP, p. 104) 
His texts, or his interpretations of them, can reveal only reasons for not continuing to 
live. It is precisely those things which are supposed to grant meaning and explanation in 
dealing with these moments (the resurrection, the return of Persephone from Hades) 
that fail him: Tales of loss and redemption, higher authority, meaningfulness. From this 
perspective, we become aware of these texts as oddly self-reflexive. These are, of 
course, parables, and as such grant explanation, order and meaning to the world. But 
they are also texts about the presence of meaning within the world. The apparent 
indeterminacy of the snowdrop (why should it mean that? ) does not merely imply that it 
might mean something else, though of course it might. Rather, the speaker is 
questioning whether it really means anything at all in and of itself. That's to say, what 
if it were simply meaningless, and that any meaning given to it, as an explanation of 
how the world works, or indeed that the world is essentially meaningful, is simply 
solipsistic? What if a snowdrop were just a snowdrop? 
Thus the speaker's isolation from others is not merely physical, or emotional, but 
marks an isolation from human meaning. It is a kind of inverted self-enclosure, where 
the isolated subject's inward gaze discovers not self-justification, self-presence, but an 
absence. In fact, this sense will enter the passage later more forcefully. For now we 
should note the powerful sense of isolation which seems to transcend even loneliness. 
Loneliness implies need for the other. Here, any kind of contact, and specifically sexual 
contact, is rejected: 'there are nights when I am lonely and long for love / But to-night 
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is quintessential dark forbidding / Anyone beside or below me'. In a kind of semiotics of I 
height, the speaker blocks any sense of a divine or expansive force 'above'. Tumulus is 
said to block any sight of 'starlight'. 
The passage continues towards a near-suicidal sense of meaninglessness: 
Good-bye the Platonic sieve of the Carnal Man 
But good-bye also Plato's philosophising; 
I have a better plan 
To hit the target straight without circumlocution. 
If you can equate Being in its purest form 
With denial of all appearance, 
Then let me disappear - the scent grows warm 
For pure Not-Being, Nirvana. 
(CP, p. 104) 
The notion of the carnal man as ? sieve' is to be found in Gorgias, where Socrates Is 
debating with Callicles on the nature of pleasure. 34 Like the film-star in Section I 
Callicles argues for pleasure as a positive good, and that the aim of life is to 'have more' 
of it. Socrates points out that for there to be pleasure there must be pain, that the 
constant search for pleasure implies an unpleasure needing to be satisfied endlessly, like 
water falling through the sieve. The speaker would seem to agree with this, aware of a 
need to relinquish unpleasure. But it Is not, one should note, in satisfaction or 
fulfilment, where 'enough' pleasure replaces the need for 'more'. The speaker locates 
pleasure in the release from unpleasure, like Socrates, rather than considering pleasure 
as good in itself. But like Freud, he associates this release from unpleasure with death, 
Nirvana. 35 Hence MacNeice's parody of Platonic notions of form applied to the self - 
the pure being of the self - finds its fullness in not being, in death. Equally, the self Is, 
by working backward as it were, considered to be pure appearance, a mirage to the self 
which the self invents to mask this ultimate meaninglessness. 
Within such a situation, the speaker forces his own parable out of the activity of 
the spider: 
Only the spider spinning out his reams 
Of colourless thread says Only there are always 
Interlopers, dreams, 
Who let no dead dog lie nor death be final. 
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The striking thing about the spider's tale is that it can cut both ways. On the one hand 
the spider's singlemindedness is seen to want to confirm the death drive. The Speaker 
identifies his will to death with the spider's will to accomplish his task of finishing the 
web. 'To want to die is to want 'only' to die, and it Is only the spider who can say 
@only'. In contrast, the speaker is aware of conflicting desires and situations, of ,-- 
'interlopers, dreams'. On the other hand, by identification with the spider's will to make 
something, we can see the spider saying 'but there are also interlopers, dreams, which 
conflict with your single-minded will to death'. Hence the spider's activities 
simultaneously confirm the will to death (which is contradicted by the 'interlopers and 
dreams' which come from the speaker), and support these interlopers through its 
example of making. Is the spider a maker or destroyer? 
In fact it is neither. The speaker's initial identification with the spider should 
alert us to is the fact that he finds there an equivalence to his sense of meaninglessness 
in both the singlemindedness of the spider and by its material place in nature. The 
'tight' web of the spider may be seen as the speaker's sense of his own materiality, 
organism, will to death. But the speaker, from within his humanity, as it were, 
constructs his own parable, which is itself a parable of meaningfulness: 
... to-morrow is also a day, That I must leave my bed and face the music. 
As all the others do who with a grin 
Shake off sleep like a dog and hurry to desk or engine 
And the fear of life goes out as they clock in 
And history is reasserted. 
Spider, spider, your irony is true; 
Who am I- or I- to demand oblivion? 
(CP, p. 104) 
MacNeice was not always so positive about work, as we have seen, yet this affirmation 
should not be read in a straightforward way as a kind of avoidance of reality -a hoped- 
for meaning in history which is simply the avoidance of awful truth. The sense here is 
that social activity is - posited as a positive good, rather than merely the avoidance 
of truth. This position is dependent on the paradoxes of the subject contemplating his 
own demise. The irony of the spider is various. One irony is that the spider's efforts 
are fragile and transitory. But, the poem can assert, they are nonetheless important for 
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that. That affirmation is tainted and impermanent, that it must partake of the 
uncertainties of 'becoming', rather than pristine, god-given 'being', ' is no argument for 
the affirmation not taking place. To suggest this would be to offer the certainties of 
absolute meaningfulness as the only alternative to absolute meaninglessness. Both 
trade in certainties which are untenable. Secondly, the demand for oblivion is, In the 
face of it, an intolerable arrogance. It implies a privileged insight into the horror of life 
which others do not share. This carries the irony that at the very moment one asserts 
one's worthlessness, one is asserting a position in superiority, banishing the courage of 
others as just so much illusion. Ouite apart, that is, from proposing a single unified 
stable ego 'I - or V which can demand the totality of death. -As before, the death 
instinct is seen merely as the reverse image of the life-instinct, shrill optimism I 
retranslated into another absolute, when it was precisely this absolutism which was 
supposed to be under attack. Thirdly, the activity of the spider allows the speaker to 
see that at precisely the point when he is affirming the desire to die . -; 
he is, almost 
against his wishes, asserting qualities which are those of life: of desire, of sensitivity, 
of pain at a loss of meaning which only allows the necessity of meaning more "' ý 
importance. It is these ironies which can allow the affirmation and commitment which 
ends the section: 
I must go out to-morrow as the others do 
And build the failing castle; 
Which has never fallen, thanks 
Not to any formula, red tape or institution, 
Not to any creeds or banks, 
But to the human animal's endless courage. 
Spider, spider, spin 
Your register and let me sleep a little, 
Not now in order to end but to begin 
The task begun so often. 
(CP, p. 104) 
There is, however, a further irony that this reflection admits, and which undercuts these 
sentiments at the very point that they are most asserted. 
,- The section began, we remember, with a loss of faith in dominant, explaining 
texts. These were not merely texts, but texts about significance, about the presence of 
meaning: the significance of the tyger, the return of Christ from the tomb, the necessity 
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of the impure Persephone returning from Hades. Given the impulse towards 
meaninglessness in this passage it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that it is 
more convincing about such nothingness than any alternatives. It is not that the 
speaker has reached the nadir, come to knowledge of it, and then found some imminent 
sense of meaning and truth to contradict this nothingness. Rather, such nothingness 
has been approached by the speaker, he has seen as much of It as he can, but he has 
resorted instead to a mode of explanation that he had initially held up to inspection, and 
found wanting. At the very point that the ultimate meaninglessness of matter was being 
contemplated the self-validiting discourses of the self are employed. They grant 
meaning at precisely the point when it is this granting of meaning which is assumed to 
be under question. Meaningfulness is not found, it is produced. But not only does this 
activity of production slip by the speaker, it is misrecognized as its exact opposite. The 
speaker claims to have found already given proof of the necessity of making - in the 
activity of the spider, which is then seen as equivalent to 'the human animal's endless 
courage'. But we cannot grant the notion of the 'human animal's endless courage' any 
truth value other than that which it supplies for itself. One might say that the spider's 
final irony is, then, to remain beyond the speaker's perception right when it is assumed 
that some interior knowledge has been gained. The spider is just there. In this, its irony 
is to remain beyond the speaker's fallacious assumptions of coming to knowledge of his 
own nothingness and returning from the nadir, and crucially, of remaining beyond his 
assumptions of meaningfulness at precisely his point of identification of the 'human 
animal' and the 'animal' animal. What the passage shows therefore is not the discovery 
of meaning, but its making, or construction in an entirely self-grounding fashion, which 
is then taken to be natural, imminent, read from the book of nature. Throughout, the 
spider is silent., 
Autumn Journal does not merely rely on the subject's own will to construct 
meaning, however, as we have seen in the citation of texts in the preceding passage. It 
abounds with intertexts, to the extent that one is sometimes unsure which text one is 
exactly reading. Sometimes, of course, the texts under question are thirties texts, 
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supplementing the poem's mention of thirties tropes quite explicitly, as in the following 
passage: 
August is nearly over, the people 
Back from holiday are tanned 
With blistered thumbs as a wallet of snaps and a little 
Joie de vivre which is contraband; 
Whose stamina is enough to face the annual 
Wait for the annual spree, 
i Whose memories are stamped with specks of sunshine 
Like faded fleurs de lys. 
(CP, p. 105) 
Clearly reference is here being made to Auden's 'August for the people', with its 
opening passage: 'August for the people and their favourite islands. / Daily the 
steamers sidle up to meet / The effusive welcome of the pier. 36 MacNeice's use of this 
detail provides a sequel of sorts -a kind of description which narrates what happens - 
when the 'long-weekend' is over. Equally, it locates the speaker as existing within an 
already-textual, already-written scene. This intertext transforms the mention of 'the 
people', meaning any old people who go on holiday, to 'the people' of political rhetoric. 
The people go on holiday, the people go back to work. MacNeice's trippers return with 
a 'wallet of, snaps' and some 'joie de vivre which is contraband'. Caudwell, we have - 
noted, was fond of using the category of money to denote socially constructed 
meanings and valueS. 37 Here the 'currency' is one of snaps - collective, social 
representations of a collective, social activity. Trippers are inscribed, in this, within their 
photo-taking; they become 'the people'. Equally, theirloie de vivre, is smuggled in, 
illegally, as though it comes from across the border, from the 'New Country' of carnival 
and free expression. There is a sense, however, that in this apparent transcendence of 
the mundane the trippers are only re-contained within a dominant social structure. The 
sense of 'spree', though forming an alternative reality to the quotidian, does not produce 
a will or desire to change it. Equally, whilst the notion of 'annual wait/annual spree' 
points to the numbing dreariness of everyday activity, it also suggests a kind of held-off 
desire in the trippersýactivity -a taste of joie which is never quite complete, never met in 
its full character, Joie is never satisfied; all one holiday does is require another. This at 
least is how it is lived. It is, however, remembered, or represented to the self, quite 
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differently. The long list of 'specks of sunshine' that pepper the memory would 
persuade the subject that each is a moment of authentic, complete joy, 'stamped' or 
authenticated by this sunlight. 
This type of containment is repeated in the lines which follow: 
Now the till and the typewriter call the fingers, 
The workman gathers his tools 
For the eight-hour day but after that the solace 
Of films or football pools 
Or of the gossip or cuddle, the moments of self-glory 
Or self-indulgence, blinkers on the eyes of doubt, 
The blue smoke rising and the brown lace sinking 
In the empty glass of stout. 
(CP, p. 105) 
Several features should be isolated here. In the past we have noted that the hand Is a 
signifier for the action of the subject - changing, touching, holding/controlling. Here this 
potential for change - the 'fingers' of the typist, the 'tools' of the workman, are already 
seconded to a particular field of action. Here again Is a reference to Auden's poem; ' 
'history, that never sleeps or dies, / And, held one moment, burns the hand'. 38 Have 
the trippers who return with 'blistered thumbs' had their hands burnt through contact 
with history, or is this injury a parody of effective contact with history? Either way, the 
hands of history are bound, and the activity of leisure serves not as a final opportunity 
to 'be oneself', but to engage in self-delusion in the gossip and cuddle 'blinkers on the 
eyes of doubt'. We might remember Frank Kermode's comment here, implying a 
patronising approach to the people. 39 However, this description is heavily cinematic: 
the blue smoke rising , the brown 
lace sinking. Here the use of the definite article 
clearly assumes a shared body of knowledge, a shared identification. What this should 
alert us to, therefore, is the propensity to regard these features - the aspect of 'the 
people' that we met in Grierson's comments on film documentary, as part of this 
process of collective representation and identification. As much as the poem is 
considering people, it is considering 'the people' as representation, and the limits this 
imposes on activity, selfhood and action. 
The people are, we are told, 'born and bred to harness', but does the speaker lie 
outside such harnesses? His notion that: 
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... some refusing harness and more who are refused it Would pray that another and a better Kingdom come, 
Which now is sketched in the air or travestied in slogans 
Written in chalk or tar on stucco or plaster-board 
But in time may find its body in men's bodies, 
Its law and order in their heart's accord. 
(CP, p. 105) 
would seem to present a competing discourse. It uses the terms of the old J'kingdom 
come'), and may be travestied by so-called 'subversive' doctrine, but it manages to ý,, 
enshrine itself in action, in the body and its accord. This statement carries important, 
future implications for notions of identity between intention and action. 
At this point, however, we should note that the desire to locate discourse, to 
make it grounded in action is contrasted with two sides of the speaker's self In dramatic 
dialogue. One, the good-natured liberal; the other, who recognises the desire to 'snap 
your fingers or a whip', and to 'build with their degradation your self-esteem'. This Is 
described as a matter of 'habit' which should be repressed. But 'habit' in this situation 
is a repressed, which inevitably returns in dreams where the speaker can 'play the 
gangster or the sheik, / Kill for the love of killing, make the world my sofa, / Unzip the 
women and insult the meek'. Such habits are thus filmic or textual representations and 
roles, which determine the desires of the subject in question as much as they do the 
people whom he observes. The solution to this double-bind, we are told, is not in 
analysis, but in action: 
... a future of action , the will and fist Of those who abjure the luxury of self-pity 
And prefer to risk a movement without being sure 
If movement would be better or worse in a hundred 
Years or a thousand when their heart is pure. 
None of our hearts are pure, we always have mixed motives. 
Are self deceivers, but the worst of all 
Deceits is to murmur 'Lord I am not worthy' 
And, lying easy, turn your face to the wall. 
But may I cure that habit, look up and outwards 
And may my feet follow my wider glance 
First no doubt to stumble, then to walk with others 
And in the end - with time and luck - to dance. 
(CP, p., 106) 
These lines have a number of elements which require unpacking. 'Will and fist' implies a 
pugilistic approach to the future, a willingness to take risks, and to break out of the 
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closures of established modes of representation in and through action. The purity of the 
bourgeois text, in its stability and its distance from effective action, must be broken in a 
practice which is open to contingency, indeterminacy. Yet in the very act of doing this 
the meaning of these lines is compromised. 'Fist' can be seen as a variety of the hand 
holding history which we met in Cornford's 'Full Moon' and in MacNeice's 'August'. 
But the 'fist' was also the symbol of the Communist movement, and of the republican 
force in Spain. MacNeice's hoped-for elusion of representation finds him once again In 
the field of representation which was only just derided as a 'travesty. Equally, one 
cannot help but catch echoes in the final lines of Yeats's 'Among School Children' ('0 
body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance, / How can we know the dancer from the 
dance? ). 40 Frank Kermode has noted that the figure of the 'dancer' in Yeats is the 
fundamental figure in which Ithe dancer] and the dance are inconceivable apart, 
indivisible as body and soul, meaning and form, ought to be'. 41 MacNeice's use of the 
figure draws on these associations, implying a unity of intention and act, of being and 
doing, which transcends his everyday activity. Like the figures of 'music' and 'voice' it 
is a recurrent figure in the poem. In this example it emerges as a wish, something to be 
desired. Thus stated, it is subject to modification as the poem progresses. 
The grounds for this restatement can be perceived in the following lines: 
To-day was a beautiful day, the sky was a brilliant 
Blue for the first time for weeks and weeks 
But posters flapping on the railings tell the fluttered 
World that Hitler speaks, that Hitler speaks 
And we cannot take it in and we go to our daily 
Jobs to the dull refrain of the caption 'War' 
Buzzing around us as from hidden insects. 
(CP, 10 8) 
One might call this a piece within the mould of the thirties serniotics of 'invasion'. 42 A 
pure, pre-political situation being taken over, usurped, to use Stephen Spender's word, 
by history. 43 In this way, the unmediated purity of the sky, and of course its beauty, 
are obscured and violated by newspaper posters, and their reporting of speech: 'Hitler 
speaks'. It's not, seemingly, what Hitler says that is important but that he speaks; or 
rather that the newspaper posters tell us that he speaks. Obviously this does not render 
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the content of Hitler's messages unimportant. But the line does two things. As a 
consequence of such omissions it persuade us that it is already known what he will say. 
The question is how much influence this is having, whether it Is being brought to the 
light of day. Such publicity works as a signifier for the state of Europe, which grants 
importance, in a state of crisis, for whatever Hitler may have to tell us. Secondly It Is 
the fact of voice, that Hitler speaks rather than invades Czechoslovakia, to which I 
attention is drawn here. The first of these might seem a merely trivial point, yet cannot 
be overlooked. Hitler's voice is anxiously inspected as a sign of what is to come. It Is 
also a sign of what is to happen - Hitler, making a threat or merely speaking out on 
something, makes something happen. Thus, it takes on a performative quality, but one 
which cannot be 'taken 'in'. It cannot be assimilated within an internal space which will 
continue to grant this internality precedence or reliable comprehension. One reason for 
this, we might suggest, is that the discourse itself is not 'complete' - its full meaning 
is contingent on its effects, and these are undisclosed. 
However, in the two lines that follow, an intriguing double perspective is 
presented. On the level of narrated detail we recognise that the 'we' is located in a 
concrete space of selfhood and the world, wandering around when outside, various 
kinds of enunciations with their own narrated detail are also to be found. These 
discourses are like 'insects' irritating and threatening the purity of self. However, and 
crucially, that use of the word 'caption' of 'War' as a 'dull refrain', something repeated 
within a text, serves to imply that, on a different level of the narrative, that of the 
narrator, the figures operate like characters in a comic strip or represented drama. They 
are in a 'fluttered' (not 'flustered') world. They are themselves part of a text from 
which they assume themselves to be absent. They assume that this text is somewhere 
'out there'. The notion of a pure selfhood, threatened by contamination by the text and 
by history, yet always already constructed out of these impurities, relies on this 
exteriorization. The 'we' of the poem cannot 'take it in' because they themselves have 
already been 'taken in' by the text. They have already been absorbed within its 
structure of signification, and, moreover, deceived that their texts are nature and exist 
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outside the self, and that the self is itself not such a text. To use MacNeice's 
terminology, these characters are 'out of the picture' because the picture is precisely 
their provenance. 
This sense of a lack of a guiding, grounding narrative, a kind of text without 
author or identifiable structure, is reflected in the perplexity revolving around the events 
- that all this has 'already happened', and thus, within a model of, say, progress, should 
not be happening again now. In this situation, the figures take refuge in one of 
MacNeice's favourite cliches that all of this is (self-referentially) 'on me': 
... we laugh it off and go round town in the evening And this, we say, is on me... 
But did you see 
The latest? You mean whether Cobb has bust the record 
Or do you mean the Australians have lost their last by ten 
Wickets or do you mean that the autumn fashions - 
No we don't mean anything like that again. 
No, what we mean is Hodza, Henlein, Hitler, 
The Maginot Line. 
(CP, p. 108) 
The comforting communal reality given in cliche"is replaced in these lines with the harsh 
context of European politics. But it is not merely history and the subject*s involvement 
in it which are at stake here, but the subject's involvement with rhetoric and its 
contexts. The 'meaning' of 'the latest' has changed, in the simplest fashion, from sport 
to history - the world of leisure and pretend power-games to real power-games. 
However, this momentary instability of 'what we mean', matching in some sense the 
'informative' function of the poem itself, is mirrored by an apparent change in, to use a 
thirties phrase, the meaning of meaning. What the addresser intends to say by the 
'latest' is supplanted by something else. This change in context of meaning is itself 
reflected in the change of status of the 'we'. 'What we mean' implies what we intend 
to say, it also implies what our identity has become, what we mean as subjects in 
history, what we represent to ourselves and to others. And what we mean is a 
collection of proper and place names: 'Hodza, Henlein, Hitler, / The Maginot Line'. 
Proper names, as 'rigid designators', are at once stable and unstable, collecting a whole 
range of associations and meanings by the very emptiness of the sign. Hodza, the 
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Czech prime minister, Henlein, leader of the Sudetenland Nazis, and Hitler found 
themselves pitched on a 'little Maginot Une' around the Sudetenland in 1938.44 What 
we mean (to say) by the 'Maginot line' depends on what happens to it, not by our 
intentions about it or what we think it is. Equally, what we represent, in our role as 
actants in history, depends on what we see happen there, what we let happen there. 
But do we, in fact, have any say in the matter, whether we mean it or not?: 
And when we go out into Picadilly Circus 
They are selling and buying the late 
Special editions snatched and read abruptly 
Beneath the electric signs as crude as Fate. 
And the individual, powerless, has to exert the 
Powers of will and choice 
And choose between enormous evils, either 
Of which depends on somebody else's voice. 
(CPI P. 109) 
Again, we have the 'voice' of Europe distanced by the papers, and distanced once again 
by the narrator's reporting of this distance. Within this situation, it is not that the 
individual, With 'powers of will and choice' is cut off from history in a way which is 
solved by communication, information and consequent action. On the contrary, the 
individual is immersed in history as much as ever. But history does not depend on his 
powers of will and choice so much as his will and choice, his engagement, depends on 
the voice of someone else. The Speaker's activity as subject depends on meanings 
provided from elsewhere, that he cannot control, and which are in themselves radically 
unstable: What will Hitler say, what will it mean, for us? What will we mean? Hence 
the 'electric signs as crude as Fate' operate in two ways: By a 'fate' which lies beyond 
the control and intentions of the speaker, and as signs which, in their stability and 
unmovingness, show the inability of accepted meanings, styles of signification, to 
explain historical circumstances and the subject's relation to them. All the signs can 
reveal in their glaring intrusion is their inscrutability, the subject's reliance on them, and 
their indeterminacy. 
The earlier parts of the poem, therefore, introduce us and call attention to 
various types of signification which are continued throughout the poem. It alerts us also 
to the existence of various explaining, organising discourses which are put in question 
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by the events that the poem narrates. Equally, the narrated subject of the poem is 
confronted with signs in a number of ways: certain events which demand 
interpretation, ordinary objects and practices which can stand both for certain 
assumptions and values, in addition to the inadequacy of these values in the face of 
history, and crucially, in the subject's own attempts at finding order within the various 
orders of signification. What this comes down to is a re-situation of the subject within 
the domain of the sign, a self-awareness of such a position, and a subsequent sense of 
uncertainty in the face of history. It is not merely that the subject is being redefined, 
but the various conditions for doing so are also subject to redefinition. This leads us to 
a two-fold position. The sense of activity and signification relying on notions of 
language which are now seen most clearly as 'Text' or 'Writing' rather than 'Voice'. In 
other words, a type of signification to which the intentional subject must be subjected, 
but which takes little account of that intentional subject. Moreover, a situation, in 
which the grammatical figure of the proper name and, by implication the deictic, the 
Inow' or 'zero hour of the day' (CP, P. 110) as MacNeice calls it, is at once palpable, 
real, pressing, and radically indeterminate. 
With the exception of the 'Spider' discussion, we have, up until now, been 
concerned with what might be regarded as the 'public' aspects of the poem: 
consideration of the functioning of meaning within the public domain, and its attendant 
instabilities. Within the rhetoric of the thirties, where the necessary evil of public 
discourse was accepted, if not entirely trusted, we might be tempted to look to the 
domain of the private for a respite from this incessant slippage of meaning. In fact, this 
manoeuvre has already been anticipated. Hence, in Section IV, following the reflection 
on the dance, and the people, we find the following introduction: 
September has come and I wake 
And I think with joy how whatever, now or in future, the system 
Nothing whatever can take 
The people away, there will always be people 
For friends or for lovers though perhaps 
The conditions of love will be changed and its vices diminished 
And affection not lapse 
To narrow possessiveness, jealousy founded on vanity. JCP, 106) 
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In these lines 'The people' have been returned to 'people', to the level of 'friends' and 
'lovers', in an almost palinodic gesture in response to the classification within the 
preceding passage. Equally, we have an impeccably good-willed gesture towards 
standards of love and friendship which honours the necessity of purifying these 
relationships of possession and self-regard. However, the lines which follow turn out to 
be less of a straightforward assertion of the rejection of possession (owning, 
controlling), jealousy (desiring what the other has, or is) and vanity (self-regard) than a 
close meditation upon it: 
September has come, it is hers 
Whose vitality leaps in the autumn, 
Whose nature prefers 
Trees without leaves and a fire in the fire-place; 
So I give her this month and the next 
Though the whole of my year should be hers who has rendered already 
So many of its days intolerable or perplexed 
But so many more happy. 
(CP, pp. 106-7) 
This passage presents an interesting variation on the presentation of structures of 
meaning in the previous discussion. September is 'hers' because its significance, its 
ability to signify, is entirely associated with memories and associations connected with 
the beloved. Indeed, this initial assertion is quite in keeping with the sense that it may 
belong to some other body - its significance created out of other frames of reference, 
other concerns. This gesture is slightly ambiguous. It is unclear whether the assertion 
indicates an act of giving on the part of the speaker, or a recognition of prior ownership. 
In fact, it is both, yet the donation is not wholly in the speaker's control: 
So I give her this month and the next 
Though the whole of my year should be hers... 
Who has left a scent on my life and left my walls 
Dancing over and over with her shadow, 
Whose hair is twined in all my waterfalls 
And all of London littered with remembered kisses. 
(CP, p. 107) 
It should be clear now what this 'gift' involves. The speaker allows, in the face of other 
competing meanings, 'September' and 'London' to signify not only the remembered 
relationship, but its assumed value. This pattern of association is, of course, in part 
metonymic; London is 'littered with remembered kisses' in associations which we must 
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assume-to be the product of contiguity. However, there are strong elements of 
metaphor here too: in an important sense, London 'is' the beloved. 
The significance of 'her' London Is that it presents a distinct alternative to the 
various meanings placed upon it by history: 
... her moods and moments More shifting and more transient than I had 
Yet thought of as being integral to beauty... 
Whose eyes are candour, 
And assurance in her feet 
Like a homing pigeon never by doubt diverted. (CP, 107) 
The beloved, whose real model was Nancy Sharp, serves as a model for all that Is 
authentic, sincere, honest. 45 'Cant, we are told, 'can never corrupt' her, 'Nor', in 
another trope of possession, * argument disinherit'. As such, she seems to lie beyond 
discourse, beyond the artifice of language and representation: 
... I shall remember how your words could hurt Because they were so honest 
And even your lies were able to assert 
Integrity of purpose. 
And it is on the strength of knowing you 
I reckon generous feeling more important 
Than the mere deliberating what to do 
When neither the pros nor cons affect the pulses. 
And though I have suffered from your special strength 
Who never flatter for points nor fake responses 
I should be proud if I could evolve at length 
An equal thrust and pattern. 
(CP, P. 108) 
Integrity of purpose, it seems, emerges as inviolate in the beloved. Like Yeats's dancer, 
she has the capacity to translate being into action. In the context of the thirties, this is 
no mean feat, particularly, as we have seen, with the indeterminacy of action in history 
which preoccupies the poem. Yet one might argue that it is precisely this assumed unity 
of being which should make us suspicious about this figure. For we have already noted 
her capacity, through the speaker, to make 'London' and 'September' signify. What It 
seemed to signify was not merely certain contiguous details, but a whole frame of 
reference, set against numerous others (the state of Europe, perhaps). This frame was 
not asserted to be merely one amongst others, but to be meaningfulness as such. What 
previously was a street of Icyphers' becomes 'ranks of men. The status of the beloved 
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depends, we might say, on a state of pure being. But it is a sphere which Is entirely 
limited to private activity, private purposes. That this is a state to be achieved, given 
the violent usurpations and insecurities that the poem deals with, is hardly surprising. 
Yet we have to ask, -again given these circumstances, whether this 'honesty' and 
'authenticity' can be translated into the wider fields of action. And, if not, just how 
valid is this state of authenticity? - 'London' may be hers for a while, but 'London', after 
all, names lots of other things. 
In dealing with these other things, the poem, almost as if it is following the 
example of the beloved, immediately attempts to ground itself in a way which Is not 
prone to the indeterminacies of history and its attendant discourses: 
... on Sunday protest Meetings assemble not, as so often, now 
Merely to advertise some patent panacea 
But simply to avow 
The need to hold the ditch; a bare avowal 
That may perhaps imply 
Death at the doors in a week but in the long run 
Exposure of the lie. 
(CP, P. 113) 
This is boldly said. We have a sense of circumstances removing cant, getting down to 
brass tacks -a 'holding the ditch', in which the ditch Is clarified as it is imperiled. 
'Patent panaceas', like the 'theories' bought in 'Turf Stacks', are superseded by a 
recognition that the roots of civilisation need to be protected, and are as such assumed 
to be valuable. Through this, it is suggested, the 'lie', a kind of generalised lie which 
seems to mirror its inauthenticity in its weightlessness, as opposed to a 'grounded' 
truth, may itself be exposed. Thus the longed-for solution to inauthenticity which 
Opatent panaceas' hoped to provide is brought about by means which are themselves 
authentic. However, this sense of grounded realism is accompanied by a distinct sense 
of insecurity. It is not merely that 'the lie' may not be exposed, or that the ditch may 
not be held, but that the ditch itself can provide no certainties to be relied on: 
Think of a number, double it, treble it, square it, 
And sponge it out 
And repeat ad lib. and mark the slate with crosses; 
There is no time to doubt 
If the puzzle really has an answer. Hitler yells on the wireless... 
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They are cutting down the trees on Primrose Hill. 
(CP, p 113) 
Paradoxically, the groundedness of the 'ditch', set in contrast to 'Flights In the air, 
castles in the air, /The autopsy of treaties', is itself subject to a kind of inflation, a kind 
of weightlessness. That there is no time to doubt if the puzzle really has an answer Is 
not the same as being sure that it does, or of having complete confidence in one's path 
of action. Doubt exists, but it must be put aside. But the fact that it does exist must 
throw this course of action, whatever the reasons for, or necessity of, taking It, Into 
question: 
,... one - meaning I- is bored, am bored, the issue 
Involving principle but bound in fact 
To squander principle in panic and self-deception - 
Accessories after the act. 
(CP, p. 114) 
The generalised 'one' is brought to '1', in a gesture which would seem to doubt the 
universality of feeling. The sense that 'principle' must give way, inevitably, to 'panic 
and self-deception' puts an ironic twist on that 'in fact', implying that the world of fact 
may itself be factitious. And there are, it seems, good reasons for this self-questioning, 
a questioning which involved not merely a difference in course of action, but a 
scepticism as to the very conditions of such a course: 
... we who have been brought up to think of 'Gallant Belgium' As so much blague 
Are now preparing again to essay good through evil 
For the sake of Prague; 
And must, we suppose, become uncritical, vindictive, 
And must, in order to beat 
The enemy, model ourselves upon the enemy, 
A howling radio for our paraclete. (p. 114) 
The point here is that although the speaker is sceptical about the truth value of the 
'howling radio', he has little faith in the value of the discourses which are supposed to 
replace it. And this for two reasons. First, that they can provide no satisfactory answer 
for what must happen, what will happen, why it has happened. Second, because, In 
the realm of practical necessity, the one thing one can be sure of is that these 
discourses must be replaced by others, or they will perish. As such, Hitter's voice, 
which is not just the voice of a fascist, but a voice of the radio, must become our own. 
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That such a strategy may end in the enemy's defeat does not quite hold at bay the 
implication that the subject has changed in this manoeuvre, his voice been supplanted 
by text, disembodied, working without a will of its own. 
This sense of insecurity can be traced back to the section dealing with the 
Spanish Civil war. ýA pivotal point for the decade, Incomparable focus for the 'public' 
issues of the period, such an encounter cannot but have special significance. But It Is 
not, as we shall see, unrelated to the previous concern with the 'private' world of the 
beloved. Initially, however, memories of Spain prompt a meditation on the inauthenticity 
that a private vision can produce, and how these must be chastened by authentic 
knowledge of the historical: 
And I remember Spain 
At Easter ripe as an egg for revolt and ruin 
Though for a tripper the rain 
Was worse than the surly or worried or the haunted faces 
With writings on the walls - 
Hammer and sickle, Boicot, Viva, Muerra; 
With cafd-au-lait brimming the waterfalls, 
With sherry, shellfish, omelettes. 
With fretted stone the Moor 
Had chiselled for effects of sun and shadow. 
(CP' P. 110) 
The speaker's memories are truly shameful. He demonstrates a blame-worthy failure to 
read the messages behind the writing on the wall. MacNeice's clever mixing of the 
literal and figural in this description compounds his blindness. - The writing on the wall is 
writing on the wall. It is not concealed in recondite signs which the speaker might have 
excused himself for not noticing. The meanings of these statements elude him, 
confronting them as he does as a tourist. Much more significant for this tourist are the 
significant forms of Moorish architecture and the pleasures of food. - It is not that the - 
details of Spain elude the observer, in that they do not mean anything, but that they do 
not mean anything other than those things to be observed within the gaze of the tourist. 
In an important sense this tells us far more about the gaze than the place itself, although 
this gaze cannot be dissociated from the historical context in which it was produced. 
Within such a gaze, everything emerges as a spectacle, a representation: 
And the standard of living was low 
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But that, we thought to ourselves, was not our business; 
All that the tripper wants is the status quo 
Cut and dried for trippers. 
(CP, P- 112) 
But it is not that the 'status quo' is seen in Spain only. What the tripper wants 
is the status quo of his culture, to see 'Spain' rather than any real place. The reason 
this is shameful is then twofold - both for acceptance of the myth rather than the real 
place, or any place approximating the real, and for the avoidance of politics, the self- 
deception which effectively prevents the speaker from realising his own place in what is 
happening: 
We heard the blood-lust of a drunkard pile 
His heaven high with curses; 
And next day took the boat 
For home, forgetting Spain, not realising 
That Spain would soon denote 
Our grief, our aspirations; 
Not knowing that our blunt 
Ideals would find their whetstone, that our spirit 
Would find its frontier on the Spanish front, 
Its body in a rag-tag army. 
(CP, p. 112) 
Hence, the name 'Spain' changes its function from tourist attraction to a place of hope 
and aspiration. But it remains, we should note, a scene of representation, a word with 
no identifiable referent, which is fundamentally indeterminate. 'Spain' presents a real 
frontier, to be sure, but it also presents a frontier of representation. Although this Is, in 
a sense, a passage concerned with coming to knowledge of the Inauthenticity of the 
tourist from the privileged position of the present, it also -316rýs us to the possibility of 
such a state of inauthenticity reasserting itself. 'Spain' denotes (designates, then 
perhaps connotes) grief and aspiration, but what are our aspirations? How can they 
avoid being infected by 'mixed motives' and 'self deception'? One might also ask who 
that 'we' is. On the one hand it is a collective political body, also extending in a gesture 
of solidarity to the 'they' of 'Spain. But if MacNeice gives us good reason for thinking 
that some kind of truer perspective has been reached in these lines, he also alerts us to 
the possibility that, through this process of denotation, and the impurity of the subject 
who employs such designations, the gaze of the tourist, albeit perhaps a different kind 
of tourist, may be reinstated in a different fashion. 
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Autumn Journal is full of refutations of states of inauthenticity - the errors, self- 
delusions and suppressions of school-life, Oxford, teaching in Birmingham, Ireland. 
What the poem seeks to achieve through these strategies of re-examination, re- 
interpretation and exposing of lies is some position of authenticity, some values which 
can be unequivocally asserted; to be, in other words, like 'hell. However, as the poem 
progresses we come to realise that not only is this position unachievable outside the 
domain of the private, but that it may itself be the product of a misrecognition, a 
deluded hope. In providing a model for authenticity, the reexamination of the beloved, 
and the speaker's response to her, this position of authenticity is similarly examined. 
Certainly the beloved does return to the poem with almost obsessive regularity: 
Knowing perfectly well in the mind, on paper, 
How wasteful and absurd 
Are personal fixations but yet the pulse keeps thrumming 
And her voice is faintly heard 
Through walls and walls of indifference and abstraction. 
(CP, p. 121) 
The continual reevaluation of the beloved is, to be sure, partly a result of 'personal 
fixation'. However, the terms used to describe her suggest that there is more to it than 
that: 
Given to over-statement, careless of caution, 
Quick to sound the chimes 
Of delicate intention, at times malicious 
And generous at times. 
Whose kaleidoscopic ways are all authentic, 
Whose truth is not of a statement but of a dance 
So that even when you deceive your deceits are merely 
Technical and of no significance. 
(CP, p. 123) 
This quality of 'authenticity' is seemingly transcendent, rising above the 'indifference 
and abstraction' of ordinary discourse. On the one hand this helps to establish how 
these discourses operate as abstractions, and to point to the ways in which they do so. 
The kind of authenticity which we find is 'of a dance' rather than a statement. As we 
have noted previously, the figure of the dancer encapsulates a unity of form and 
meaning, which can extend to a unity between being and doing, or intention and action. 
Even though she is 'given to over-statement', sometimes 'malicious', the beloved Is 
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never less than herself, able to transcend the 'merely technical' activities of deception. 
This kind of self-presence is enviable. As was stated, it gains its importance from the 
lack of self presence of the speaker, vitiated as he is by self-deception, the necessities 
of history,, and of writing. The fact that 'hungry love' is feared to be an 'Jim1proper 
analyst' does not, at this stage anyway, 'automatically Invalidate the Identity of the 
beloved - it is not merely that the speaker feels her lack that makes her appear in this 
way, but the conditions which motivated him to make this identification, namely his own 
sense of vitiation in history. Moreover, the speaker finds In the beloved both a goal of 
self-presence, and, indeed, a desire to achieve this goal through unity of Identity and 
action: 'I see the future glinting with your presence / Uke moon on a slate roof' as he 
puts it, 'the fire', he is capable of asserting, 'will always burn. 
However, as the poem progresses the speaker feels a change of heart towards 
his lover, and seems less keen to grant her this idealised status of transcendence. In 
fact, he suspects, the beloved may have been more of a signifier of his own desire than 
something with any authentic existence: 
Now I could see her come ' 
Around the corner without the pulse responding, 
The flowery orator in the heart is dumb, 
His bag of tricks is empty, his over-statements, 
I Those rainbow bubbles, have burst: 
When we meet, she need not feel embarrassed, 
The cad with the golden tongue has done his worst 
And has no orders from me to mix his phrases rich, 
To make the air a carpet 
For her to walk on. 
(CP, p. 140) 
This is a paradoxical position. Where previously the beloved stood for an authenticity 
that transcended discourse, she now appears as an Invention of that very discourse. 
Language, it seems, presented the authentic when it was precisely the transcendence of 
language that this authenticity was to achieve. It is not simply that the signified was 
discovered only through language, but that this linguistic mediation was denied precisely 
where it did its most work. 
Despite assertions to the contrary, therefore, the speaker is In grave doubt about 
his own sense of what is authentic and inauthentic, about the distinction between truth 
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and lies. It is, however, part of the distinction of the poem that it continues to argue for 
a resolution to this insecurity, for a 'joy whose grounds are true' to use Hillis Miller's 
phrase. 46 Previous to this discussion of the beloved, we are told that the insecurity 
engaged with here is not purely that of the speaker, but is a general condition. With 
'the devil quoting scripture, the traitor, the coward, the thug / Eating dinner in the name 
of peace and progress' it is: 
No wonder many would renounce their birthright, 
The responsibility of moral choice, 
And sit with a mess of pottage taking orders 
Out of a square box from a mad voice - 
Lies on the air endlessly repeated 
Turning the air to fog. 
(CP, p. 13 9) 
'The sun' is said to shine 'cryptically' on this scene. As in 'Eclogue for Christmas' it 
functions as a sign always suggesting meaning, but withholding it. Against the shrill 
optimism of the assertion that 'the sun will always shine', a gesture of optimism that is 
self-grounding in assuming not only that the sun will shine, but that the meanings which 
associate sunlight with human good, the speaker asserts: 'but how many people / Will 
see it with their eyes in Nineteen-Thirty-Nine? ' (p. 139). In a sense this is not to doubt 
that the sun is good, but that this structure of meaning, and its attendant 'humane' 
values, may be drawing to a close: 
Yes, the earlier days had their music, 
We still have some still to-day, 
But the orchestra is due for the bonfire 
If things go on this way. 
Still there are the seeds of energy and choice 
Still alive even if forbidden, hidden, 
And while man has voice 
He may recover music. 
(CP, P. 139) 
It is possible to see a pattern of figural language emerging here. The usurping 'voice' of 
the wireless is, although constitutive of the subject's position in history, anonymous and 
authorless. Where previously this kind of 'written' voice is countered by the dance, here 
this countering is associated with music. Both these figures can themselves be used as 
metaphors for self-presence, intentionality, unity of form and meaning, of signifier and 
signified. The threat to these notions of self-presence is the threat to the subject that 
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Autumn Journal is encountering, with the added sense that, given the Imminence of the 
death of the liberal subject, 'the god of nothing', meaning the god of death, has its 
appeal: 
... While I sympathise With the wish to quit, to make the great refusal, 
I feel that such a defeat is also treason, 
That deaths like these are lies. 
A fire should be left burning 
Till it burns itself out: 
We shan't have another chance to dance and shout 
Once the flames are silent. 
(CP, P. 145) 
As in 'Now that the shapes of mist', MacNeice is considering a position where the 
'accidental' subject, born out of 'all that waste of sperm', cannot claim any kind of 
sovereign authority. However, this cannot entirely rid that subject of value. Fire Is here 
used as a figure for a kind of self-grounding of value which, without any recourse to 
higher authority, claims its own self-supporting right to be. The fact that it may be an 
illusion is countered by the fact that to make the 'great refusal' in death Is merely giving 
in to another lie, that despair at the meaninglessness of matter only reveals a kind of 
disguised humanism in that the only reasons for living are those sanction by some kind 
determinate authority. Thus MacNeice's concern with 'this make-belief of standing on a 
brink' (p. 134), of the temptation to 'enjoy hating / The world to which I ever belong' (p. 
147). The speaker is, therefore, caught within a tissue of lies. To maintain the 
authority of the stable, self-present autonomous self is a lie, yet to denounce it from a 
position which would see all as meaningless is a lie, moreover one which utilises the 
discourse of meaning which it claims to refute. The subject is bound to construct 
parables, find meaning even where that meaning is said to be absent. 
In line with the times, this situation has a social, and political, bearing which not 
only locates the problems of truth and lies within a historical context, but prompts 
questions of how such truths and lies affect the subject who must live and act within 
history. The focus of this situatina is Spain: 
The road ran downhill into Spain 
The wind blew fresh on barnboý grasses, 
The white plane-trees were bone-naked 
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And the issues plain: 
We have come to a place in space where shortly 
ý All of us may be forced to camp in time. 
(p. 148) 
We have spoken previously of the indeterminacy of the name, the 'rigid designator' that 
is 'Spain'. In this passage we see the simultaneous construction of a meaning, a 
denotation of Spain at precisely the moment when it Is said to be revealed in all its truth. 
Telling the truth, that is, about the place which hopes to reveal the truth under the 
surface of lies, and distortions. Since for all the 'plainness' of the issues in Spain, that 
'human values remain, purged in the fire, / And it appears that every man's desire / Is 
life rather than victuals', this is a piece of writing stubbornly entrenched within the 
codes of thirties reportage. The discourse has been placed, so to speak, after all the 
dispute on the unreliability of language, the lies of the papers, the usurpation of voice by 
text, within the very codes that the poem denounces, at the very moment that some 
position outside such codes is thought to be found. In its simplest terms, the speaker is 
speaking in a voice not his own. It is writing, the text, which announces: 
May God, if there is one, send 
As much courage again and greater vision 
And resolve the antinomies in which we live 
-Where man must be either safe because he is negative 
Or free on the edge of the razor. 
(CP, p. 149) 
The poem is mentioning this speech rather than using it, in a manner which renders it 
radically indeterminate. In short, we cannot -I &W ;F- what the poem Is saying Is 
true or not, and how this should influence our actions: 
The stubborn heirs of freedom 
Whose matter-of-fact faith and courage shame 
Our niggling equivocations - 
We who play for safety, 
A safety only in name. 
Whereas these people contain truth, whatever 
Their nominal faqade. 
Listen: a whirr, a challenge, an aubade - 
It is the cock crowing in Barcelona. 
(CP' P. 150) 
'Man can embody truth', as Yeats put it, 'but he cannot know it'. 47 The people of 
Spain may indeed embody something of truth about them, but we can come to that 
truth only through the contaminating influence of language, of writing. It is a space 
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which is radically indeterminate, and radically impure, lying about its own mediating 
status at precisely the moment at which it would seek to deny such a status in offering 
us a single, stable 'truth'. The assumed 'safety' of these lines may indeed be only in 
name, with no grounding in truth. But at the same time we cannot get beyond the 
'nominal facade', the instabilities of naming, that the people of Spain ('Spain') represent. 
That cock crowing returns us to the indeterminacy of signs that begun our 
discussion: 'Is it the heart's reveille or the sour / Reproach of Simon Peter? '. It Is 
impossible to say, since a clear answer would depend on a clarity of action which the 
poem forbids. We cannot say what such a sign means, since the discourses in which it 
is situated have themselves been put in question by the poem. Hence 'the sharp 
annunciation of the %re4w, -? (p. 148) which would seek to provide us with a 'clarified 
atmosphere of truth' is shown to be delusive. The 'reproach of Simon Peter', that the 
subject has been guilty of betrayal, of sins of omission, cannot find any 'excuse' within 
the poem, since the clarity of 'truth' which would enable such an excuse, via the honest 
confession, is forbidden. 
In this way MacNeice is most honest in revealing the impossibility of honesty, 
where such honesty is enabled by the self-presence of an intentional subject that pre- 
exists its linguistic construction 11 - or P). Equally, he does not hesitate to expose the 
mediating effects of language, its effects on notions of 'truth', of truth in language, of 
'truths' about language, most particularly when the truth about its very mediating 
status, its own indeterminacy is suppressed within a perspective which is stable, 
determinate, transparent. MacNeice is thus at his most honest when he is honest about 
his impurity, and the impurities of writing. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, that the 
poem ends with an assertion of 'human' values within an injunction to 'sleep'. For at 
the same time that the faith in the human subject is asserted, the ability of the subject 
to attain such values by the activity of conscious will is denied. 'Voice' gives over to 
the text of sleep as its only redeemer, as a means of achieving its final goal of self- 
presence. The injunction remains a hope that exposes its own hopelessness. It is a 
wish, an assertion of a wish, that forbids such a wish ever being fulfilled. It is a 
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journey, in other words, which can never have an end, because the technique for 
travelling and discovery, vitiates, renders impure, this goal from the beginning: 
Sleep to the noise of running water 
To-morrow to be crossed, however deep; 
This is no river of the dead or Lethe, 
To-night we sleep 
On the banks of Rubicon - the die is cast; 
There will be time to audit 
The accounts later, there will be sunlight later 
And the equation will come out at last. 
(CP, p. 153) 
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Chapter Six 
A Poetics of Impurity: 
Louis MacNeice, Writing, the Thirties. 
This is an impure age, so it follows that much of its poetry, if it is honest 
- and poetry must be honest even before it is beautiful - must be impure. 
Louis MacNeicel 
I don't believe in pure form, I don't believe in pure anything. Anything 
pure is an abstraction. 
Louis MacNeice2 
[Blefore jeering at the Aesthetes for their triviality, we should do well to 
remember that at least they avoided the intellectualist error which the 
modern world inherited from the Greeks and which still vitiates literary 
criticism, viz. that it is the thought that dominates a poem and gives its 
value .... There is something in a suggestion made by Hermann Broch in his novel, The Sleepwalkers, where he wonders 'whether even the 
thought of an epoch is not a vehicle for its style... '. 
Louis MacNeice3 
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This study began with a notion of purity, in its simplest terms, as an indication of form, 
style, artifice, removed from the rough and messy impurities of 'experience' or 'life'. 
However, MacNeice's poems of the thirties, closely inspected, reveal that rather than 
unmediated 'experience' which complicates the purities of the autotelic, formalist text, it 
makes more sense to see formal elements (the mediating agents in consciousness, the 
mediation of consciousness) as elements which, again and again, render 'experience' 
impure. This kind of impurity is connected to others: the impurity of the relation 
between one object and another, between one moment and another, between 
representation and the subject, between text and history. MacNeIce's world in the 
thirties is one characterized by contradiction, variety, flux, incompleteness and, crucially, 
their necessary opposites. These features take us some way from what might be 
considered the prevalent view of MacNeice which began this study: the 'honest Louis', 
in the mould of a thirties empirlcisý. who 'bumps into experience in an unmediated way 
and is simply telling the truth about it', in service of an uninspected liberal humaniSM. 4 
These senses of transgression, violation, or contamination were always implicit in an 
'impure' poetry, where the emphasis would be on a breaching of borders, a breaking of 
frontiers. - But their implications must be ignored in a reading of MacNeice in the thirties 
which relies on the assumption and valoriz-P-A, of a pure state of subjectivity or 
experience, a pure consciousness for which form serves only as a-PQZtee, ý, vehicle: a 
supplementary, transparent medium of a pre-formed subjectivity and world. 
Autumn Journal marks the culmination of the examination of the threat to 
priorities given to the subject during the thirties. These privileges of the subject were 
seen to be under threat by historical crisis: an external threat in itself, in forcing the 
subject to take account of history, in addition to what this threat contained. There is 
nothing new in such a reading. But MacNeice's response to this threat, widely seen 
within figures of invasion, where the claims of the self are often thought to be most 
asserted because most under threat, is in fact to assert that this invasion, this 
undermining, has already taken place. The self which would offer itself as autonomous, 
placed against its dissolution in history, is already undermined from within. The 
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supposedly external 'others' of text and history are the causes of this undermining, 
which in turn pose significant questions about the problems of acting in history, about 
the dependence of the subject on undependable means. This sense is at odds with one 
which would see the invading force of history as separable from the formation of the 
subject, even if this subject argued for an apparently rigoroas, attention to history. A 
text which reveals the contaminating effects of form therefore, is nevertheless crucially 
located in history. This sense of impurity as contamination from within, a paradigm 
which forbids a sense of one autonomous and self-contained entity existing 'side by 
side' with another, is of course the sense of impurity which we have explored in a 
number of ways. We might suggest a difference, then, between types of impurity, 
ways of questioning notions of the impure. One might see impurity as a mixing of pre- 
formed, separable, previously autonomous entities, made necessary by circumstance, 
which strive for co-existence, or where one is subordinated to another. On the other 
hand one might see impurity as more in keeping with a sense of identity predicated on 
difference, where one entity requires and supposes the other as a fundamental 
condition, where this relation is indeterminately without grounding privilege ('I - or V), 
where identity is consequently unstable. This is the sense of impurity for which I have 
rgued in this discussion. If this condition of impurity is not in keeping with some 
anonical views of MacNeice, it is perhaps necessary to consider in conclusion what 
alternative perspectives it can offer on 'MacNeice, writing, and the thirties'. 
If, from the previous discussion, it is clear that the straightforward 
characterization of MacNeice as 'Anglo-Irish poet liberal humanist' during the thirties 
needs reconsideration, how else might we characterize him and his work? S As I have 
argued in the previous chapter, and indeed implied throughout this study, this identity 
cannot be entirely dismissed. MacNeice's poetic project is undeniably formidably 
informed by the values and agendas of the liberal humanist tradition. However, in 
challenging the identity of MacNeice as straightforward 'liberal humanist', I have been 
less concerned with denying this influence, or indeed MacNeice's mediation of it, than 
with resituating it. Certainly it cannot simply be displaced purely by some 'other' 
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MacNeice, who is wholly outside the confines of liberal humanism. In line with the 
previous discussion, however, I would argue the liberal humanism attributed to 
MacNeice carries with it a kind of commenting intelligence which is infused with the 
inaccuracy, the error, of this persona., This intelligence cannot prohibit this identity , nor 
can it propose another identity to be arrived at uncomplicatedly. This position is implied 
in MacNeice's scepticism towards the established 'literary-political' movements of the 
thirties. However, such scepticism should not be misunderstood as a retreat into a pure 
a-political or a-historical space of personal quietism. On the contrary, MacNeice's 
attention to both the necessity and the nature of his historical context has been noted 
throughout. By way of illustration, one might see a parallel between this impurity, 
between two worlds of liberal humanism and its other, in MacNeice's presentation of 
time discussed in Chapter Two, where 'Imaginary' time was seen as a necessary error, 
which MacNeice infused with the knowledge of this error, but a knowledge which could 
not provide any grounds wholly outside this realm of error. It might be best summed up 
in the consciousness of a 'dramatic irony', where a necessary enunciation is inhabited 
by its own inadequacy in the face of this error, and where the subject must play the role 
of both ironizer and ironized. Rejecting a certain environment, that of the bourgeois, 
rejecting the same identity, wanting to 'smash the aquarium' of middle-class 
domesticity, yet always remaining complicit with this identity, neither the priorities of 
liberal nor Marxist positions were finally acceptable. 6 Yet instead of positing a well- 
reasoned golden mean between antinomies, MacNeice entered on a process of rigoroc,! ýg, 
self-inspection and interrogation, culminating in the hopelessly impure perspective of 
Autumn Journal. The 'dramatic' quality of this situation may be understood as a kind of 
performative dimension to this persona: dramatic because certain assumptions and 
assertions ('honesty', 'the struggle') are placed within invisible quotation marks, seen as 
'enunciated' as if by a distanced persona, received as scripted, as written. Ironic 
because we, and the speaker, witness both the distance of the speaker from these 
assertions, and their function in forming the very interior of this subject, constituting its 
value through the contamination of text. Furthermore, we should consider the necessity 
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of such utterances within a particular historical context, the earth compelling, which 
runs parallel with the indeterminacies of this context which will always undermine the 
stabilizing closures of language and the self. 
The Hynes-Longley notion of the thirties as exclusively and most interestingly a 
decade for a more or less straightforward 'empirical' and realist-political writing was 
contrasted at the beginning of this study with that of Cunningham-Bergonzi. This 
second camp, it was seen, conceived the thirties more as a period regulated by a set of 
signs, constructs, systems of signification. The perils of writing in such a context are 
obvious in practice, if not in theory. On the one hand, a intense empiricism which lies 
beyond analysis as construct, on the other the adoption of a communal text, consciously 
or not, to be windily repeated without recognition that it was a received communal text. 
In MacNeice's work this mixing of concerns seems to me to be different. Inevitably, 
MacNeice entered into the communal text of the thirties, indeed the notion of impurity 
might be seen as a variant on the major thirties trope of the frontier: on the border, 
between two worlds, transgression, contamination of and by two worlds. However, the 
attention we have seen in this study to the mediating agents of the self, to history, to 
the construction of the self in social context, the place of representation in this 
construction, of action within the already-written, is hardly the attention of an 'adjunct. 
If adjacent to the terms of the thirties, MacNeice's work forms a rigorOLAS inspection of 
these terms, of this text, which is nevertheless certainly conscious of the ethical and 
historical imperatives behind it. It is this ability to hold. this communal thirties text up to 
inspection, consider it as text, relate it to other signifying systems, to signification in 
itself, and in relation to the subject involved in history that we might read MacNeice's 
most significant contribution to thirties writind. Where MacNeice shared preoccupations 
with fellow thirties writers, he dealt with them on his own terms; where he entered into 
the communal text of the thirties, he did so to open this text to rigoroas inspection. 
This attention to text and signification, part of that which 'invades' the subject 
in history, represented most prominently in this study by the notion Of 'P3r3ble', of the 
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figural, the making of meaning, demonstrates the wider implications of 'writing' in this 
study. This is not mere 'literal' writing of graphic representation (although it of course 
includes this definition), but a condition of the subject, involved in the making of 
meaning, in interaction with meaning which precedes and orientates him/her within 
history. As such, this writing is seen to be radically indeterminate within the impure 
context of history. The seemingly 'autonomous' self is, of necessity, lmmerýed in this 
contaminated and contaminating realm, which is itself open to the indeterminacies of 
history, and of action within history. 
This is an appropriate point to return to the original concern of purity/impurity 
'. form/content that began this study. In view of this notion of impurity, the MacNeice of 
Modern Poetry can be seen to share a similarity with the practitioners of 'Aestheticism' 
in forcing a separation between 'form' and 'content' in a floating autotelicism, or a 
transparent world of experience. The mixing of these categories within an impurity of 
'reference' cannot provide an alternative to this, since it offers form as subordinate, 
merely as a transparent communicative vehicle for this pure experience. Hence, the 
'impurity' of Modern Poetry borrows from the structures of purity which it claims to 
reject. This borrowing is, however, undone in the practice of the poetry, which borrows 
in a different way the category of form, mixing it with content in a way which is 
radically impure. In this sense of impurity, every content is inhabited by form; where 
form might attempt to pass itself off as content, the reverse is not the case. This is not 
then to reverse the previous valorIzAiKoeof form, but to relocate it, as the impurities of 
form and content, each trespassing on the other, are relocated within the impure 
contexts of history, and of the subject in history. It is within these conditions that the 
further impurities of the previously pure terms of 'honesty' and 'integrity' must be 
examined. In making this examination, arguing for both their necessity and the 
conditions of their error, MacNeice made the closest approximation to the values 
associated with these now impure terms. 
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